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CHAPTER 1
Road Map
1.1 People on the Move
Our life changed drastically with the pace of globalisation. Traders travelled far
along the Silk Road through Asian regions, to exchange for exotic goods, culture
and knowledge; cars are assembled in the United States with several important
parts coming from Japan and Germany; the Standard Chartered Bank initiates its
management trainee programmes and hires graduates from all continents; global
news networks such as CNN are broadcasting all events of the world, and have a much
larger range of audience than ever before.
There are countless examples that fit the four basic concepts of globalisation: trade
and transactions, capital and investment movements, migration and movement of
people, and the dissemination of knowledge (International Monetary Fund, 2000).
The swift expansion of transport networks and the prevalence of ICT use have
helped facilitating trade flows, capital flows and knowledge flows in systematic and
organised manners. Labour flows among others are, however, the most complicated
phenomenon to study. On the one hand, labour flows are fundamental to creating a
global economy, and the interplay among trade, capital and knowledge relies heavily
on the mobility of workers (Chang, 1999; Freeman, 2006; Poot and Strutt, 2010).
On the other hand, the complex institutional differences, historical reasons, and
individuals’ diverse socio-demographic characteristics, make the migrant workers’
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choice of destination and job much more uncontrollable (Massey et al., 1993; Poot,
1996). Why do they come? How do they come? Are their skills needed there? Do they
expect to develop new skills and move further?
A solid microeconomic foundation is necessary to model workers’ migration
behaviour. Four seminal studies are worth mentioning. Sjaastad (1962) is the first to
apply human capital theory to understanding migration, where he treats migration
as an investment increasing the productivity of human resources. This cost-benefit
calculation is conceptualised into monetary costs, non-monetary costs, monetary
returns and non-monetary returns. Katz and Stark (1987) further take into account
the information asymmetry in the model. When employers are unable to detect the
ability of potential migrant workers, there would be adverse selection discouraging
high-ability workers to migrate. Later Chiswick (1999) concludes a human-model of
investment in migration, and presents scenarios when the favourable selectivity of
migrant workers would occur. Note that the models in the previous three studies apply
to migrants who mainly move for economic opportunities. Besides the economic
migrant, some people move for ‘non-economic’ reasons, such as tied movers and
refugee migrants. A more sophisticated analysis is provided by Mincer (1978), who
explores the effects of family ties relevant to migration decisions on the probability of
migration, on consequent changes in employment and earnings of family members,
and on family stability.1
Migrants choose their destinations for a variety of reasons. A strand of migration
literature tackles specifically the direction of labour flows and the attractiveness of
regions. To summarise, three dominant factors play a significant role in affecting
the migrants’ choice of destination: the local characteristics of the destination, the
gravity force between origin and destination, and the individual characteristics of
migrants. First and foremost, employment opportunity in the destination is frequently
seen as the most predominant pull factor (Hicks, 1932; Greenwood and Hunt, 1984).
Besides the economic aspect, quality of local governance and good public goods
services also increase regional attractiveness for future residents (Tiebout, 1956;
Glaeser et al., 2001; Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). Equally important is the
1These theoretical studies elaborated here are far from an exhaustive review of the literature.
Though the entry barriers are different for domestic migration and international migration, there is no
theoretical distinction. I refer to Bodvarsson et al. (2015) for a broad review of migration theory.
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value of local natural amenities, such as topographical, water or climate-related
features. It is implicitly incorporated in the wage level and the housing price, and
turns out to be another attractor for incoming migrants (Graves, 1980; Roback, 1982;
Rappaport, 2007; Dorfman et al., 2011; Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer, 2012). Second,
the gravity force between origin and destination includes many terms: high income
differentials, shorter physical distance, closer cultural atmosphere, linguistic proximity,
and larger flows of people between origin and destination. These factors could
increase significantly the migrants’ probability of choosing a specific region or area
(Greenwood, 1975; Bartel, 1989; Epstein and Gang, 2006; Bauer et al., 2007; Fafchamps
and Shilpi, 2013; Adserà, 2015). Third, some individual characteristics affect the
migration pattern. For example, older people have higher preferences for better
weather (Scott, 2010); Young, highly educated households tend to move towards
places with higher quality business environments (Chen and Rosenthal, 2008).
We will now proceed to an intriguing issue, that is of paramount importance to
both migrants themselves and the host society, namely, the migrants’ post-arrival
adjustment. How do they fare? Are they socially integrated?
With regard to economic assimilation, Chiswick’s pioneering study with US census
data shows that the earnings gains of foreign-born men are the greatest in the initial
years upon arrival, tapering off with time in the destination country (Chiswick, 1978).
It initiated an avalanche of subsequent studies on the pattern of immigrants earnings
assimilation in Canada, Australia and some European countries (see, e.g., Bloom
and Gunderson, 1991; Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Chiswick et al., 2005; Izquierdo
et al., 2009; Clark and Lindley, 2009; Algan et al., 2010; Kaushal et al., 2016). The
accumulation of destination-specific human capital, such as post-arrival schooling,
language skill acquisition, and on-the-job training, is seen as the main instrument to
realise earnings growth and occupational mobility.
Nevertheless, social integration of migrants should go hand-in-hand with eco-
nomic assimilation (Tselios et al., 2015a). As Dustmann (1996) briefly puts it, ‘one
should expect that social and economic adjustment are to some extent correlated.’
Social integration involves multidimensional barriers: culture, networks and language.
First, adjustment to a new culture and changes in identity might cause multiple
stresses (Bhugra and Becker, 2005). The current economic approach to cultural
integration is mainly the analysis of individual incentives in forming a new cultural
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identity (Kónya, 2007; Nekby and Rödin, 2010) and in transmitting values and beliefs
across generations (Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001; Kónya, 2005). Second, developing
new networks at the destination facilitates economic adjustment (Edin et al., 2003;
Munshi, 2003; Lancee, 2012a). Migrants usually start developing networks of their
own ethnic group, and further bridge social interaction with the native population
with the passage of time in the destination. Third, overcoming language barriers is an
essential step towards social integration, which not only brings economic benefit but
also increases social welfare (Lazear, 1999; Chiswick and Miller, 2015). Policies aiming
at training migrants’ local language skills are in this context most likely very helpful.
Lastly, and perhaps what the host society is most concerned about, is the short-
term and long-term impact of migration flows. For example, do they fulfill vacancies
which could have been filled by natives with the same labour characteristics, and exert
an income distributional effect (Van Dijk and Folmer, 1986; Greenwood and McDowell,
1986; Lalonde and Topel, 1997; Borjas, 2005; Zorlu and Hartog, 2005; Hartog, 2008)?
What are the impacts on the population composition and the corresponding fiscal
balance (Lee and Miller, 2000; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014)? And do they affect social
cohesion of the host society (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005)? The public continuously
addresses these questions with the aging of early cohorts and the incoming of recent
cohorts.2
Figure 1.1: Niche of Research in the Dissertation
2I refer to Nijkamp et al. (2012) for an exhaustive review of migration impact assessment as a tool
to map out the relevant effects.
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My research on migration in this dissertation is conducted in the niche of migrants’
locational choice and adjustment, with a particular focus on barriers of culture,
networks and language. Figure 1.1 summarises the topics discussed above. In the
next section, I will review some related studies on the three specific topics (culture,
networks and language) in the migration literature, and discuss the current missing
gaps and prospective avenues for research.
1.2 Barriers of Culture, Networks and Language
1.2.1 Culture
The destination countries are a melting pot of people with different cultural back-
grounds. The perspective of assimilation theory has dominated much of the socio-
logical thinking for most of the twentieth century (see, e.g., Gordon, 1964; Sandberg,
1974; Alba and Nee, 1997). The minority group’s adoption of the cultural patterns of
the host society typically comes first and inevitable. Algan et al. (2012) concludes for
some European countries (France, Germany, Switzerland, etc) that immigrants’ values
converge to the local context within a generation.
Nevertheless, the barriers to assimilation more or less preserve migrants’ cul-
tural character over time. With the increasing diversity of origins in contemporary
migrants, more researchers start paying attention to the economic benefits reaped
from distinctive sets of values and beliefs. Ottaviano and Peri (2005) and Suedekum
et al. (2014) both find a positive effect of cultural diversity on local productivity, and
then on wage and employment density of native workers. Ozgen et al. (2013) and
Brunow and Blien (2014) demonstrate positive economic impacts of cultural diversity
on productivity and innovation at firm level. Niebuhr (2010) shows that the difference
in knowledge and capabilities of workers from diverse cultural backgrounds enhance
the performance of regional R&D sectors.3
The policy debate over to what extent the immigrants should adapt to the
local cultural values and beliefs is often tense. The answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is never a
3The type of cultural diversity measured is a decisive factor when the impact on the local economy
is examined (Rodríguez-Pose and Hardy, 2015). See Nijkamp and Poot (2015) and Arribas-Bel et al.
(2016) for a summary and extensive discussion of cultural diversity measurement.
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satisfying remedy for social integration.4 It calls for more research that touches upon
the quantitative measurement of cultural adoption (such as Constant et al., 2009;
Engbersen et al., 2013), and interdisciplinary studies on the subsets of cultural traits or
beliefs to be transmitted and integrated (Hofstede et al., 2010). That is exactly the issue
in Chapter 2, which highlights the measurement of regional cultural composition and
how it further determines the migrants’ destination choice.
1.2.2 Networks
The topic of social networks seems to be quite a full-fledged field in the migration
research. Apart from the role of social interaction in fertility, smoking, crime, etc
(Kohler et al., 2001; Soetevent and Koormen, 2007; Bernasco et al., 2012), economists
and sociologists have conducted especially an avalanche of studies on the importance
of social networks for labour market performance (see, e.g., Rees, 1966; Granovetter,
1974; Lin et al., 1981; Montgomery, 1991; Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Wahba and
Zenou, 2005). Recently, a growing literature emerged, which focuses on the distinction
between the co-ethnic network and the inter-ethnic network for migrants (Putnam,
2000; Munshi, 2003; Kazemipur, 2006; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012; Lancee, 2012b;
Tselios et al., 2015b, 2016). Contact with the natives yields unambiguously positive
returns, because it provides immigrants with information on higher quality job offers
and assistance in assimilation. However, the economic returns of co-ethnic contacts
are less clear-cut. Socializing with co-ethnics provides assistance in job information
and initial settlement. Yet, while embedding into co-ethnic networks enhances ethnic
solidarity, it retards contact with the host society. This may hamper upward economic
mobility.
Still, there is a missing gap in this field. To fully utilise social networks to integrate,
it is necessary to investigate the network formation process. Glaeser (2001) especially
calls for more works on the causes of social capital. ‘Indeed, the weakness of this
research is not in either the theory or the empirical work on the effects of social capital.
The real weakness is the lack of both theory and empirical work focusing on the causes
of social capital. If we are going to change the level of social capital, we must have a
4An interesting finding in Rodríguez-Pose and Von Berlepsch (2015) shows that the economic
legacy of mass migration in the United States is less linked to the national origin of the migrants than to
migrants’ preserved self-selective character.
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coherent model of the formation of social capital and a body of empirical work that
we trust about the formation of norms and networks.’
While Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and Goyal (2000), Brueckner (2006), and
Currarini et al. (2009) model network stability on the basis of cooperative game theory,
few studies have looked at the meso-level determinants of individual social networks,
such as local labour market conditions. If any, Roskruge et al. (2012) tries to explain
individual social capital formation by the local expenditure on social infrastructure;
Zenou (2015) and Sato and Zenou (2015) relate social network formation with local
job-destruction, job-information rate, etc. Against this background, Chapter 3 aims to
fill this gap by employing a job search model to investigate how local labour market
conditions affect the migrants’ decision on social network formation as well as the
location of residence. In addition, Chapter 4 looks at the impact of co-ethnic contacts
and native contacts on immigrants’ economic performance at the destination country.
1.2.3 Language
Language skills are considered as major economic assets for individuals. A widely
accepted fact is that adult male immigrants with a fluent level in the local language
earn a wage premium in the range from 5 % to 35 % (see, e.g., Carliner, 1981;
McManus et al., 1983; Grenier, 1984; Chiswick, 1998; Chiswick and Miller, 2002;
Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003; Budria and Swedberg, 2012; Beckhusen et al., 2013).
A unified methodology in most of the studies is to employ a human capital earnings
function (Mincer, 1974). Two issues lead to biased estimates in the regression:
misclassified language indicators (Dustmann and Van Soest, 2001), and endogeneity
between language and earnings (Chiswick and Miller, 1995). Refined datasets, valid
instruments, and using longitudinal feature of datasets, could all increase the precision
of the estimates. In Chapter 4, this issue is studied in the context of the Netherlands,
and the wage premiums of mastering Dutch language are found to be around 15 %.
Besides, a number of studies looks at foreign language (other than the local
language) skills (Grin, 2001; Fry and Lowell, 2003; Henley and Jones, 2005; Lang
and Siniver, 2009; Christofides and Swidinsky, 2010; Williams, 2011; Ginsburgh and
Prieto-Rodriguez, 2011; Toomet, 2011; Isphording, 2013; Di Paolo and Tansel, 2015;
Stohr, 2015; Chiswick and Miller, 2016). Although acquiring a foreign language skill is
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not compulsory for migrants to integrate, mastering a foreign language skill has its
economic value and is well appreciated in the labour market (European Commission,
2008).
It should be noted, however, that the reward patterns for natives and migrants are
not necessarily the same. Under the circumstance that migrants are not fully fluent
in the local language at the destination, they have to choose which type of human
capital to invest to maximise their future earnings. To disentangle the puzzle, Chapter
5 provides an exhaustive assessment for the economic value of foreign language skills
at work in Europe, and considers the heterogeneous impacts among natives and
migrants.
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation carries out an in-depth research in the role of culture, networks and
language in migration, and the subsequent four interrelated chapters expand on this
in a logical order, as shown in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: The Systematic Order of Subsequent Chapters
Chapter 2 deals with the migrants’ choice of destination, incorporating cultural
gravity force into the locational choice model. It studies migration flows in Europe,
and analyses the impact of cultural composition on regional attractiveness at a NUTS1
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) level. Migrants’ varying preferences
for both cultural diversity and cultural distance are estimated. It is found that cultural
diversity increases regional attractiveness, while the average cultural distance within a
region greatly weakens regional attractiveness.
Chapter 3 studies how migrants’ choose their residential areas and develop social
networks at the time of entering the destination country. It aims to analyse the
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social network formation process in response to local labour market conditions, with
an emphasis on the co-ethnic contact and the contact with the natives. A job and
residential search model is derived and empirically tested for the case of immigrants
in the Netherlands. This study finds that a higher job arrival rate, and a larger wage
difference between the ethnic labour market and the host labour market, both lead to
a stronger co-ethnic network developed, a less strong native network developed, and
the choice of more ethnically concentrated areas. A paradox of economic prosperity
and social integration seems to exist in the sense that immigrants spontaneously
assimilate less into the host society in good times of the economy at the destination
country.
Chapter 4 then investigates how social networks and local language proficiency
facilitate the migrants’ economic assimilation at the destination. It examines the
impacts of social contacts and Dutch language proficiency on adult foreign-born
men’s earnings, employment and occupational status, using longitudinal data on
immigrants in the Netherlands for the years 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002. The main
conclusions are as follows. On average, social contacts and a good mastery of the
Dutch language enhance the immigrants’ economic performances. The effects are
stronger for immigrants with low-skill-transferability than for immigrants with high-
skill-transferability, and are stronger for economic migrants than for non-economic
migrants. Contact with Dutch people and Dutch organisations unambiguously
enhances all aspects of immigrants’ economic performance; however, there is no
evidence for a positive effect of co-ethnic contact on employment status.
Chapter 5 tackles an issue related to Chapter 4, i.e. the economic performance,
but focusing on the effect of foreign language (other than the local language) skills.
It examines the heterogeneous impacts of foreign language use on earnings of both
native-born workers and foreign-born workers, using a longitudinal survey, viz. the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) running from the year 1994 to 2001.
The findings are the following. First, for native-born workers, the use of a foreign
language at work is found to have an unambiguously positive impact on their earnings
(3 % on average). Second, for foreign-born workers, however, the foreign language
use at work is highly complementary to their educational level. Third, with regard to
language types, non-EU official languages are rewarded most; English comes in the
second place; and other EU official languages rank the lowest. This holds for both
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native-born and foreign-born workers. Fourth, the local language in the country of
residence plays a significant role in affecting the foreign-born workers’ choice on the
use of foreign languages and on the use of the mother tongue at work.
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a short summary of this dissertation, and relates its
further policy relevance to the applicability of these conclusions.
CHAPTER 2
Cultural Diversity and Cultural
Distance as Choice Determinants
of Migration Destination5
2.1 Introduction
Economic incentives significantly determine migration flows (Borjas, 1987; Borjas
et al., 1992; Carrington et al., 1996; Chiswick, 1999). Migrants tend to emigrate
to areas with relatively high wages and low moving costs. Apart from economic
concerns, migrants also seem to care about localised social interaction in the receiving
areas. Culturally-diversified areas are often found to be self-perpetuating in attracting
migrants (see, e.g., Florida, 2002; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Olfert and Partridge, 2011;
Bakens et al., 2013)6, which points to the importance of compositional concerns in
location choice.
It should be noted, however, that cultural diversity only partially accounts for
differences in regional attractiveness. Not only the sizes or shares of cultural groups
5This chapter is based on Wang et al. (2016a).
6Other local characteristics and amenities also play significant roles in attracting migrants both in
the US and the European context (Haurin, 1980; Roback, 1982; Glaeser et al., 2001; Scott, 2010; Biagi
et al., 2011; Dorfman et al., 2011; Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer, 2012), including weather, population
density, physical setting, public goods provision, etc.
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matter for migrants’ destination choices, but also the between-group cultural dis-
tances within the area. Consider, for example, the case where region 1 is composed
of 50% Dutch and 50% Germans and region 2 is composed of 50% Dutch and 50%
Turks. The two regions are probably not equally attractive for each migrant, although,
statistically, they exhibit the same level of cultural diversity.7 Therefore, in order to
describe the cultural composition of a specific area, it is necessary to use at least two
indices: ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘cultural distance’. Cultural diversity describes the
compositional profile of diverse or different cultures as opposed to monoculture in a
given area. It is often measured as the probability that two randomly selected persons
from a given area will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group (Mauro, 1995) and
is commonly referred to as the fractionalisation index. The second concept, cultural
distance, describes how dissimilar culture actually is among these groups. It touches
upon the specific cultural traits and characteristics of people in the area concerned.
Similar attitudes and beliefs are usually driven by the collective ‘mental programming’
of people with a similar cultural background (Hofstede et al., 2010), and we therefore
measure these by the quantitative differences in attitudinal survey responses between
the natives and the immigrants within an area. So, cultural diversity is mainly a
quantitative measure, while cultural distance is more a qualitative measure.8
In this chapter we aim to analyse the contribution of cultural composition to
regional attractiveness for international migrants on a European NUTS1 level. We
construct a regional index for average cultural distance (using attitudinal responses),
and compare its contribution to regional attractiveness with that of an index for
regional cultural diversity. From a theoretical perspective, diverse groups of people
make an area attractive because of the accompanying diverse consumer amenities
and complementarities of skills in various sectors of the economy (Ottaviano and Peri,
2005), while a substantially large cultural distance between natives and immigrants
may create misunderstanding and social conflict, thus making an area unattractive
(Caselli and Coleman, 2013). We examine these possible effects by employing an
7Distinctive compositions of norms, values and beliefs endow the two regions with different
compositional amenities. The consequences are shown by Card et al. (2012), who found that
compositional concerns are much more important than economic concerns in shaping natives’ anti-
immigrant attitudes.
8Despite the possible confusion of using ‘cultural’ in both phrases (where cultural diversity
connotes ethno-linguistic classifications and cultural distance connotes values and beliefs), we stick to
this terminology in order to be consistent with the literature.
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equilibrium sorting model proposed by Bayer et al. (2004b). The bottom line is the
following research question: What kind of societal cultural composition within a
region do migrants prefer?
A major assumption is imposed to validate our analysis: freedom of movement.
Migrants derive utility from living in a certain region, and are able to move to that
region with the highest utility rather freely. This ensures the validity of a discrete
choice model. The validity of the assumption is tested by looking at a subsample of
immigrants from the European Union only.
Our main findings from this study are twofold. On the one hand, cultural diversity
enhances regional attractiveness, thus confirming previous research. On the other
hand, a large average cultural distance within a region has a negative impact on
regional attractiveness. In other words, even though culturally diverse areas are very
attractive to potential migrants, this attractivity diminishes if there are substantially
large cultural differences between natives and immigrants in the region concerned.
This conclusion holds especially for European Union (hereafter EU) migrants, who
emigrated from one EU member state to another.9 We also find that migrants are
more likely to move to regions that are geographically close to their countries of
origin and are culturally close to their own cultural backgrounds. However, for
a migrant’s destination choice, cultural proximity is valued almost three times as
much as geographical proximity. Network effects are found to be strong, but have
decreased greatly for migrants from recent years. Our results are robust when we take
into account the possible assimilation of migrants, a different subset of attitudinal
questions, an alternative way to describe cultural composition and the comparability
of the cultural indicators at a certain spatial scale.
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we address the joint incorpo-
ration of cultural diversity and cultural distance in a nested econometric model. To
the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the first attempt to identify the combined
impact of cultural diversity and cultural distance on regional attractiveness. Second,
this chapter operationalises cultural distance by summarizing the responses from
9In this chapter, the range covers EU-27 Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Non-EU migrants are those who migrate to the EU from
countries outside the EU.
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attitudinal survey questions and, subsequently, by using a principal component
analysis to efficiently construct a new index for regional cultural composition. Third,
we employ a new type of instrumental variable in our empirical analysis. Unlike other
culturally-related studies, in which historical and geographical variables are often
used as instruments, we apply artificial instrumental variables.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 initiates a brief
discussion on cultural diversity and cultural distance. In Section 2.3, we discuss the
sorting model used for our empirical analysis and the endogeneity problem to be
tackled. Section 2.4 describes the data set and the variables, and then Section 2.5
presents and interprets the estimation results. Section 2.6 gives the results for different
robustness checks, including those that validate our two main assumptions. All are
found to be in line with our main findings. The final section provides concluding
remarks, and discusses avenues for future research.
2.2 Cultural Diversity and Cultural Distance
Cultural diversity (hereafter denoted as Di v) has generated a large literature in the
recent decade, as summarised by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Nijkamp and
Baycan (2012). It has penetrated gradually into the economic domain, such as urban or
regional growth and local public goods provision. To operationalise cultural diversity,
much of the literature uses an index of fractionalisation to measure cultural diversity,
written as:
Di v j = 1−
∑
i=1
s2i j , i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J , (2.1)
where si j is the share of group i over the total population in a specific region j . Di v is
region-specific, and measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals
from a given area will not belong to the same group.10 In our study, we use this
fractionalisation index to measure cultural diversity and we classify groups by country
of origin. The higher the Di v j index, the more fragmented into groups area j is.
10The measurement of cultural diversity captures more than merely the fractionalisation index. See
Montalvo and Reynal-querol (2005) or Ager and Brückner (2013) for a discussion of polarization; and
Nijkamp and Poot (2015) for an overview of cultural diversity measures, where they consider, in turn,
abundance, dispersion and socio-cultural distance-related measures of diversity.
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To quantify cultural distance, we employ the responses to attitudinal survey
questions from the European Social Survey (ESS). In general, culture is a collective
identity based on certain norms, values and beliefs. This informal yet widely accepted
definition supports the use of attitudinal surveys, because it is the most straightfor-
ward manifestation of people’s perception of norms, values and beliefs. This conforms
with the ESS database, where one of the aims is ‘to monitor and interpret changing
public attitudes and values within Europe’. Furthermore, using attitudinal responses
has a solid theoretical foundation. Individual attitudes are to a large extent shaped
by intrinsic cultural characteristics. Notably, Hofstede et al. (2010) have argued that
similar attitudes and beliefs are driven by the collective ‘mental programming’ of
people with a similar cultural background.11
Immigrants’ self-identities are taken to be two-dimensional: (i) the perception of
the cultural value of one’s country of origin and (ii) the dichotomous perception of
being an immigrant or not. We use two distance measures to make this distinction in
self-identity. First, ‘Bilateral Cultural Distance’ (hereafter denoted as BC D), which is
constructed to measure the cultural distance between a migrant’s own ethnic group i
and the native group in the receiving region j , written as:
BC Di j = |Attitudesi −Attitudes j |, (2.2)
where BC Di j is a between-group measure, involving both origin i and destination j .
Second, ‘Average Cultural Distance’ (hereafter denoted as AC D), which is constructed
as a weighted average value of all cultural distances between every immigrant m and
the native culture in the receiving region j (weights denoted as pm), written as:
AC D j =
∑
m living in j
pm · |Attitudesm −Attitudes j |, (2.3)
where AC D j is a region-specific measure (similar to cultural diversity), describing the
overall cultural proximity level between the natives and the residing immigrants as a
whole.
More details about the ESS data set and how we use attitudinal responses to
construct cultural distance variables will be discussed further in Section 2.4.
11Examples of using indicators of individual values and beliefs to measure culture can be found in
Grief (1994); Tabellini (2010); Tadesse and White (2009); Belot and Ederveen (2012).
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2.3 Empirical Model
The equilibrium sorting model proposed by Bayer et al. (2004b) is the starting point
for our methodological framework. We use it to examine migrants’ heterogeneous
preferences and the contribution of cultural composition to regional attractiveness.12
2.3.1 The equilibrium sorting model
We model a population of migrants, indexed by m = 1, . . . , M . Their countries of birth
are indexed by i = 1, . . . , I and they have to choose a destination from all possible
alternatives, indexed by j = 1, . . . , J . Each migrant maximises her indirect utility
function in choosing destinations:
max
j
Vmi j ,t =αmZj,t−1+γPij,t−1+η j ,t +εmi j ,t . (2.4)
The indirect utility migrant m from country i derives from living in region j at time t
depends firstly on a number of regional characteristics and amenities Zj,t−1 (such as
GDP, unemployment ratio, cultural diversity Di v j , average cultural distance AC D j ,
etc.) observed at time t −1, and secondly, on certain pair-specific information Pij,t−1
(such as bilateral cultural distance BC Di j ) at time t −1. For simplicity, we omit the
time subscript t in the subsequent text.13
The valuation parameter αm is then written as a function of the migrants’ individ-
ual characteristics Xm, including age, gender, education, occupation, etcetera, written
as:
αm =β0+β(Xm−X). (2.5)
The error structure in the indirect utility function is composed of both regional
characteristics η j , which we do not observe14, and individual-specific errors εmi j .
12This differentiated ‘product’ approach is typically referred to as the Berry-Levinsohn-Pakes (BLP)
approach (Berry et al., 1995), and has recently been applied to a number of empirical studies (Murdock,
2006; Klaiber and Phaneuf, 2010; Van Duijn and Rouwendal, 2013; Levkovich and Rouwendal, 2014).
13An underlying assumption is that the migrants choose their destinations with perfect foresight
about the regional information, which is not so hard nowadays with the accessibility to the internet.
14These regional unobserved characteristics (which are observed by the migrants) might include
social tensions, cultural or natural amenities, and specific (regional) institutional settings.
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We rewrite our indirect utility function by substituting equation (2.5) into equation
(2.4):
Vmi j =λ j + (Xm−X)βZj+γPij+εmi j , (2.6)
with
λ j =β0Zj+η j , (2.7)
where we mostly are interested in equation (2.7) as this gives us the valuation for
regional amenities, including cultural composition.
2.3.2 The estimation procedure
The estimation is a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimate equation
(2.6) accordingly as a multinomial logit model with alternative-specific constants,
assuming that the εmi j ’s are distributed as a Type I Extreme Value distribution. The
estimated constants λ j ’s measure a region’s attractiveness. The coefficients β are the
interaction parameters describing heterogeneous preferences for different regional
characteristics and amenities, while the coefficients γ measure the impact of pair-
specific variables Pij. In the second stage, the estimated λ j ’s are further regressed on Zj
as shown in equation (2.7). We have to deal with endogeneity problems in this stage,
since the unobserved regional characteristics (η j ) are very likely to be correlated with
both the regressors (Zj) and regional attractiveness (λ j ). The coefficients β0 are to be
estimated.
In a nutshell, the first stage aims to tease out the heterogeneous preferences of
migrants in choosing destinations, while the second stage is of more interest to us,
because it aims to explain the real contribution of cultural composition to regional
attractiveness using instrumental variables.
Note that it is a hierarchical estimation, where 2SLS (two-stage least squares) takes
place in the second stage of the whole procedure. To avoid the confusion of the
wording ‘two-stage’ or ‘the second stage’, we use the term ‘instrumental variable (IV)
estimation’ throughout the chapter instead of 2SLS. Whenever the phrase ‘two-stage’
or ‘the second stage’ is used, it refers uniquely to the second stage of the estimation
procedure. The procedure of the full estimation is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: The Full Estimation Procedure
2.3.3 Endogeneity and artificial instrumental variables
As previously mentioned, unobserved heterogeneity may cause an estimation bias,
and hence we resort to IV estimation. The compositional amenity we are most
interested in is the AC D index. If, for whatever reason (but not for the AC D index nor
for other observed variables), many immigrants with similar cultural characteristics
choose region j , then our coefficient for the AC D index is biased upwards. The
unobserved characteristics η j ’s then lead to an overestimate of the coefficient βAC D .
Similarly, if unobserved regional characteristics cause migrants with different cultural
characteristics to choose region j , our coefficient for the AC D index is biased
downwards. To solve for this, we instrument the AC D index by using an artificial
instrument—where we argue that our instrument is correlated with the region’s
cultural composition but not directly with its present attractiveness to potential
migrants.
Bayer et al. (2004b), after they have provided in the first stage a precise characteri-
zation of preferences for housing and neighborhood attributes, show how demand for
these attributes varies with households’ income, race, education, and family structure.
In the second stage of their study, housing price itself is the endogenous variable and
they used an artificial instrumental variable to deal with the correlation between price
and unobserved housing and neighbourhood quality.15 The artificial instrument was
computed as the equilibrium price that would clear the housing market in the absence
of the unobserved heterogeneity. In our work, however, an instrument is constructed
by solving for the vector of AC Ds that will clear the ‘market for regions’16, if there
15See also Bayer et al. (2004a) for an application to school quality, and Van Duijn and Rouwendal
(2013) for an application to cultural heritage.
16We consider living in a region is a product to be purchased by migrants, and each migrant only
purchases one unit product with a particular package of regional characteristics and amenities. The
local authorities provide the products in the market by making production decisions on what packages
of characteristics and amenities are to be assembled (Tiebout, 1956; Rosen, 1974).
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were no unobserved heterogeneity. The instrument we use is an artificial constructed
vector AC D∗ solved from the multinomial logit model while forcing the unobserved
heterogeneity η to be zero.
To do so, we first define pim j to be the probability that migrant m chooses region j .
If the freedom of movement assumption is not violated, then the following equalities
have to hold:
POP j =
M∑
m=1
pim j , (2.8)
where POP j denotes the total population of immigrants living in region j observed
in our sample. We now impose that η j is zero and define a new variable AC D∗ as the
instrument for ACD. Now, rewrite equation (2.8) as:
POP j =
∑
m
exp
(
w mj (AC D
∗)
)
∑J
j=1 exp
(
w mj (AC D
∗)
) , for m in j , (2.9)
where w mj is the deterministic part of equation (2.6), with the variable for AC D
replaced by AC D∗. If AC D∗ is the solution for which the equalities (2.9) hold, we
have then found an instrumental variable that is, by definition, uncorrelated with
η j , and should in theory be related to the AC D index. This approach requires an
iterative procedure for both steps. Initial values of βk0 are obtained by estimating
equation (2.7) using OLS, while the initial value of λ j is the predicted value according
to OLS coefficients. The estimates of βk0, λ j , together with all β coefficients from
equation (2.6), are then used to calculate a new AC D∗ in the equalities in equation
(2.9), after imposing η j = 0 for all j . The new vector we have solved is then used as an
instrumental variable for the AC D index in equation (2.7). Theβ0 coefficients are then
updated as 2SLS coefficients. The new values of β0’s and λ j are again inserted into
equation (2.9) in the same way as before. This process is repeated, until the procedure
leads to convergence which yields the artificial instrument AC D∗.
To summarise, the artificial instrumental variable created can be regarded as
the exogenous component of the AC D index (it is by definition independent of
unobserved heterogeneity). Moreover, it should be correlated with the observed
value of AC D . Consequently, it is a plausible instrument to be used in an instrumental
variable estimation. Although cultural diversity is of less interest to us, we use the
same iterative procedure to find an instrument for the Di v index. Therefore, we have
20 Chapter 2. Cultural Diversity versus Cultural Distance
(theoretically) valid instruments for both the AC D and the Di v variable, which are
otherwise most likely to be endogenous in the second-stage estimation.
2.4 Data and Variables
2.4.1 The ESS data set
A full estimation of the model requires three types of data: the individual socio-
demographic characteristics Xm; the regional characteristics and amenities Zj; and
origin-destination specific information Pij. The European Social Survey (ESS) Multi-
level Data is a rich data set that is consistent with our research goals. It is a merged
database that links individuals to their corresponding contextual information, both
regionally and nationally. Round 4 in year 2008 and Round 5 in year 2010 are available
as cross-sectional data, which contain respectively, 56,752 and 50,681 respondents. In
addition, the geodesic distances between countries are provided by VU Geoplaza, and
regional characteristics of sectoral composition are supplemented by the Cambridge
Econometrics database.17
The ESS sample is representative of all persons aged 15 and over (no upper
age limit) within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality,
citizenship or language. There are in total 3,955 first-generation immigrants in ESS
Round 5 survey and 30% of them are EU migrants. Multi-generational natives make up
around 90% of the ESS sample, as is shown in Table 2.1. The immigrants in the sample
are mostly international migrants. Considering the socio-economic assimilation of
the offspring of early immigrants, we treat second-generation immigrants as natives
in the subsequent analysis. We have checked the data that the beliefs and values of
the second-generation group are much closer to those of multi-generational natives
than those of the first-generation group.
We use Round 4 mainly for regional characteristics and cultural composition
measures prior to Round 5. For sorting models, the more aggregate the spatial level
used, the more likely it is that the model suffers from unobserved heterogeneity.
Besides, we focus in this chapter on a concept of culture knitted closely with values
and beliefs, which transcends the notion of country borders. The two reasons
17More details can be found in http://geoplaza.ubvu.vu.nl and http://www.camecon.com/.
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Table 2.1: ESS Sample in Round 5
FG SG MG
immigrants immigrants natives
Country of origin is in the EU 1203 351 45887
Country of origin is outside the EU 2752 488 0
Observations 50681
Notes: FG denotes first-generation. SG denotes second-generation. MG denotes
multi-generational.
Source: ESS Round 5.
above make the analysis at the country level less favorable. We therefore employ
a more disaggregate level NUTS1, where NUTS (the Nomenclature of Territorial Units
for Statistics) is a geocode standard for referencing the administrative divisions of
countries for statistical purposes, developed by the European Union.
Unfortunately, the ESS dataset contains too many missing values at the NUTS2 and
NUTS3 level, which prevents us to employ a more disaggregate spatial level. Obviously,
this has consequences for our results, as we can not draw inferences about the impact
of cultural composition on attractiveness within NUTS1 regions. Differences between
NUTS1 regions can, however, be largely taken into account by using country fixed
effects and regional characteristics.
2.4.2 The first-generation sample and the descriptive statis-
tics
An individual is identified as a first-generation immigrant if both she and her parents
were born outside the country of residence. The analysis is carried out on a sample of
first-generation immigrants from the ESS Round 5, who were at least 18 years old at
the time of immigration. Individuals who were younger than 18 are unlikely to have
made an independent migration decision. We are then left with a sample of 1,935
individuals, who were most likely to make the immigration decision on the basis of
regional attractiveness (other than family ties). The living areas of the sample cover 61
regions at the NUTS1 level in 20 countries in Europe: Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland,
22 Chapter 2. Cultural Diversity versus Cultural Distance
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia.
The individual socio-demographic characteristics Xm include gender, education,
marital status, age when immigrated, years since migration, occupation, income and
household composition. The regional characteristics Zj come from the ESS Round
4 in year 2008 and the Cambridge Eonometrics database. Our analysis includes:
population density; gross enrollment ratio; unemployment ratio; life expectancy;
period growth rates of agriculture; manufacturing and service sectors; institutional
quality; and a capital dummy for each NUTS1 region. Cultural diversity, as one of the
compositional amenities, is measured by the index of fractionalisation, as mentioned
in Section 2.2. The other compositional amenity, AC D, will be further elaborated in
the next subsection.
Descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 show that immigrants mainly work in the
manufacturing and service sectors. Moreover, on average immigrants earn less than
natives.
As pair-specific information Pij, we include three variables in our analysis. To
measure the network effect or ethnic group size effect, we use as the first variable
the diaspora from country i living in region j , where we use the ESS Round 4 data to
calculate the share of different ethnic groups in a specific region. The second variable
is the geodesic distance between country i and region j , where we use the data from
VU Geoplaza to calculate the distance matrix. We add it to measure how geographical
proximity affects migrants’ choice. The third variable is the bilateral cultural distance
(BCD) between country i and region j , which will be further elaborated in the next
subsection as well.
Finally, to make all coefficients comparable, we standardise all variables.
2.4.3 The construction of cultural distance variables
In Section 2.2, we briefly discussed the validity of using attitudinal responses to
quantify cultural distance. The ESS Round 4 collects attitudinal responses from the
survey on the basic values and beliefs of individuals, and these questions cover a wide
range of issues. In our analysis, we chose 116 questions covering individual attitudes
towards (1) the media and social trust; (2) politics; (3) subjective well-being, social
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Table 2.2: Descriptives of Individual Characteristics in ESS Round 5
mean sd min max
Female 0.56 0.50 0 1
Educated years 13.07 4.54 0 40
Married 0.43 0.49 0 1
Age when immigrated 28.74 9.39 18 84
Years since migration 18.54 15.12 0 67
Work in agriculture industry 0.03 0.16 0 1
Work in manufacturing industry 0.23 0.42 0 1
Work in service sector 0.65 0.48 0 1
High income earner 0.27 0.44 0 1
Number of household members 2.80 1.44 1 12
With children 0.48 0.50 0 1
Originally from EU countries 0.42 0.49 0 1
Observations 1935
Notes: Married: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is married, in a
civil partnership, separated (still legally married), or separated (still
in a civil partnership). Work in agriculture industry: dummy equal
to 1 if respondent is working in agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining,
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, mining and related
service activity. Work in manufacturing industry: dummy equal
to 1 if respondent is working in manufacture of food, beverages,
tobacco, textiles, apparel, wood, paper products, fuel, chemical
products, metals, machinery,television, vehicles, furniture, transport
equipment, etc. Work in service sector: dummy equal to 1 if respondent
is working in media, post and telecommunications, finance, insurance,
real estate activities, research, public administration, education,
recreational activities, sales, trade, hotels, restaurants, etc. High
income earner: it is based on self-reported percentiles of the whole
household’s total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from
all sources. Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported their income
above median.
Source: ESS Round 5.
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exclusion, religion, national and ethnic identity; and (4) human values.18 Most of
the questions are phrased as a plain statement. In most cases, the respondents were
asked to indicate the extent of agreement on a scale of 0-10. One illustrative example
is presented below:
‘Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally
trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an
institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.’
A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted to summarise all these
attitudinal responses.19 PCA reduces these responses into fewer principal components
(F1, . . . ,FQ ) for each individual, where Q is the number of components. Q is chosen to
be the number of factors with eigenvalues over 1, and is set to be 29 in our subsequent
analysis for 116 attitudinal responses. These components explain around 60% of the
variation of the responses. PCA is able to reduce multiple dimensions to a great extent,
while it also circumnavigates multicollinearity of the responses.
We use the inverse of the inclusion probabilities as weights p. F m and F n are
both Q×1 vectors, denoting cultural principal components for the migrant indexed
by m, and for the native indexed by n. A representative native in region j has a
principal component F j , which is equal to the weighted average of F n in region j
(F j = ∑n∈ j pn ·F n), while a representative migrant originally from country i has a
principal component F i , which is equal to the weighted average of F m from country i
(F i =∑m∈i pm ·F m).
The bilateral cultural distance BC Di j between the mainstream culture of origin i
and that of region j is then measured by group distances:20
BC Di j = |F i −F j |. (2.10)
18A selection of survey questions and the average responses can be found in Table 2.8 in the
Appendix.
19See Tubadji and Nijkamp (2014) for an example of PCA in cultural impact analysis.
20We use Euclidean distance, e.g.
|F a −F b | =
√
(F a1 −F b1 )2+·· ·+ (F aQ −F bQ )2.
An alternative definition of bilateral cultural distance BC Dm j between migrant’s individual attitudes
and region j ’s mainstream culture has also been tried out, and the results do not differ from BC Di j . In
addition, we tried out a new variable BC Di i ′ , which measures the cultural distance between the culture
of origin i and that of the largest immigrant group i ′. The estimate in the discrete choice model is
insignificant for the variable and thus we dropped this measure in our following analysis for simplicity.
The estimation results are available on request.
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The average cultural distance AC D j for region j needs to take into account every
individual-specific cultural distance existing in the region. Therefore AC D is defined
as a weighted average of cultural distance between F j and every immigrant F m living
in region j , written as:
AC D j =
∑
m living in j
pm · |F m −F j |. (2.11)
Cultural diversity
 < -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 2.5 Std. Dev.
 > 2.5 Std. Dev.
Average cultural distance
 < -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
 > 1.5 Std. Dev.
Figure 2.2: Cultural Diversity and Average Cultural Distance of NUTS1 Regions in
Europe
Figure 2.2 shows the map of cultural diversity and average cultural distance at
the NUTS1 level. The patterns of the two cultural composition indicators are quite
different. There is a sharp contrast between the regions in terms of cultural diversity,
while the changes are much more moderate in terms of AC D. Generally speaking,
Western Europe is much more culturally diversified than Eastern Europe. Ireland
and the Nordic countries are also highly culturally diversified. This fits our common
impression that popular migration destinations are always marked by high cultural
diversity. Regions in the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Ireland, and Madrid score
relatively low in terms of AC D , indicating a more similar cultural composition, while
regions in France, Germany, Greece, and Romania are characterised by a relatively
high AC D .
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It is noteworthy that a fractionalised composition does not necessarily imply a high
degree of AC D as we might initially think. Some regions in Eastern Europe (Romania,
Poland and Bulgaria) have a low degree of cultural diversity, but the cultural distances
between the natives and the immigrants are substantial. Belgium and Switzerland,
however, remain low in AC D, even though they are the most culturally diversified
regions in Europe.
2.5 Estimation Results
This section presents and discusses the results of the sorting model estimation for
the European regions using the above-mentioned ESS data set. The estimation is
implemented in two stages, where the results in the first stage refer to the migrants’
heterogeneous preferences, while the results in the second stage explain how societal
cultural composition contributes to regional attractiveness.
2.5.1 First stage
The first stage of the estimation procedure yields 121 coefficients on terms that interact
with individual characteristics across different regional characteristics21, and also 3
coefficients for the three pair-specific variables (Pij). This permits greater flexibility in
modelling the heterogeneous preferences of migrants. The first stage also addresses
regional attractiveness (the region specific λ) across alternatives and prepares for the
second stage of the estimation.
In the first stage, the heterogeneous preferences for compositional amenities
is of particular interest to us. Table 2.3 reports some significant cross effects of
immigrants and compositional amenities. Younger migrants, earlier cohorts, those
without children and non-EU migrants have a preference for regions with high cultural
diversity compared with their counterparts. The higher the regional ACD is, the less
attractive it is to older migrants, recent cohorts, females, and EU migrants. There is no
large difference in preference for compositional amenities across sectors.
There are three estimates, γ, for the pair-specific variables. First, the ethnic-
specific group size effect has a positive effect in attracting migrants of its own ethnicity.
21There are 11 variables for individual characteristics Xm, and 11 variables for regional characteristics
and amenities Zj, respectively. The full estimation results are in Table 2.9.
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Table 2.3: First-Stage Estimation (Selected Results): β for Interaction Terms, and γ for
Pair-specific Variables
Cultural Diversity Average Cultural Distance
β
Household members 0.043 (0.059) -0.015 (0.160)
Educated years 0.005 (0.054) 0.090 (0.065)
Age when immigrated -0.129∗∗ (0.020) -0.182∗∗ (0.027)
Years since migration 0.321∗∗ (0.098) 0.243∗ (0.109)
Married 0.042 (0.064) -0.010 (0.092)
Manufacturing worker 0.066 (0.115) 0.155 (0.103)
Service sector worker -0.032 (0.119) 0.141 (0.118)
Female -0.066 (0.041) -0.144∗∗ (0.038)
With children -0.145∗ (0.063) -0.037 (0.203)
Originally from EU -0.103+ (0.061) -0.318∗ (0.129)
γ
Network effect 0.286∗∗ (0.085)
Bilateral cultural distance -6.466∗∗ (1.132)
Geodesic distance -1.862∗∗ (0.297)
Observations 1935
Regions 61
Log lik. -5242.028
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Notes: Network effect/diaspora effect is measured by the population share of one’s
own ethnic group in other regions. The reference category of the sector variable is
agricultural worker.
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Second, the smaller the BCD is between a migrant’s host culture and the region’s
mainstream culture, the more likely she will be moving there. Third, being close to a
region greatly increases the probability of moving there. It is noteworthy that cultural
proximity is valued about three times higher than geographical proximity by migrants.
Lambda
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 2.1 Std. Dev.
Figure 2.3: Relative Attractiveness of NUTS1 Regions, Based on the Alternative-specific
Constants λ j
Figure 2.3 shows the relative attractiveness of the NUTS1 regions, based on the
alternative-specific constants λ j . Again, the colours of the Western European areas
are darker than those of the Eastern European areas. Ireland and the Nordic countries
turn out to have a high regional attractiveness. Determining the relationship between
cultural compositional amenities and regional attractiveness is not as simple as merely
comparing Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. Therefore, we need to proceed to the second
stage, and explore the relative contribution of different characteristics and amenities
to regional attractiveness λ j .
2.5.2 Second stage
The second stage of the estimation procedure is presented in Table 2.4. The de-
pendent variable is obtained from the first stage as alternative-specific constants
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Table 2.4: Second-Stage Estimation: β0 for Regional Characteristics and Amenities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Population density -0.216 -0.281+ -0.071 -0.247∗ -0.868 -0.662+
(0.156) (0.165) (0.323) (0.119) (0.668) (0.381)
Gross enrollment ratio 0.217 0.598∗∗ 0.059 0.554∗∗ -0.039 0.220
(0.156) (0.166) (0.170) (0.156) (0.213) (0.225)
Unemployment -0.325∗ -0.270 -0.313 -0.291∗ -0.118 -0.502∗
(0.142) (0.163) (0.277) (0.138) (0.211) (0.227)
Life expectancy 0.136 -0.371 0.345 -0.369 0.003 -0.969∗
(0.355) (0.349) (0.399) (0.252) (0.474) (0.408)
Growth of Agri. 0.313 0.405∗∗ 0.443+ 0.443∗∗ 0.633∗ 0.669∗∗
(0.231) (0.132) (0.232) (0.115) (0.283) (0.231)
Growth of Manu. 0.166 -0.235 0.130 -0.225 -0.115 -0.430
(0.128) (0.182) (0.159) (0.139) (0.273) (0.283)
Growth of Ser. 0.148 0.091 0.057 0.073 -0.181 -0.209
(0.209) (0.158) (0.334) (0.123) (0.380) (0.228)
Capital dummy 0.425∗ 0.112 0.300+ 0.105 0.047 0.188
(0.154) (0.140) (0.178) (0.104) (0.217) (0.183)
Institutional quality 0.394 0.184 0.139 0.234 -0.190 -0.151
(0.312) (0.292) (0.448) (0.186) (0.535) (0.513)
Cultural diversity 0.298+ 0.297∗ 0.143 0.264∗ 1.666∗ 1.161∗
(0.154) (0.143) (0.217) (0.108) (0.843) (0.518)
Average cultural distance -0.481∗∗ -0.295∗ -1.503∗∗ -0.439∗ -1.748∗∗ -0.785∗
(0.085) (0.112) (0.485) (0.187) (0.607) (0.324)
Constant -0.327+ 0.724∗ -0.327∗ -0.327∗
(0.174) (0.301) (0.133) (0.162)
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61
R2 0.711 0.953 0.361 0.838 -0.308 0.424
Country fixed effect N Y N Y N Y
Div instrumented - - N N Y Y
ACD instrumented - - Y Y Y Y
F-test of excluded instruments
For AC D - - 8.28 3.22 5.80 2.48
For Di v - - - - 9.27 2.91
Underidentification test - - Reject Reject Reject Reject
Weak identification test - - Reject Reject Reject Reject
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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(λ), which imply regional attractiveness. The regressors are regional characteristics
and amenities: population density; gross enrollment ratio; unemployment; life
expectancy; institutional quality; capital, annual growth of each sector; cultural
diversity; and average cultural distance. The OLS results in columns(1) and (2)
show the positive impact of cultural diversity and the negative impact of average
cultural distance. The order of magnitude becomes slightly lower when we control
for country fixed effects, but the estimates still remain significant. In the following
specifications, we deal with unobserved heterogeneity as discussed in Section 2.3
and use our artificial instrumental variables. In columns (3) and (4), the artificial
instrumental variable alone performs well, as shown in the diagnostic statistics.
The F-test statistics in the auxiliary regression are 8.28, implying a high level of
relevance. The instrument, which is the equilibrium AC D value, is, by definition,
orthogonal to unobserved heterogeneity but relevant to the observed AC D in reality.
Interestingly, the negative impact of average cultural distance becomes stronger in
both specifications compared with the OLS estimates. Columns (5) and (6), where
both Di v and AC D are instrumented, seem to be qualitatively similar to columns (3)
and (4).22
In all specifications, the two indicators of cultural composition are considered
as endogenous variables to be instrumented. Ottaviano and Peri (2005) and some
subsequent studies have used historical population share information and geography
(distance to gateway cities, etc.) as instruments.23 Our artificial instrument variables
for cultural composition work at least as good as the instruments used in previous
research. Other regional variables are also possibly endogenous, but only in the long
run. Most of the economic indicators are held invariant over a short period of time,
and we therefore take these as exogenous controls.
In general, the order of magnitude of the AC D index increases in the IV estimation
compared with the OLS estimation. Migrants appear to sort into the same region due
22We did the second stage estimation for 41 regions in the western Europe, where the estimate for
cultural diversity is insignificant and the estimate for average cultural distance is significantly negative.
For the eastern Europe and the Scandinavian countries, there are too few observations for us to do the
regression separately.
23We also tried traditional instrumental variables in the analysis, e.g. geographical features of
regions as in Monfort (2009). The instruments were less strongly correlated with the two indicators of
cultural composition with less significant but qualitatively similar results. The estimation results are
available on request.
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to unobserved heterogeneity, and AC D matters even more for regional attractiveness
when we have controlled for sorting. Given a certain level of cultural diversity, a rela-
tively homogeneous cultural composition is a powerful attractor for future migrants.
The policy implication is clear. ‘Civic integration’ and ‘diversity of ethnic groups’
are not necessarily at odds with each other. Both of them are beneficial for regions
to increase their attractiveness. Clearly, this finding suggests that an immigration
department might seek to enhance the immigrants’ learning of the official language
and their acknowledgment of the host country society’s basic norms and values. On
the other hand, promoting educational penetration among immigrants could be a
policy instrument to promote the immigrants’ social assimilation. Cameron et al.
(2012) do indeed show that the more education received, the more the immigrants
behave like the natives.
Specifications (2), (4) and (6) allow for country fixed effects, mainly to control
for size differences of NUTS1 regions across countries, but as well to control partly
for specific attractiveness of countries for migrants. Our estimates remain robust,
although the impact of AC D becomes smaller when controlling for country-specific
variation in regional attractiveness.
Our results are in line with the findings by Saiz and Wachter (2011) and Card et al.
(2012) who find that compositional concerns are more important than economic
concerns. Immigration reshapes the composition of local population to a great extent,
and this has gradually raised an issue noticed by both natives and immigrants. Cultural
diversity is indeed conducive to migration, yet may be accompanied by more social
tensions if natives and immigrants are too dissimilar in culture. Our results show, from
a migrants’ perspective, that regions are then indeed becoming more unattractive.
2.5.3 Language
So far, we have not considered any language-related information. But language is
a substantial factor in the choice of migration destination (Fafchamps and Shilpi,
2013), especially in the multilingual European context—both within countries and
within some regions. It is quite common for a European to speak one or two languages
other than her mother tongue. We created a language dummy, which equals 1 if the
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respondent can speak the language of the receiving areas. The empirical analysis is
done at a subsample of EU migrants.24
Table 2.5: A Summary of Estimation Results for EU Subsample
First Stage: γ
Network effect 0.216 (0.174)
Bilateral cultural distance 0.346+ (0.183)
Geodesic distance -0.354∗ (0.175)
Language 1.138∗∗ (0.077)
Second Stage: β0
Cultural diversity 2.917∗∗ (0.981)
Average cultural distance -1.957∗ (0.893)
Observations 825
Regions 55
Standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are
clustered on the country level.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Notes: Network effect/diaspora effect is measured by the
population share of one’s own ethnic group in other regions.
Language variable is a dummy which equals 1 if respondent
can speak the language of the receiving areas and 0 otherwise.
The second stage result is obtained from the specification
with both cultural diversity and average cultural distance
instrumented.
The regressions for the EU sample also test the validity of the freedom of movement
assumption, because they face largely similar immigration policies and political
environments. In the choice of migration destination, the potential set of regions
available to migrants differs due to legal barriers for migration and migration costs
(e.g. visa application). This ensures the homogeneity of the choice set to some extent.
55 NUTS1 regions are analysed in this specification.
24An estimation of a discrete choice model requires variation within each individual’s choice set.
The language dummy is quite unlikely to vary for non-EU migrants since most of its values are equal to
0. Therefore, we drop non-EU migrants for this extension.
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In the first stage, the estimates for the heterogeneous preferencesβ’s do not change
much, but the estimates for the γ’s do change. Table 2.5 shows language as a positive
pulling factor to attract migrants. The sign of BCD flips from negative to positive,
implying that the language dummy greatly absorbs the effect of cultural-related
variables. The network effect is not strong for EU migrants. The effect of geodesic
distance is still significantly negative, but of a much smaller order of magnitude. In the
second stage, the estimates for the β0’s are consistent with those for the whole sample,
with higher orders of magnitudes. EU migrants seem to be especially concerned
about regional composition amenities, and the AC D turns out to be a crucial factor in
contributing to regional attractiveness.
2.5.4 Spatial extension
Finally, we extend our model by considering the possible presence of spatial auto-
correlation: namely, that the impact of the cultural environment can possibly extend
over geographical boundaries. Thus, a region could generally be regarded as more
attractive when being close to another attractive region and migrants might therefore
choose to live close to a region which has their desired societal cultural composition.
To take into account the possibility that the attractiveness of a specific region may
be partially affected by its surrounding regions, the baseline model is extended by
including the neighbouring regions’ attractiveness λ, weighted by a contiguity matrix
W. We now utilise a spatial autoregressive model (SAR: Anselin, 1988),
λ= ρWλ+βZ+u (2.12)
In our spatial econometric specifications, 61 regions at the NUTS1 level from
20 countries are considered. The spatial-weighting matrix contains 5 island areas:
Estonia (EE0), Ireland (IE0), Canary Islands in Spain (ES7), Cyprus (CY0) and Aegean
Islands, Crete in Greece (GR4). As can be seen in Table 2.6, the estimates for Di v and
AC D still remain significant at the 0.05 level, consistent with our main findings in
Table 2.4. In columns (1) and (2), the socio-cultural composition can exert a sufficient
impact on neighboring regions. When allowing for both country fixed and regional
dependence in column (3) in Table 2.6, our results still hold. However, both Di v
and AC D have smaller values compared with those in column (6) in Table 2.4. Thus,
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Table 2.6: Spatial Autoregressive Model
(1) (2) (3)
λ λ λ
Population density -0.229 -0.366∗ -0.280∗∗
(0.162) (0.185) (0.100)
Gross enrollment ratio 0.193+ 0.158 0.599∗∗
(0.117) (0.124) (0.071)
Unemployment -0.222 -0.194 -0.275∗∗
(0.142) (0.151) (0.106)
Life expectancy 0.177 0.130 -0.377
(0.183) (0.197) (0.237)
Growth of Agr. 0.271∗ 0.329∗ 0.413∗∗
(0.125) (0.132) (0.090)
Growth of Manu. 0.070 0.029 -0.235∗
(0.161) (0.171) (0.106)
Growth of Ser. 0.168 0.108 0.098
(0.147) (0.156) (0.130)
Capital dummy 0.475∗∗ 0.405∗∗ 0.104
(0.140) (0.150) (0.101)
Institutional stability 0.260 0.181 0.187
(0.171) (0.181) (0.180)
Cultural diversity 0.244 0.531∗ 0.301∗∗
(0.152) (0.209) (0.100)
Average cultural distance -0.533∗∗ -0.697∗∗ -0.291∗∗
(0.147) (0.151) (0.055)
Constant -0.222∗ -0.234∗ 0.727∗∗
(0.112) (0.118) (0.253)
ρ 0.342∗ 0.302∗ -0.026
(0.137) (0.141) (0.100)
Observations 61 61 61
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
Notes: We also ran the regressions with the inverse-distance
matrix. The results are still the same, except for insignificant
spatial autocorrelation.
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the impact of the socio-cultural composition is clearly diluted by allowing for the
neighbouring regions’ attractiveness.
In column (3), ρ becomes insignificant in the fixed effect specification, indicating
that the impact of the socio-cultural composition is more affected by spatial het-
erogeneity than by spatial auto-correlation. Regional attractiveness seems to hinge
heavily upon countries’ institutional settings.
2.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, some further checks are made to validate our main findings. Four
issues are of particular interest to us. First, does the date of collecting respondents’
attitudinal responses matter for the result? Second, how valid is the constructed AC D
index in our analysis and is the result subject to the selection of the cultural variables?
Third, how can we adjust for between-group cultural distances among immigrants?
Fourth, Is NUTS1 an appropriate spatial scale for cultural composition measures?
Since a cross-sectional data set is used for the empirical analysis, these attitudinal
answers in the ESS Round 4 were not collected at the time of the migration decision.25
If migrants’ values and beliefs converge to the regional mainstream culture over the
years, the true AC D index should be much larger due to assimilation. This is an
important problem, because around 60% of the migrants in our sample immigrated
over 10 years ago. To minimise the assimilation effect to the least possible extent
while still preserving sufficient individuals in the sample, we selected a subsample of
migrants who have immigrated in the years 2000–2010.
The estimation is implemented on a subsample of 825 recent migrants in 55 NUTS1
regions. In the first stage, the ethnic group size effect turns out to be insignificant,
but cultural proximity and geographical proximity still matter. It is quite intuitive
that earlier migrants (from, say, the 1990s or earlier) rely heavily on the ethnic
network, while recent migrants rely relatively less on ethnic networks. We employ the
specification in which we control for country fixed effects, and use the two artificial
instruments in the second stage. The estimates for both Di v and AC D keep the same
25This issue also applies to other regional characteristics. Since more of them remain relatively
invariant over time (e.g., sectoral growth), we focus only on the AC D variable which is most likely to
bias the results.
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signs, and the estimate for Di v increases. Seemingly, cultural diversity is attractive to
recent migrants, while average cultural distance is still taken into account by them.
We now proceed to the second issue. A subset of attitudinal responses is chosen
to validate the constructed AC D index. The advantage of the ESS is the richness of
its information that provides a quantitative description of cultural distances between
individuals. In the main regression, we used all attitudes related to culture. In doing
so, we focus more on cultural differences among individuals, yet less on mapping the
attitudes to certain cultural qualities. However, in previous cultural-related literature
(Tabellini, 2010; Grief, 1994; Tadesse and White, 2009), researchers are more specific
in choosing cultural-specific questions that embody certain cultural qualities.
Trust, control, respect, and obedience are four features that have been directly
used before to proxy culture. We chose the related questions from the ESS that
reveal attitudes to these features. As is shown in Table 2.7, natives and immigrants
differ greatly in terms of the four features except with respect to obedience. The new
AC D index still has significant variation. We repeat our previous regressions. The
IV estimates for Di v and AC D keep the same signs as the main findings, but both
have a lower order of magnitude, respectively 0.40 and −0.33. The change should
be attributed to a smaller variation of the new AC D index, since fewer attitudinal
questions were selected. The cultural difference is weakened in this scenario, so it has
a much more moderate effect on regional attractiveness.
To tackle the third issue, we replace the AC D index with the mean variation
of attitudes principal components in a specific region. Instead of focusing on the
distinction of the native group and the immigrant group, this crude measure takes
into account every individual’s attitudes (including those of the natives) regardless of
the country of origin. This measure quantifies the degree of heterogeneity within a
society and yields similar results as column (5) and (6) in Table 2.4.
As for the fourth issue, the computation of the cultural indicators at the NUTS1
level leads to measures on very different size or density of an area. To make these
measures more comparable, we chose a subset of 41 non-capital regions to run the
regressions in the second stage. Those NUTS1 regions containing capital cities are
excluded, since capital cities are often especially attractive with much smaller area
size and higher population density.26 In the IV estimation, the coefficients for AC D is
26There are only 20 NUTS1 regions that contains a capital city. We have too few observations to run
the regression for this subsample.
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Table 2.7: A Subset of ESS Attitudinal Responses
Natives Immigrants
mean mean t-test
1. Most people can be trusted
or you can’t be too careful (1-10)
4.68 5.01 -0.33∗∗∗
2. Important to make own
decisions and be free (1-6)
2.27 2.17 0.10∗∗∗
3. Important to help people
and care for others’ well-being (1-6)
2.27 2.15 0.12∗∗∗
4. Important to do what is
told and follow rules (1-6)
3.01 3.02 -0.01
Observations 51617 4904
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Notes: The immigrants here refer to the first-generation immigrants.
The second-generation immigrants are treated as natives.
Source: ESS questionnaires in Round 4.
significant with a magnitude of −0.98, when controlling for country fixed effects.
In summary, our main results are robust, when we take into account the possible
assimilation of migrants, the selection of attitudinal responses, and an alternative way
to describe cultural composition. First, the timing issue of responses collected does
not weaken our main finding. Using attitudinal responses in the ESS Round 4 in year
2008, we might underestimate the true AC D index at the time of their immigration.
When we carry out the analysis with the subsample of migrants in the most recent
decade, the conclusion remains relatively robust. Second, in accordance with the
previous literature, we try to map cultural qualities to these attitudinal responses.
Though the new constructed AC D index has lower variation, it still leads to significant
results with more moderate estimates. Third, to correct for between-group distances
among immigrants, we tried a crude measure that takes into account every individual’s
attitudinal responses. Fourth, we ran the regressions for a subset of non-capital regions
to make the cultural indicators more comparable. The results are consistent with the
main analysis.
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2.7 Concluding Remarks
Our research has investigated whether migrants are attracted by a region’s socio-
cultural composition. We focused primarily on the impact of cultural distance.
Theoretically, its impact is ambiguous at first sight. On the one hand, a large cultural
distance enriches societal norms, values and beliefs, and people might perceive
large average cultural distance as a positive amenity. On the other hand, these
wide cultural gaps between natives and immigrants may breed miscommunication,
misunderstandings, and social conflict.
By studying a sample of 1,935 first-generation immigrants above 18 years old
from the European Social Survey Round 5, we first looked at how individuals made
their migration destination choice on the basis of regional characteristics and societal
cultural compositions. In general, migrants prefer to move to regions with a cultural
background similar to themselves, and this holds especially for EU migrants. Younger
migrants have a higher tolerance for regional average cultural distance than older
migrants. We also find that migrants are more likely to choose regions geographically
close to their country of origin. The ethnic group size effect is an important factor for
the earlier generation of migrants, and non-EU migrants are influenced by it much
more than EU migrants.
In the second stage, we compared the attractiveness of 61 regions at the NUTS1
level in 20 European countries, and identified the contribution of cultural diversity
and average cultural distance to regional attractiveness. We found a significant and
robust negative correlation between average cultural distance and attractiveness,
while cultural diversity has a positive impact, as confirmed by previous studies. These
impacts can extend outside the local area and increase (or decrease) neighbouring
regions’ attractiveness. These results are robust, when we take into account the
possible assimilation of migrants, a subset of attitudinal questions, an alternative way
to describe cultural composition and the comparability of the cultural indicators at a
certain spatial scale.
Although we have adopted country fixed effects in our second stage to control
for size differences in NUTS1 regions across countries and various other regional
characteristics to control for differences between NUTS1 regions, there could still
be considerable heterogeneity within NUTS1 regions; most notably with respect to
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our cultural variables. There is evidence that neighborhoods within diverse cities or
regions thrive better when they are more homogeneous in norms and values (Neal and
Neal, 2014). If so, then our average cultural distance estimate is an underestimation
(in an absolute sense), if immigrants specifically value lower average cultural distances
at more disaggregate spatial levels. On the other hand, the literature shows that a
positive impact of cultural diversity is typically found on more aggregate levels (cities
and regions) while on a neighborhood or even street level often insignificant or even
negative effects can be found (see, e.g. Bakens et al., 2013). To ideally disentangle
these effects one needs to not only have more detailed (neighborhood) data, but one
also needs to account for the various appropriate spatial levels. The latter is typically
done in a multilevel analysis, although these are quite difficult to combine with an IV
approach.
The country fixed effects control as well for country-specific variation in regional
attractiveness, but not for specific country of origin and destination combinations
(that might arise, e.g., because of historical reasons). Unfortunately, for data limi-
tations it is not possible to control for this, so it might be that the average cultural
distance is influenced by such origin and destination combinations. However, we
have controlled for network effects and the results are robust for subsamples of EU
migrants and migrants from the last decade, so the possible bias should be relatively
small.
The cultural composition of a region or city matters. The migrants not only
perceive the bilateral cultural distance between the origin country and the destination,
but also care about the average cultural distance between the native group and the
immigrant group at the destination. It was found that migrants choose destinations
with the cultural atmosphere closer to their own cultural background, and are attracted
to regions with high level of cultural diversity (in terms of diversified ethnic groups)
and low level of average cultural distance between the natives and the immigrants.
From a policy perspective, given the premise that local authorities would like to
attract more migrants, it seems to be plausible to enhance cultural integration
and assimilation as a marginal attraction force. This is not necessarily opposed to
increasing cultural diversity, because diversity only refers to the proportion of people
from different ethnicities. The thrust of integration is to narrow the cultural distance
between immigrants and the host society, which could be achieved by two channels.
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One is to make immigrants know a country’s social norms, principles, and institutions,
and the other is to encourage the natives to understand the immigrants more. Not
only do the immigrants who already reside within a region then derive higher utilities,
but also do future incoming immigrants.
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Appendix
Table 2.8: ESS Attitudinal Responses
Natives Immigrants
Mean Mean t-test
Media and Social Trust
TV watching, total time (0-7) 4.43 4.33 0.10∗∗
Radio listening, total time (0-7) 2.79 2.48 0.31∗∗∗
Newspaper reading, total time (0-7) 1.31 1.30 0.01
Most people can be trusted
(0-10,10 denotes ‘high trust’)
4.68 5.02 -0.34∗∗∗
Most of the time people helpful (0-10) 4.56 4.86 -0.30∗∗∗
Politics
How interested in politics
(1-4, 1 denotes ‘very interested’)
2.64 2.59 0.05∗∗∗
Trust in the country’s parliament (0-10) 4.21 4.49 -0.29∗∗∗
Trust in the legal system (0-10) 4.82 5.27 -0.45∗∗∗
Trust in the police (0-10) 5.50 5.64 -0.15∗∗∗
Trust in political parties (0-10) 3.33 3.72 -0.39∗∗∗
Feel closer to a particular party (1,yes;2,no) 1.50 1.58 -0.08∗∗∗
How satisfied with life as a whole (0-10) 6.55 6.54 0.01
Gays and lesbians free to live life
as they wish (1-5)
2.45 2.52 -0.07∗∗∗
Allow many immigrants of different race/ethnic
group from majority (1-4)
2.56 2.35 0.212∗∗∗
Immigration bad or good for country’s economy
(0-10, 10 denotes ‘good’)
4.76 5.82 -1.06∗∗∗
Country’s cultural life enriched by immigrants
(0-10, 10 denotes ‘agree strongly’)
5.30 6.29 -0.99∗∗∗
Subjective Well-Being, Social Exclusion, and Religion
How happy are you (0-10) 6.93 7.00 -0.07∗
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How often socially meet with friends, relatives
or colleagues (1-7, 1 denotes ‘never’)
4.85 4.72 0.127∗∗∗
Anyone with whom to discuss intimate
and personal matters with (1, yes; 2, no)
1.13 1.17 -0.04∗∗∗
Take part in social activities compared to
others of same age
(1-5,5 denotes ‘much more than most’)
2.70 2.56 0.15∗∗∗
How religious are you (0-10) 4.87 5.13 -0.25∗∗∗
Human Values
Important to be creative
(1-6, 1 denotes ‘important’)
2.65 2.60 0.05∗
Important that people are treated equally (1-6) 2.15 2.04 0.11∗∗∗
Important to try new and different things(1-6) 3.00 2.93 0.07∗∗
Important to follow rules (1-6) 3.02 2.97 0.04
Important to be humble and modest (1-6) 2.76 2.60 0.16∗∗∗
Important to have a good time (1-6) 2.99 2.94 0.05∗
Important to make own decisions (1-6) 2.27 2.18 0.09∗∗∗
Important to help people and care for others(1-6) 2.27 2.15 0.12∗∗∗
Important to behave properly (1-6) 2.61 2.49 0.11∗∗∗
Important to get respect from others (1-6) 3.10 2.90 0.20∗∗∗
Important to be loyal to friends (1-6) 2.03 1.97 0.07∗∗∗
Important to follow traditions and customs (1-6) 2.63 2.57 0.06∗∗
Observations 52437 4107
Notes: In this table, the second-generation immigrants are treated as natives.
Source: ESS questionnaires in Round 4.
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CHAPTER 3
A Paradox of Economic Prosperity
and Social Integration?27
3.1 Introduction
Currently, it is estimated that there are 232 million international migrants, and this
number is expected to rise to 405 million by 2050 (UN statistics). Recently with the
massive inflow of the asylum seekers to Europe, social integration is becoming one
of the main challenges for immigrant-receiving countries. The ethnic composition
of immigrant’s social network is of the primary interest due to its heterogeneous
effects on the economic performance (Lancee, 2010; Kanas et al., 2012; Chiswick
and Wang, 2016). The first type of social network is the one developed among the
co-ethnic group. Upon arrival in a new country, an immigrant usually chooses the
location where the ethnic network is relatively dense. Ethnic communities are often
able to provide sufficient help in immigrants’ initial settlement and also in providing
job information (Chiswick and Miller, 2004; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012). However,
another type of social network is of equal importance to immigrants if they want to
make headway on the labour market, that is, contact with the native population in
the destination country. The natives would be capable of providing the immigrants
27This chapter is based on Wang (2016).
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with job information of higher quality, as they are more informed and familiar with
the local labour market (Lancee, 2012b; Iosifides et al., 2007; Kazemipur, 2006).28
This chapter aims to analyse immigrants’ social network formation in relation to
the local labour market conditions. The main findings are that a higher job arrival
rate, and a larger wage difference between the ethnic labour market and the host
labour market, both lead to more co-ethnic network developed, less native network
developed, and the choice of more ethnically concentrated areas. There seems to be a
paradox of economic prosperity and social integration in the sense that immigrants
spontaneously assimilate less into host society in good times of the economy at the
destination country.
This study departs from an avalanche of literature on social network formation (see,
e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000; Brueckner, 2006; Currarini et al.,
2009), as it focues on the meso-level determinants of individual social interaction,
more specifically, the local labour market conditions.29 It investigates particularly
the consequences of local labour market on individual time spent with co-ethnic
networks and with native networks. To the best of my knowledge, Zenou (2015) and
Sato and Zenou (2015) are the only two studies that tackle the similar research issue.
It was found that when job-destruction rate or the job-information rate increases,
workers choose to rely more on their weak ties in order to find a job. While their scope
is aimed at general urbanites, this chapter is targeted only to the immigrant group.
I assume a division of labour markets for immigrants: ethnic labour market and
host labour market.30 A job and residential search model is developed for immigrants,
and is embedded with two types of social networks. An immigrant faces the trade-off
between psychic benefits from living with co-ethnic peers and better job opportunities.
The hypotheses derived from the theoretical model are then tested with a combined
28There are various terms expressing similar meanings. Take some for example, ‘homophily’
and ‘heterophily’ (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954); ‘strong ties’ and ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973);
‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ (Putnam, 2000; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000); and ‘intragroup interaction’
and ‘intergroup interaction’ (Martí and Zenou, 2009).
29Individual socio-demographic characteristics such as age (Glaeser et al., 2002), education (Huang
et al., 2009; Martinovic et al., 2009), family composition (Roskruge et al., 2013b), and home ownership
(DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Roskruge et al., 2013a) are frequently discussed as the determinants
of individual social capital accumulation. Roskruge et al. (2012) is one exception that tries to explain
individual social capital formation using meso-level determinants.
30This division is analogous to, but not entirely the same with the dual market segmentation in
Reich et al. (1973); Bulow and Summers (1986). More details will follow in Section 3.2.
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data set. The data are from the Dutch survey ‘Social Position and Use of Public
Facilities by Immigrants’ (SPVA), which is a large-scale, cross-sectional survey of the
four largest non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands: Turks, Moroccans,
Surinamese, and Antilleans. It contains rich information on immigrants’ socio-
economic characteristics and social contact variables. The data are merged with
the labour market variables of immigrants’ first job search year at the provincial level.
The association between network composition and its determinants is tested using
the structural-form specification.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents a
theoretical model where comparative statics are derived for labour market conditions
and individual characteristics. In Section 3.3, the implications of the model are
empirically tested. The final section provides concluding remarks, and discusses
avenues for future research.
3.2 A Theoretical Model
The theoretical framework is based on a standard job search model with an endoge-
nous network intensity (see, e.g., Mortensen, 1986; Montgomery, 1992; Van Den Berg
and Van Der Klaauw, 2006; Goel and Lang, 2009). Some major assumptions are made
in the model. First, immigrants are assumed to be unemployed at the time of entering
the destination country.31 Then they make decisions on the choice of residential areas
and on the time spent with co-ethnic networks and native networks. In consideration
of the local labour market conditions, the immigrants choose the optimal ethnic
concentration level and social interaction level to maximise their utility. Second, I
assume a division of the labour markets for immigrants: ethnic labour market and host
labour market. The ethnic labour market includes mainly elementary jobs. The wages
are low and not much effort is required. The host labour market provides high-wage
jobs and associated job ladders. Access to the two markets differs by types of social
networks, where the co-ethnic network facilitates the spread of job information in the
ethnic labour market, and the native network leads to the information about better
job offers in the host labour market. The ethnic labour market and the host labour
31It was reported that 58% of the immigrants arrive in the Netherlands without having a definite job.
(Source: Dutch survey ‘Social Position and Use of Public Facilities by Immigrants’)
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market give different economic incentives for immigrants to develop social network,
and they need to allocate time between co-ethnic networks and native networks to
gain the highest utilities. Third, I assume that if a job offer is accepted, the worker
does not keep it forever. Jobs end for some exogenous reason.
3.2.1 A job search model
Consider an unemployed immigrant searching for a job. The unemployment benefit is
b. The individual can search through either co-ethnic contacts (for the ethnic labour
market) or native contacts (for the host labour market). Every individual allocates
her social time between the co-ethnic group and the native group, where the time
constraint is normalised to 1. An amount of time s is devoted to the co-ethnic network,
and 1− s is devoted to the native network. For simplicity, co-ethnic network incurs no
cost, and native network incurs cost β. Job offers arrive at the immigrant according to
a Poisson process, with rate sα1 for the ethnic labour market and (1− s)α2 for the host
labour market. A job offer is characterised by a random draw from contact-specific
wage offer distributions, F1 for the ethnic labour market, or F2 for the host labour
market. w 1 and w 1, and w 2 and w 2 are, respectively, the lower bound and upper
bound for the two wage distributions. The exogenous layoff rate is δ, and is the same
for both markets.
e refers to the level of ethnic concentration in a residential area. On the one hand,
ethnic concentration e generates a significant psychic benefit for immigrants, and it
compensates for the potential wage gap between the ethnic labour market and the
host labour market. It yields a psychic benefit R(s,e), with Re > 0, Rs > 0, and Res > 0.
On the other hand, living in an ethnic enclave weakens the efficiency of searching for
higher-paid jobs in the host labour market because of limited exposure to the natives.
Therefore, an efficiency function G(e) ∈ [0,1] is introduced. G(0)= 1 and G ′ < 0 hold.
An unemployed immigrant who has just newly arrived derives utility as follows:
rU =b+R(s,e)+ sα1
∫ w1
0
max[W (w)−U ,0] f1(w)dw
+ (1− s)α2G(e)
∫ w2
0
max[W (w)−U ,0] f2(w)dw −C (s),
(3.1)
where rU is the flow value of being unemployed with r being the interest rate. This
equals the instantaneous net pay-off b +R(s,e)−C (s), plus the probability sα of
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accepting a job offer from wage distribution F1(w), and the probability (1− s)αG(e) of
accepting a job offer from wage distribution F2(w). Otherwise the values are 0.
Once a job offer is accepted, the worker keeps it until an exogenous separation
occurs. The inflow value of being employed at the wage rate w is:
r W (w)=w +R(s,e)−δ(W (w)−U ), (3.2)
which equals the sum of the instantaneous net pay-off w+R(s,e), minus the expected
loss of being laid off. The psychic benefit function R(s,e) remains. Once the network
is developed it lasts forever, even when the immigrant is unemployed. So the worker
can still reap psychic benefits.
Equation (3.1) is simplified to the following maximisation problem with respect to
s and e:32
max
s,e
rU = b+R(s,e)+ sα1
r +δQ1+
(1− s)α2 ·G(e)
r +δ Q2−C (s), (3.3)
with Qi being the surplus function of Fi (w):
Qi =
∫ w i
wr
(1−Fi (w))d w, (3.4)
wr is the reservation wage rate. Note that the job offers from the host labour market
have a higher surplus than the ones from the ethnic labour market, i.e. Q2−Q1 > 0.
The reservation wage wr should be the same for both markets, as the probability of
being laid off (δ) is the same.
The heterogeneity of the job arrival rates comes from the difference in labour
demand. If there is a high wage gap between the host labour market and the ethnic
labour market, the ethnic labour market has a relatively higher demand for workers,
making jobs in this market more accessible. It is written that α1 =α · E(w2)−E(w1)E(w1) and
α2 = α.33 The term E(w2)−E(w1)E(w1) captures the average wage difference between two
labour markets.
32See Appendix II for the derivation.
33In mathematical terms, E(wi )=
∫ w i
w i
wdFi (w).
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3.2.2 Solutions and comparative statics
The model has three arguments: wr , s, and e. To solve the model, I shall derive the
two first-order conditions (FOC) for s and e from equation (3.3), respectively. Also,
the reservation wage identity is needed (i.e. the immigrant is indifferent between
accepting a job offer at a wage rate of wr and keeping unemployed).
Before proceeding to the interior solution of model, I first discuss the corner
solutions. The optimal level of s and e is bounded in the range [0,1], and hence four
scenarios exist: (1) s∗ = 0, e∗ = 0; (2) s∗ = 0, e∗ = 1; (3) s∗ = 1, e∗ = 0; and (4) s∗ = 1,
e∗ = 1.34 The corner solutions x = 1 (x refers to either s or e) is stable if and only if
FOCx |x=1 > 0, and x = 0 is stable if and only if FOCx |x=0 < 0. FOCx is the first-order
condition with respect to argument x. Therefore I get two corner solutions:
• s∗ = 0 and e∗ = 0 if β< α2Q2−α1Q12b(r+δ) ;
• s∗ = 1 and e∗ = 1.
The first equilibrium implies that, if the cost of developing native networks is very
small, the immigrant no longer needs any co-ethnic contact. The economic benefit
from job offers in the host labour market is much higher, and the psychic benefit from
living in an ethnic enclave is much less. The second equilibrium is the scenario where
the immigrant only communicates with her co-ethnic group and not with the natives
at all. The marginal benefit of s and e is always higher than the marginal cost.
Next, the interior solution of the model is as follows:
wr +C (s)−b− sα1
r +δQ1−
(1− s)α2 ·G(e)
r +δ Q2 = 0; (3.5)
Rs + α1 ·Q1−α2 ·G(e) ·Q2
r +δ −C
′ = 0; (3.6)
Re + (1− s) ·G
′ ·α2 ·Q2
r +δ = 0. (3.7)
Since there is no closed-form solution, a numerical simulation is implemented to
analyse the comparative statics.
First, I choose specific forms for the various functions in the model. An unem-
ployed individual samples one independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) offer
34The four scenoarios are comparable to the acculturation strategies mentioned in Berry (1997)
and Phillimore (2011): integration (s=0, e=1), assimilation (s=0, e=0), marginalisation (s=1, e=0) and
separation (s=1, e=1).
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each period from a known distribution Fi . The wage offer density function is chosen
as the following functional form (Van Den Berg, 1990):
fi (w)= 1
w
· 1
log(w i /w i )
for w ∈ [w i , w i ], (3.8)
with w i being the upper bound, and w i being the lower bound of its corresponding
wage offer distribution.
The psychic benefit function is written as R(s,e) = b · s · e(1+σ). σ ∈ [0,1] proxies
individual residential preferences for ethnic concentration.35 The higher σ is, the
more compensated she is by ethnic concentration. The unemployment benefit b is
used as an adjustment term to monetise the psychic benefit. The higher b is, the more
satisfaction she gets from an ethnically concentrated area. The efficiency function is
written as G(e)= (1−e)2. In addition, the cost function is written as C (s)= b ·β(1− s)2.
Like the psychic benefit function, the unemployment benefit b is also used as an
adjustment term to monetise the cost of developing native networks.
Second, Using Dutch labour market facts from the year 1994 (as reported by
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), I calibrated all labour market parameters. A
quarter is used as the time unit. The CPI adjusted unemployment benefit per quarter
is 2,234 euros, and this is set to be the value for b.36 By assumption, the exogenous job
separation is the only reason for unemployment. The inflow rate of the unemployed
per quarter is 12%, and this is set to be the value for δ. For wage distribution in the
ethnic labour market, the following sectors were chosen: 1. agriculture, forestry and
fishing; 2. industry and energy; and 3. trade, transport, hotels and restaurants. The
lower bound of the wage is 2,973 euros per quarter, and the higher bound of the wage is
4,200 euros per quarter. For wage distribution in the host labour market, the following
sectors were chosen: 1. information and communication; 2. financial services; 3.
rental and commercial property; 4. business services; 5. government and care; and
6. culture, recreation and other services. The lower bound of the wage is 3,699 euros
per quarter, and the highest bound of the wage is 5148 euros per quarter. Therefore
35In the highly influential works of Schelling (1969, 1971), the residential composition preference is
singled out as a critical factor in explaining persistent segregation. I incorporated the Schelling-type
residential preference in the search model for individual sorting.
36Although an immigrant who has just arrived at the destination country might not be eligible for
unemployment benefit, she still has some monetary sources like family remittances, savings, etc. The
value of this parameter here is simply a proxy for this amount of money during unemployment.
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w 1 = 2,973, w 1 = 4,200, w 2 = 3,699, and w 2 = 5,148. The yearly long-term interest
rate is 7.2%, and the corresponding quarterly rate is calculated as 1.8%37 (Van Der Bie
and Smits, 2001). Therefore r is set to be 0.018. The value for α is calculated from
the hazard rate α[1−F (wr )]. The average search period of a job is 2.97 quarters, and
hence the hazard rate is 1/2.97= 0.337. Solving hazard rate function, equations (3.5),
(3.6), and (3.7) together yields the solution 0.5 for α.
Table 3.1 shows the calibration of all parameters. b is the unemployment benefit.
α is the job arrival rate. r is the interest rate. δ is the layoff rate. w 1 is the lower
bound of wage offer distribution in the ethnic labour market. w 1 is the upper bound
of wage offer distribution in the ethnic labour market. w 2 is the lower bound of wage
offer distribution in the host labour market. w 2 is the upper bound of wage offer
distribution in the host labour market. σ is the residential preference parameter for
ethnic concentration. β is the cost of developing native networks.
Table 3.1: Calibration of Parameters
Parameters Initial Value Range for Simulation
b 2234 (2000,2500)
α 0.50 (0.30,0.90)
δ 0.12 (0.05,0.30)
r 0.018 (0.01,0.04)
w1 2973 (3123,3573)
w1 4200 (4350,4800)
w2 3699 (3849,4299)
w2 5148 (5298,5748)
σ 0.5 (0.2,1.0)
β 0.5 (0.2,1.0)
Each time, one parameter varies within the range of simulation in Table 3.1, with
all other parameters fixed at their initial values. The comparative statics of s∗ and e∗,
with respect to all parameters are summarised in Table 3.2.38
37The compound interest formula (1+ r )4 = 0.072 is used here.
38The comparative statics of wr is not the main focus of the chapter, and hence it is not shown in
the table.
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Table 3.2: The Comparative Statics of s∗ and e∗
Parameters s∗ e∗
b - -
α + +
δ - -
r - -
w1 - -
w1 - +
w2 + +
w2 + +
σ +/- +
β + -
It implies that co-ethnic network unambiguously: (1) declines with the unemploy-
ment benefit, b; (2) rises with the job arrival rate, α; (3) declines with the layoff rate,
δ; (4) declines with wage offered in the ethnic labour market, w 1 and w 1; (5) rises
with wage offered in the host labour market, w 2 and w 2; and (6) rises with the cost
of developing native networks, β. It also implies that the probability of choosing an
ethnically concentrated area unambiguously: (1) declines with the unemployment
benefit, b; (2) rises with the job arrival rate, α; (3) declines with the layoff rate, δ; (4)
rises with wage offered in the host labour market, w 2 and w 2; (5) rises with residential
preference for co-ethnic neighbours; and (6) declines with the cost of developing
native networks, β.
3.2.3 Hypotheses derived from the model
Some testable hypotheses are formulated and explained as follows.
When the overall labour market is good and promising due to an exogenous
positive demand shock (high α and low δ), immigrants are able to get a job relatively
easily from their friends or acquaintances from the same country of origin, instead of
reaching out to bridge with the native population. It is then expected that a higher
job arrival rate or a lower job destruction rate leads to more co-ethnic network and less
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native network developed (H1); and a higher job arrival rate or a lower job destruction
rate leads to the choice of more ethnically concentrated areas (H2).
The average wage difference between the ethnic labour market and the host labour
market (embodied, respectively, in w 1 and w 1, and w 2 and w 2) also affects social
network formation and choice of location. A high wage difference leads to different
labour demand in the ethnic market and the host market, making jobs in the ethnic
labour market more accessible. It creates incentives for immigrants to search more in
the ethnic labour market. In addition, a high wage difference is usually accompanied
by wage discrimination, and it further drives immigrants to cluster together. The
following hypotheses are derived: A higher average wage difference between the ethnic
labour market and the host labour market leads to more co-ethnic network and less
native network developed (H3); and a higer average wage difference between the ethnic
labour market and the labour market leads to the choice of more ethnically concentrated
areas (H4).
About the residential preference parameter (σ), immigrants with a higher demand
for ethnic goods and co-ethnic neighbours would be more likely to move into an ethnic
enclave. Due to the complementarity effect between co-ethnic network and living in
an ethnic enclave, co-ethnic network should be increasing as well. It is hypothesised
that a higher preference for co-ethnic neighbours leads to more co-ethnic network and
less native network developed (H5), and a higher preference for co-ethnic neighbours
leads to the choice of more ethnically concentrated areas (H6).
The cost of developing native networks (β) is related to various factors, such as
the immigrant’s education level, the friendliness of the local people, and the linguistic
similarity between the immigrant’s mother tongue and the language in the destination
country. When the cost is high, immigrants invest less in developing native networks.
In terms of location choice, however, they sort into less ethnically concentrated areas
in order to get more exposure to local people for job information. The model predicts
that: a higher cost of developing native networks leads to more co-ethnic network and
less native network developed (H7); and a higher cost of developing native networks
leads to the choice of less ethnically concentrated areas (H8).
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3.3 An Empirical Analysis
I tested the model using data about immigrants in the Netherlands. Turks, Moroccans,
Surinamese and Antilleans are the four largest immigrant ethnic minority groups in
the Netherlands. The Turks and Moroccans were responsive to the ‘guest workers’
program by the Dutch government, and migrated to the Netherlands in large numbers
in the 1960s. Family-reunification in the 1980s and second-generation children born
in the Netherlands have then substantially increased the proportion of Turks and
Moroccans in the Netherlands. The mass inflow of Surinamese took place after the
decolonisation of Surinam in 1975, while large migrant groups from the Netherlands
Antilles (still an autonomous area within the Kingdom of the Netherlands) have been
arriving since the 1990s. The socio-cultural adaptation of the four ethnic minority
groups has become a central political issue with the massive inflow of the immigrants.
3.3.1 Data and variables
The data are from the Dutch survey ‘Social Position and Use of Public Facilities by
Immigrants’ (SPVA), which is a large-scale, cross-sectional survey for the four largest
non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands: Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese,
and Antilleans. The survey is to collect information for the analysis of the socio-
economic and socio-cultural position of the four largest ethnic minorities in the
Netherlands. The sample frame consists of 10–13 cities (depending on the survey
year), where immigrants are relatively overrepresented. It was conducted in the years
1991, 1994, 1998, and 2002, with, respectively, 2581, 2572, 5231, and 3614 households.
The data for the head of the household are used in the analysis. A second source of
data is from Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), which provides yearly local
labour market conditions at municipality level.
In Appendix I, Table 3.7 shows a list of the variables in SPVA, with their detailed
definitions and coding.
The two dependent variables in which we are most interested are the social
network variable s∗ and the ethnic concentration variable e∗. The social network
variable is a relative time measure between co-ethnic contacts and contacts with
Dutch people. Contact composition: the respondent was asked about frequency of
her Dutch contact and co-ethnic contact during her free time. The three categories
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are: (1) more contact with the Dutch; (2) equal contact with Dutch and co-ethnics;
(3) more contact with co-ethnics. The variable is recoded as numerical values from
1 to 3. The higher the value, the larger is the share of time allocated to developing
co-ethnic networks. Ethnic concentration: this is measured by the percentage of the
respondent’s ethnic group in the resident population of the city, for, respectively, Turks,
Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans.39
Human capital variables are included. Education is measured by five dichotomous
variables: no education, primary education, lower secondary education, intermediate
education, and higher education.40 Education: the highest degree obtained, among
the five levels above. Working experience in NL: working experience in the Netherlands
is measured in years, which was directly asked in the questionnaires in all four waves.
Dutch proficiency: a categorical variable with: (1) do not speak Dutch or find it very
difficult; (2) do not speak Dutch very well, sometimes find it difficult; and (3) speak
Dutch very well, never find it difficult, where (1) is the reference category.
Other background characteristics are also included as follows. Ethnicity: re-
spondents self-report their ethnicity, including Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and
Antilleans. The Turks are treated as the reference group. Municipality: this is
the respondent’s place of residence. Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht,
Eindhoven, Enschede, Almere, Alphen aan den Rijn, Bergen op Zoom, Hoogezand-
Sappemeer, Delft, Dordrecht, Tiel are all identified in the survey and are included in the
analysis. Amsterdam is the reference category. Nationality: the dichotomous variable
equals 1 if the respondent reported having Dutch nationality (citizenship). Married:
the dichotomous variable equals 1 if the respondent is married (spouse present), and
0 otherwise. Number of children: the respondents were asked how many children they
have at home in the Netherlands and also outside home in the Netherlands. I create a
new variable by summing up the numbers. Years since migration: years of stay in the
Netherlands. Monthly income: the respondents report their total net income in the
survey. Residential preference parameter: the respondents were asked whether they
39The variable is constructed using the population statistics in CBS.
40According to Oosterbeek (1992), secondary education in the Netherlands is composed of both
vocational and general branches, with different years of schooling. Within each branch, students can
enter lower secondary education directly after primary education, and can only enter intermediate
education upon graduation from the previous level. Higher education refers to higher vocational edu-
cation and university. We distinguish education as primary education (LO), lower secondary education
(LBO/MAVO), intermediate education (MBO/HAVO/VWO), and higher education (HBO/WO).
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want to live in a district with many co-ethnics. The degree of preference ranges from 1
to 5.41
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the social network variable. It shows
that the ethnic composition varies significantly across four ethnic groups. In general,
the Surinamese and the Antilleans have more networks developed among Dutch
people compared with the Turks and the Moroccans. The Turks have the highest level
of co-ethnic networks. 64 % of the Turks have more co-ethnic contacts than Dutch
contacts, while the Antilleans have the lowest level of co-ethnic networks.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Social Network Composition across Ethnicity for
Cross-sectional Data, Adult Immigrants
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans
During free time: more contact with Dutch 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.41
During free time: equal contact 0.27 0.44 0.45 0.37
During free time: more contact with co-ethnics 0.64 0.44 0.33 0.22
Notes: the social network variable is dichotomous with a value of either 0 or 1. The figures in the
table are the percentage of respondents who fit the description of the first column within each
ethnic group.
Sample size: 13998.
Source: SPVA 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002.
The data for the labour market conditions are retrieved from CBS. α is proxied by
vacancies per thousand population in each province. δ is proxied by the percentage of
inflow into unemployment benefits in each province (unit: percentages). The wage
information (w 1, w 1, w 2, w 2) is proxied by the average wage rates of representative
sectors in both the ethnic labour market and the host labour market (unit: euros per
hour). For wage distribution in the ethnic labour market, the chosen sectors are: 1.
agriculture, forestry and fishing; 2. industry and energy; and 3. trade, transport, hotels,
and restaurants. For wage distribution in the host labour market, the chosen sectors:
1. information and communication; 2. financial services; 3. rental and commercial
41In Appendix I, Table 3.8 presents the descriptive statistics for the cross-sectional data. The data
are restricted to adult immigrants, whose ages range from 25 to 64.
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property; 4. business services; 5. government and care; and 6. culture, recreation, and
other services.42
The labour market parameters are matched to each immigrant in the micro-data,
with job search year and province being the identifiers.43 From the assumption of
the model, the labour market conditions of the job search year should be crucial to
immigrant’s social network formation. In the SPVA micro-data, the year the first
job was obtained in the Netherlands is used.44 12 provinces in the Netherlands
are included in the analysis: Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, Flevoland,
Gelderland, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, and
Limburg.
3.3.2 Structural-form specification and instrumental vari-
ables
The structural-form specification of the model is a system of two equations, where
s∗ and e∗ are interdependent, and are also dependent on a set of labour market
parameters and individual parameters, written as:
Si ,t = c11+ c12Xi ,t + c13LMi ,t0 + c14Ei ,t +ε1, t = 1, . . . ,T and i = 1, . . . , I , (3.9)
Ei ,t = c21+ c22Xi ,t + c23LMi ,t0 + c24Si ,t +ε2, t = 1, . . . ,T and i = 1, . . . , I , (3.10)
where i stands for individuals; t stands for survey years; t0 is the job search year; S
is the social network variable; E is the ethnic concentration; X are a set of individual
characteristics; LM are labour market variables; ε1 and ε2 are disturbance terms.
As both of the regressors S and E are correlated with the disturbances, a two-
stage least squares estimation (2SLS) with valid instrumental variables (IV) would be
unbiased. The instrumental variables for each equation must not be correlated with
the disturbance term of the corresponding equation. Furthermore, in this system, the
42The choice of representative sectors is supported by the findings in Peri and Sparber (2009).
Foreign-born workers specialise in jobs intensive in manual labour skills, and the host labour market
covers jobs more intensive in communication-language tasks.
43For sector wage rates, there is no regional difference, and hence the job search year is the only
identifier.
44Year of entry could also be an option. But, for immigrants who moved to the Netherlands at a
young age, it cannot proxy for the job search year.
3.3. An Empirical Analysis 59
disturbances ε1 and ε2 are quite likely to be contemporaneously correlated. Some
unobserved characteristics, such as personality traits, affect co-ethnic network forma-
tion and ethnic concentration simultaneously. In this case, a feasible generalised least
squares version of the 2SLS estimation would lead to consistent and asymptotically
more efficient estimates. This estimation procedure is generally called ‘three-stage
least squares (3SLS)’ (Zellner and Theil, 1962), and hence the 3SLS is employed here
to estimate equations (3.9) and (3.10) simultaneously.
For social network variable S, I use the number of household members at the
survey year as the instrument. This captures the fact that, if an immigrant has more
household members, she is obliged to spend more time on co-ethnic networks instead
of bridging out to the natives.45 However, as the choice of ethnic concentration was
made at a much earlier stage before the number of household members expanded,
the correlation is rather low due to the different timings of the recorded variables.
For ethnic concentration E , I use the cultural diversity index at the municipality
level as the instrument. Much of the literature (see, e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 2005;
Bakens et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016a) uses an index of fractionalisation to measure
cultural diversity, written as:
Di v j = 1−
∑
g=1
shar e2g j , g = 1, . . . ,G and j = 1, . . . , J , (3.11)
where shar eg j is the share of group g over the total population in a specific region
j . Di v is region-specific, and measures the probability that two randomly selected
individuals from a given area will not belong to the same group. An immigrant would
consider the presence of other ethnic groups when choosing a residential location,
while this numerical value is not related to the relative measure of time spent on
co-ethnic friendship and Dutch friendship.
Note that ideally, the social network composition variable and the ethnic con-
centration variable at the first job search year t0 would be the first choice, as I am
45This fact would not hold if the household head has a Dutch partner. But in the SPVA surveys, no
household reported an inter-ethnic marriage. Moreover, as children might be the bridges that help
their parents to communicate with the local people (for information of schooling, health care, etc), this
positive correlation would not hold either if the children-oriented demand for native networks is too
strong. Hence I further validate this instrument by deducting the number of children from the number
of household members. Then the new variable would only include parents and other relatives of the
household heads. The positive correlation between the instrument and co-ethnic network intensity
still holds.
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interested in individual decisions upon arrival. However, due to data limitation, the
social network variable and the ethnic concentration variable at the survey year are
used. There is evidence that immigrants usually start with building intensive co-ethnic
networks and moving to ethnic enclaves, and once they are familiarized with the local
milieu, they put more time in socializing with the natives and move out to mixed
neighbourhoods (Nijkamp et al., 2012). If so, the estimate from the specifications
above is an underestimation of labour market conditions’ effects on Si ,t0 and Ei ,t0 .
More robustness checks will follow in later subsections.
3.3.3 Estimation results
Table 3.4 shows the results of the simultaneous estimation for a sample of immigrants
who obtained their first job in the Netherlands during the years 1991 to 2002, where
α, β and σ are the main explanatory variables. Column (1) is for social network, and
column (2) is for ethnic concentration. In column (1), co-ethnic network intensity
is positively associated with a high vacancy rate (0.037). Furthermore, a higher
residential preference for co-ethnics leads to more co-ethnic network and less native
network developed (0.057). The findings above confirm hypotheses H1 and H5. In
column (2), the ethnic concentration is the dependent variable. The coefficient
is positive for vacancies per thousand population (0.243). The coefficient for the
residential preference parameter σ is significantly positive (0.305). The findings above
confirm hypotheses H2 and H6.
Table 3.5 shows the results of the simultaneous estimation for a sample of
immigrants who obtained their first job in the Netherlands during the years 1991
to 2002, where δ, β and σ are the main explanatory variables. Column (1) is for
social network, and column (2) is for ethnic concentration. In column (1), a high
unemployment inflow percentage leads to less time spent in co-ethnic networks (-
0.197). Furthermore, a higher residential preference for co-ethnics leads to more
co-ethnic network and less native network developed (0.063). In column (2), the
negative association between the ethnic concentration and the unemployment inflow
percentage (-1.052) is also confirmed. A higher residential preference for co-ethnics
leads to the choice of more ethnically concentrated areas (0.234). Similar to Table 3.4,
these findings confirm hypotheses H1, H2, H5, and H6.
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Table 3.4: Simultaneous Equations Model for Social Network and Ethnic Concentration
(α, β, and σ as Explanatory Variables), Job Search Year 1991 to 2002
s∗ e∗
Constant 2.346 (0.231)∗∗∗ 12.800 (4.873)∗∗∗
Dutch nationality (β) 0.020 (0.073) 0.118 (0.312)
First generation (β) 0.520 (0.089)∗∗∗ 2.726 (1.196)∗∗
Years since migration (β) −0.010 (0.006) −0.041 (0.039)
Dutch: not very well (β) −0.064 (0.098) −0.336 (0.441)
Dutch: very well (β) −0.175 (0.101)∗ −0.865 (0.601)
Primary education (β) −0.182 (0.120) −0.827 (0.705)
Lower education (β) −0.049 (0.121) 0.055 (0.603)
Intermed. education (β) −0.028 (0.118) 0.052 (0.539)
Higher education (β) −0.160 (0.124) −0.570 (0.748)
Residential preference (σ) 0.057 (0.025)∗∗ 0.305 (0.161)∗
Number of vacancies (α) 0.037 (0.012)∗∗∗ 0.243 (0.068)∗∗∗
Num. obs. 1666 1666
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The dependent variable of column (1) the social network measure in numerical values: 1-
more contact with the natives; 2-equal contact with the natives and the co-ethnics; 3-more
contact with the co-ethnics. The dependent variable of column (2) is the percentage of the
immigrant’s own ethnic group in her living city.
The reference category for each categorical variable is as follows. Dutch proficiency: do
not speak Dutch or find it very difficult. Education: no education.
The regressors not included in the table are ethnicity, gender, marital status, number of
children, age at migration, working experience in the Netherlands, and monthly income.
The time trend effect is controlled for as well.
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Table 3.5: Simultaneous Equations Model for Social Network and Ethnic Concentration
(δ, β and σ as Explanatory Variables), Job Search Year 1991 to 2002
s∗ e∗
Constant 3.010 (0.313)∗∗∗ 12.031 (3.945)∗∗∗
Dutch nationality (β) 0.006 (0.065) 0.093 (0.222)
First generation (β) 0.481 (0.083)∗∗∗ 1.512 (0.796)∗
Years since migration (β) −0.010 (0.006)∗ −0.018 (0.029)
Dutch: not very well (β) −0.028 (0.087) −0.110 (0.300)
Dutch: very well (β) −0.099 (0.090) −0.227 (0.358)
Primary education (β) −0.089 (0.108) −0.041 (0.424)
Lower education (β) −0.054 (0.109) 0.225 (0.418)
Intermed. education (β) −0.059 (0.107) 0.143 (0.409)
Higher education (β) −0.185 (0.113) −0.206 (0.554)
Residential preference (σ) 0.063 (0.023)∗∗∗ 0.234 (0.116)∗∗
Unemployment inflow percentage (δ) −0.197 (0.044)∗∗∗ −1.052 (0.203)∗∗∗
Num. obs. 2018 2018
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The dependent variable of column (1) the social network measure in numerical values: 1-
more contact with the natives; 2-equal contact with the natives and the co-ethnics; 3-more
contact with the co-ethnics. The dependent variable of column (2) is the percentage of the
immigrant’s own ethnic group in her living city.
The reference category for each categorical variable is as follows. Dutch proficiency: do
not speak Dutch or find it very difficult. Education: no education.
The regressors not included in the table are ethnicity, gender, marital status, number of
children, age at migration, working experience in the Netherlands, and monthly income.
The time trend effect is controlled for as well.
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Table 3.6: Simultaneous Equations Model for Social Network and Ethnic Concentration
(Wage Distribution, β and σ as Explanatory Variables), Job Search Year 1969 to 2002
s∗ e∗
Constant 2.002 (0.228)∗∗∗ 6.986 (3.474)∗∗
Dutch nationality (β) −0.010 (0.033) 0.077 (0.129)
First generation (β) 0.526 (0.054)∗∗∗ 1.310 (0.907)
Years since migration (β) −0.012 (0.003)∗∗∗ −0.017 (0.023)
Dutch: not very well (β) −0.083 (0.050)∗ −0.212 (0.239)
Dutch: very well (β) −0.199 (0.051)∗∗∗ −0.230 (0.386)
Primary education (β) −0.045 (0.051) 0.091 (0.212)
Lower education (β) 0.009 (0.052) 0.323 (0.202)
Intermed. education (β) −0.024 (0.053) 0.376 (0.206)∗
Higher education (β) −0.103 (0.057)∗ 0.100 (0.279)
Residential preference (σ) 0.045 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.197 (0.091)∗∗
Ethnic labour market (w1,w1) −0.166 (0.079)∗∗ −0.536 (0.413)
Host labour market (w2,w2) 0.152 (0.055)
∗∗∗ 0.653 (0.331)∗∗
Num. obs. 6626 6626
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The dependent variable of column (1) the social network measure in numerical values: 1-
more contact with the natives; 2-equal contact with the natives and the co-ethnics; 3-more
contact with the co-ethnics. The dependent variable of column (2) is the percentage of the
immigrant’s own ethnic group in her living city.
The reference category for each categorical variable is as follows. Dutch proficiency: do
not speak Dutch or find it very difficult. Education: no education.
The regressors not included in the table are ethnicity, gender, marital status, number of
children, age at migration, working experience in the Netherlands, and monthly income.
The time trend effect is controlled for as well.
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Table 3.6 shows the results of the simultaneous estimation for a sample of
immigrants who obtained their first job in the Netherlands during the years 1969
to 2001, where w 1,w 1, w 2, w 2, β and σ are the main explanatory variables. The
average wage rates of representative sectors in the ethnic labour market and the host
labour market are included as independent variables to proxy for w 1,w 1, w 2, and
w 2. Column (1) is for social network, and column (2) is for ethnic concentration. In
column (1), co-ethnic network intensity is positively associated with high average
wage rates of jobs in the host labour market (0.152), and negatively associated with
a high wage rates of jobs in the ethnic labour market (-0.166). The higher the wage
difference between the ethnic labour market and the host labour market, the more
time the immigrant spends in developing co-ethnic network. The coefficients are
significant for most of the individual characteristics. Being first generation (0.526),
having fewer years since migration (-0.012), a lower proficiency in speaking Dutch
(-0.083 and -0.199), and a lower level of education (-0.103), all correspond to a high
cost of developing native networks β. They are all associated with a higher level of
co-ethnic network. Moreover, the coefficient for residential preference parameter σ
is also significantly positive (0.045). This empirical findings confirm hypotheses H3,
and further confirm hypotheses H5 and H7. In column (2), the ethnic concentration
is positively associated with a higher wage difference between the ethnic labour
market and the host labour market (0.653). Highly-educated immigrants tend to
live in more ethnically concentrated areas (0.376). Lastly, the coefficient for the
residential preference parameter σ is significantly positive (0.197). These finding
confirm hypotheses H4, H6 and H8.
3.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, some further checks are made to validate our empirical results. First,
it is observed what happens if the immigrant relocates between the job search
year and the timing of the survey. Second, it is determined whether there is an
endogeneity problem between immigrants’ social network composition and wage
offer distribution.
3.4. Robustness Checks 65
3.4.1 Relocation
It is assumed in the model that the immigrant chooses her residential location and
social network composition upon arrival at the destination country, and, hence, in
the regressions, the labour market conditions of the job search year are used as the
regressors. The dependent variable is the social network variable in the year of survey.
If, however, the immigrant relocates over the years, the social network is then updated
and is dependent on the labour market conditions of the current year rather than
the job search year. To check whether the decision-making process is consistent, as
a robustness check, the labour market conditions of the survey year are used as the
regressors.
The structural-form specification of the model is then changed to the following:
Si ,t = c11+ c12Xi ,t + c13LMi ,t + c14Ei ,t +ε1, t = 1, . . . ,T and i = 1, . . . , I , (3.12)
Ei ,t = c21+ c22Xi ,t + c23LMi ,t + c24Si ,t +ε2, t = 1, . . . ,T and i = 1, . . . , I , (3.13)
where the job search year t0 is replaced with survey year t . 3SLS is still employed to
estimate the model.
In Appendix I, Table 3.9 shows the regression results for the whole sample. The
signs of the coefficients forα and δ remain consistent with the results in Tables 3.4 and
3.5. Even if there exists relocation and reinvestment in either type of social network,
the local labour market conditions affect social network formation and choice of
location in the same way as in the job search year.
3.4.2 Endogenous wage offer distribution
The wage offer distributions are assumed to be exogenous in the theoretical model. If
this assumption is loosened, the direction of the association between social network
composition and wage difference is still unclear in the empirical analysis. Both
arguments are plausible: on the one hand, immigrants develop their social network in
response to wage differences between the ethnic labour market and the host labour
market. On the other hand, it could be the case that employers adjust wage rates
according to the immigrants’ network composition and search intensity in the two
types of markets.
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The endogeneity issue is addressed using an instrumental variables approach. The
instrument used is the average number of employees in representative sectors in the
ethnic labour market and the host labour market. It is relevant to the average wage
rates in both types of sectors, as wage rates and employment size are endogenously
determined by labour supply and demand. However, the overall employment size
should not affect individual decision on social network formation, as workers would
only be concerned about the vacancies that are most relevant to their skills. This
makes the variable a valid instrument.
In Appendix I, Table 3.10 shows the IV estimation results for the whole sample. The
weak instruments hypotheses are rejected in both columns. The coefficient for the
average wage rate in the host labour market is significantly positive. The coefficient for
the average wage rate in the ethnic labour market is negative, but not significant. The
result does not differ from Table 3.6. A high wage difference leads to more co-ethnic
network developed.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Immigrants’ social network composition are important not only for their own eco-
nomic performance in the destination country, but also for the social integration of the
society. As the consequences of social networks are persistent over time, this chapter
has fully explored the labour market conditions as determinants of immigrants’ social
network formation upon arrival in the host country.
I developed a job and residential search model for an unemployed immigrant
who has just arrived in the destination country. The individual chooses time spent
in two types of social network and residential location simultaneously. The optimal
time spent in co-ethnic network, native network and the optimal level of ethnic
concentration are derived. I used Dutch immigrant data to test the comparative statics
of co-ethnic network, native network and ethnic concentration level with respect to
local labour market conditions. The empirical analysis does not reject the hypotheses
from the theoretical model.
The main conclusions are as follows. First, a more buoyant labour market increases
co-ethnic network, decreases native network, and leads to the choice of a more
ethnically concentrated area. There is not such a strong motive for immigrants to
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build bridges to the natives when the economy is doing well. Second, a larger wage
difference between the ethnic labour market and the host labour market leads to more
co-ethnic network developed, less native network developed, and the choice of more
ethnically concentrated areas. At first sight, this conclusion turns out to be surprising
as the economic incentive does not drive immigrants to develop more native networks.
This finding is explained from the perspective of labour market demand changes. The
relatively lower wage in the ethnic labour market increases the labour demand, and
hence co-ethnic network pays back more quickly compared with native network.
Some minor findings with respect to individual characteristics are summarised
below. First, the Schelling-type residential preference for co-ethnics leads to more
co-ethnic network developed, less native network developed, and the choice of
more ethnically concentrated areas. The individual heterogeneity in preference is a
key determinant in social network formation, and it has clear implications for the
characteristics of different ethnic groups. Second, the higher cost of developing
native networks (e.g. lower education, low level of proficiency in Dutch) leads to
more co-ethnic networks, less native networks, but the choice of less ethnically
concentrated areas. The explanation of the finding with respect to choice of location
is that less ethnically concentrated areas allow frequent exposure to the natives. This
compensates for the immigrant’s high stock of co-ethnic networks.46
The formation of co-ethnic networks and native networks is worth studying. In the
Netherlands, for instance, the discourse on the integration of ethnic minorities has
undergone profound changes over the past few decades (Scholten and Holzhacker,
2009). The Turks and Moroccans were responsive to the ‘guest workers’ program
by the Dutch government, and migrated to the Netherlands in large numbers in
the 1960s. In the meantime, the Dutch political discourse stressed the importance
of social contacts within ethnic minorities but not of bridging to the natives, with
the aim of facilitating the return migration of these temporary workers. When the
permanent settlement of ethnic minorities was accepted as an immigration policy
in the 1980s, developing native networks became central to the political discourse.
After the year 2000, the policy focus on integration started to stress the negative side
46Eeckhout et al. (2014) explain this pattern of spatial sorting by extreme-skill complementarity.
High-skilled workers sort into cities with many low-skilled workers, and the productivity of high-skilled
workers and of the providers of low-skilled services are mutually enhanced.
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of co-ethnic networks in eroding the national identity, and the discourse changed
to an assimilationist approach (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2006; Joppke, 2007). Once
immigrants are locked in ethnic enclaves, full interaction in co-ethnic networks would
take place and remain persistent. In the Netherlands, a mixed housing policy is
encouraged, which is primarily designed to prevent full segregation and enhance
native network formation.47
To sum up, a key finding in this chapter is a paradox of economic prosperity and
social integration. Immigrants seem spontaneously assimilate less into host society
in good times of the economy at the destination country. The result implies that the
consumption of the ethnic community and cultural activities is higher than the job
search effect. This phenomenon could be even more pronounced for refugees, who are
more dependent on their co-ethnic networks at arrival. I used instrumental variables
to partially address the endogeneity in the simultaneous equations model. The result
would be more solid if sufficient pre-migration characteristics are accessible in this
dataset. The human capital investment theory could also be employed to explain this
phenomenon. During the economic recession, the opportunity cost of developing
networks with the natives is low enough to give incentives to migrants.
Even though the empirical analysis is implemented only on the Dutch immigrant
sample, the theoretical model of social network formation in this chapter is applicable
to all immigrant-receiving countries, such as the UK, Canada, and Germany. One
avenue for future research could be a cross-country comparison if data on social
contacts are accessible. A second direction is to incorporate the thickness of the
labour market into the model, i.e. the dependence relationship between the job arrival
rate and the ethnic concentration level. A third avenue for future research would
be the dynamic effect of social networks on immigrants’ economic success. Battisti
et al. (2016) investigated both the short run and long run effects of initial co-ethnic
networks at arrival on the economic success of immigrants. Although immigrants with
larger co-ethnic networks at arrival are more likely to be employed first, they have a
lower probability of investing in human capital. In the long run it leads to a lower wage.
It remains interesting to modify the theoretical model in the context of sequential
47A recent study by Neal and Neal (2014) also shows that it is hard to make neighbourhoods both
diverse and cohesive, and therefore the primary, overarching, and achievable objective is to strengthen
bridging ties between communities (Florida, 2013).
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decisions on choice of location and social network formation, and take into account
the locked-in effect of living in an ethnic enclave. Fourthly, bridging this topic to the
urban economic literature will supplement the missing elements in the current model,
i.e. urban amenities, housing price, cost of living, etc. The interdependent relationship
with the urban characteristics and social interaction deserves a lot more attention,
with the decreasing cost of communication, and the increasing use of networks in job
activities.
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Appendix I
Table 3.7: The Definitions and Coding of the Variables in ‘Social Position and Use of
Public Facilities by Immigrants’ (SPVA)
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
Contact composition ‘In your spare time, do you have more contact with
during free time Dutch people or do you have more contact with people
from your own ethnic group?’
1-More co-ethnic contact;
2-Both equally;
3-More contact with Dutch people.
Monthly income ‘What is your total net monthly income?’
In year 2002, the currency changed from Dutch guilders
to Euros. The exchange ratio 2.2:1 is used to unify
the monetary unit across four waves.
Education ‘What is the highest degree you have completed?’
0-No degree;
1-Degree in primary education (LO);
2-Degree in secondary education (LBO/MAVO);
3-Degree in intermediate education (MBO/HAVO/VWO);
4-Degree in higher education (HBO/WO).
Work experience in NL ‘How long have you worked in total in the Netherlands?’
Dutch language ‘When you are in a conversation, do you have any
proficiency difficulty in using Dutch language?’
0-Yes, very difficult/ do not speak Dutch at all;
1-Yes, sometimes;
2-No, never.
Residential preference ’Do you prefer to live in a neighborhood where many
people of your own ethni group live?’
1-Strong dislike;
2-Rather not;
Continued on next page
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Table 3.7 – continued from previous page
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
3-It does not matter;
4-Rather well;
5-Strong preference.
Ethnicity ‘What is your ethnic group?’
1-Turks;
2-Moroccans;
3-Surinamese;
4-Antilleans.
Municipality Registered residence municipality
1-Amsterdam; 2-Rotterdam; 3-Den Haag; 4-Utrecht;
5-Eindhoven; 6-Enschede; 7-Almere; 8-Alphen aan den Rijn;
9-Bergen op Zoom; 10-Hoogezand-Sappemeer; 11-Delft;
12-Dordrecht; 13-Tiel.
Leeuwarden, Spijkenisse, Zwijndrecht and Gornichem are
recoded in SPVA 1991, but not in other waves. And hence
we drop the observations in these municipalities.
Nationality ‘What is your nationality?’
1-Orgin country’s nationality;
2-Dutch nationality;
3-Both the origin country’s and Dutch nationalities;
4-Others.
The answers are recoded to a dichotomous variable
which equals 1 if the respondent reported having
Dutch nationality, and 0 otherwise.
Married ‘What is your marital status?’
1-Married; 2-Divorced; 3-Widow/widower;
4-Never been married.
Number of children ‘How many children are there living in the house?’
‘How many children are not living in the Netherlands?’
These two answeres are summed up.
Continued on next page
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Table 3.7 – continued from previous page
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
Years since migration ‘What is your length of stay in the Netherlands?’
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Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics for Cross-sectional Data, Adult Immigrants
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Male 13,961 0.68 0.47 0 1
Age 13,998 39.99 10.40 25 64
Turks 13,968 0.28 0.45 0 1
Moroccans 13,968 0.26 0.44 0 1
Surinamese 13,968 0.28 0.45 0 1
Antilleans 13,968 0.19 0.39 0 1
Dutch nationality 13,998 0.61 0.49 0 1
YSM (in years) 13,760 16.31 9.64 0.00 52.50
Married 13,998 0.65 0.48 0 1
Number of children 13,998 2.35 2.20 0 17
No edu. 13,425 0.22 0.42 0 1
Primary edu. 13,425 0.28 0.45 0 1
Lower edu. 13,425 0.22 0.41 0 1
Intermed. edu. 13,425 0.18 0.38 0 1
Higher edu. 13,425 0.10 0.30 0 1
Do not speak Dutch 13,838 0.20 0.40 0 1
Dutch: not very well 13,838 0.30 0.46 0 1
Dutch: very well 13,838 0.51 0.50 0 1
Exp. in NL (in years) 13,855 10.34 8.57 0.00 48.00
Income (in Dutch guilders) 11,744 1,867.34 825.66 0.00 16,508.26
Residential preference parameter 10,432 2.65 0.94 1 5
Year of first job 8,567 1,982.71 9.31 1,953 2,002
Ethnic concentration 11,382 4.79 2.81 0.26 9.73
Year of survey: 1991 13,998 0.18 0.39 0 1
Year of survey: 1994 13,998 0.18 0.39 0 1
Year of survey: 1998 13,998 0.37 0.48 0 1
Year of survey: 2002 13,998 0.26 0.44 0 1
Respondents are those reported as the household head by the household members.
Income is measured as monthly net income in Dutch guilders, adjusted by CPI.
Residential preference parameter indicates the degree of preference for ethnic
concentration.
Ethnic concentration is measured in percentages.
Source: SPVA 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002.
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Table 3.9: Robustness Checks: Simultaneous Equation Model for Social Network and
Ethnic Concentration, Job Search Year 1991 to 2002
s∗ s∗ e∗ e∗
Constant 2.151∗∗∗ 2.798∗∗∗ 3.581∗∗∗ 10.514∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.118) (0.206) (0.315)
Dutch nationality (β) −0.064∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.038
(0.025) (0.025) (0.065) (0.064)
First generation (β) 0.510∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.117) (0.115)
Years since migration (β) −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Age at migration (β) −0.002 −0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Dutch: not very well (β) −0.129∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ 0.120 0.140∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.077) (0.075)
Dutch: very well (β) −0.271∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.086) (0.084)
Primary education (β) 0.010 0.017 −0.091 −0.020
(0.033) (0.032) (0.078) (0.076)
Lower education (β) 0.010 0.018 0.118 0.191∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.089) (0.087)
Intermed. education (β) −0.023 −0.018 0.084 0.153∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.094) (0.092)
Higher education (β) −0.113∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.158 −0.072
(0.041) (0.041) (0.111) (0.109)
Residential preference (σ) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026)
Number of vacancies (α) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.011)
Unemployment inflow percentage (δ) −0.150∗∗∗ −1.524∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.057)
R2 0.212 0.217 0.414 0.440
Adj. R2 0.209 0.214 0.413 0.439
Num. obs. 5532 5532 7820 7820
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The dependent variable of column (1) and column (2) is the social network measure in numerical
values: 1-more contact with the natives; 2-equal contact with the natives and the co-ethnics; 3-more
contact with the co-ethnics. The dependent variable of column (3) and column (4) is the percentage
of the immigrant’s own ethnic group in her living city.
The reference category for each categorical variable is as follows. Dutch proficiency: do not speak
Dutch or find it very difficult. Education: no education.
The regressors not included in the table are ethnicity, gender, marital status, number of children, age
at migration, working experience in the Netherlands, and monthly income. The time trend effect is
controlled for as well.
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Table 3.10: Robustness Checks: IV Estimation for Social Network
s∗
Constant 1.214 (0.940)
Dutch nationality (β) −0.016 (0.034)
First generation (β) 0.503 (0.063)∗∗∗
Years since migration (β) −0.080 (0.030)∗∗∗
Age at migration (β) −0.007 (0.002)∗∗∗
Dutch: not very well (β) −0.087 (0.051)∗
Dutch: very well (β) −0.201 (0.052)∗∗∗
Primary education (β) −0.054 (0.053)
Lower education (β) 0.005 (0.054)
Intermed. education (β) −0.026 (0.054)
Higher education (β) −0.108 (0.058)∗
Residential preference (σ) 0.045 (0.013)∗∗∗
Ethnic labour market (w1,w1) −0.240 (0.151)
Host labour market (w2,w2) 0.402 (0.157)
∗∗
R2 0.199
Adj. R2 0.194
Num. obs. 3313
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The dependent variable is the social network in numerical values: 1-
more contact with the natives; 2-equal contact with the natives and
the co-ethnics; 3-more contact with the co-ethnics.
The reference category for each categorical variable is as follows.
Dutch proficiency: do not speak Dutch or find it very difficult. Edu-
cation: no education.
The regressors not included in the table are ethnicity, gender, mari-
tal status, number of children, age at migration, working experience
in the Netherlands, and monthly income. The time trend effect is
controlled for as well.
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Appendix II
This appendix illustrates how equation (3.1) is simplified to (3.3).
From equation (3.2) (the inflow value of being employed at wage rate w), W (wr )
is derived using the reservation wage identity W (wr )=U ,
W (wr )=U = wr +R(s,e)
r
. (3.14)
Substitute equation (3.14) into equation (3.2) to obtain the following:
W (w)−U = w −wr
r +δ . (3.15)
Then substitute equation (3.15) into equation (3.1), it becomes:
rU =b+R(s,e)+ sα1
r +δ
∫ w1
wr
(w −wr ) f1(w)dw
+ (1− s)α2G(e)
r +δ
∫ w2
wr
(w −wr ) f2(w)dw −C (s).
(3.16)
Using the theorem of integration by parts,∫ w i
wr
(w −wr ) fi (w)dw ={(w −wr )Fi (w)}w iwr −
∫ w i
wr
Fi (w)dw
=(w i −wr )−
∫ w i
wr
Fi (w)dw
=
∫ w i
wr
[1−Fi (w)]dw,
where Qi is the surplus function of Fi (w): Qi =
∫ w i
wr
(1−Fi (w))dw . And this is the
whole exposition for the derivation of equation (3.3).
CHAPTER 4
Social Contacts, Dutch Language
Proficiency and Immigrant
Economic Performance in the
Netherlands: A Longitudinal
Study48
4.1 Introduction
Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans are the four largest immigrant ethnic
minority groups in the Netherlands, and they earn around 20 % less than the natives
in the Dutch labour market, ceteris paribus (Van Ours and Veenman, 1999). The
Turks and Moroccans were responsive to the ‘guest workers’ program by the Dutch
government, and migrated to the Netherlands in large numbers in the 1960s. Family-
reunification in the 1980s and second-generation children born in the Netherlands
have then substantially increased the proportion of Turks and Moroccans in the
Netherlands. The mass inflow of Surinamese took place after the decolonisation of
Surinam in 1975, while large migrant groups from the Netherlands Antilles (still an
48This chapter is based on Chiswick and Wang (2016).
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autonomous area within the Kingdom of the Netherlands) have been arriving since
the 1990s.
The economic integration of the four ethnic minorities requires a comprehensive
understanding of immigrant economic success in Dutch society (Zorlu and Hartog,
2001). In this chapter, we are particularly interested in how social contacts affect Dutch
immigrant economic success. We propose the following research questions: to what
extent does the ethnic composition of contacts affect immigrant economic success
in the Netherlands? How do the effects vary across ethnicity, education level, age at
migration, and occupation? A second focus is on the effect of acquiring local language.
How does Dutch language proficiency contribute to the economic performance of
these four groups?
Many empirical studies on social contacts and economic performance analysed
cross-sectional data, where the causal effect of social contacts is hard to infer (see, e.g.,
Lin et al., 1981; Kanas and Van Tubergen, 2006; Lancee, 2010). There is a paucity of
studies of significant adjustment in a dynamic setting. Xue (2008) looks at the role
of social networks using a longitudinal survey of immigrants to Canada, and finds
that social capital facilitates employment, possibly through a more ethnically diverse
network. Kanas et al. (2012) uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, and
find that inter-ethnic ties with Germans lead to higher occupational status but not
to increased income. Piracha et al. (2014) uses the Households Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia longitudinal data, and find a positive effect of social capital
on migrants’ employment outcomes and wages, especially for women. Moreover,
it affects the employment probability of obtaining a white-collar job rather than a
blue-collar one.
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we enrich the social
network and labour market performance literature by distinguishing co-ethnic contact
and inter-ethnic contact. Second, we add to the literature on the labour market effects
of Dutch language proficiency in the Netherlands. Third, we study labour market
outcomes more comprehensively than the previous literature by using three measures:
labour market earnings, employment probability, and occupational status. Fourth,
the Dutch immigrant data enables us to test the causal effect of social contacts and
Dutch language proficiency more rigorously in a longitudinal setting.
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 proposes the
theory and our hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the data and variables. Section
4.4 presents the empirical analysis. Robustness checks are performed in Section 4.5,
confirming our main results. The final section provides concluding remarks, and
discusses avenues for future research.
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses
The literature both in labour economics and sociology is replete with references to the
importance of social networks for labour market performance (mainly earnings and
employment)(see, e.g., Granovetter, 1974; Montgomery, 1991; Ioannides and Loury,
2004). Social contacts facilitate economic opportunities by providing access to job
information (Lin, 1999; Mouw, 2003). Equally important is the linguistic skill as a host-
country specific human capital. The positive effect of destination language proficiency
for immigrants’ economic well-being has been widely acknowledged in English-
speaking countries such as the US, Canada, Australia and the UK (Carliner, 1981;
McManus et al., 1983; Chiswick and Miller, 1995, 2002; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003),
as well as non-English speaking countries such as Germany, Spain and Israel (Chiswick,
1998; Dustmann and Van Soest, 2001; Budria and Swedberg, 2012). Destination
language proficiency directly enhances earnings and enhances the partial effect of
other forms of human capital. Above all, it is then hypothesised that social contacts
and Dutch language proficiency increase the likelihood of employment and earnings of
non-western immigrants in the Netherlands. (H1)
Immigrants’ labour market performance is closely associated with skill transferabil-
ity (Duleep and Regets, 1999; Chiswick and Miller, 2012), since low-skill-transferability
immigrants will be making greater human-capital investment in the Netherlands.
Skill transferability can be proxied empirically by age at migration, linguistic distance
between origin and destination languages, and host-country specific education. High-
skill-transferability immigrants are able to quickly adapt to the new environment
by themselves, while social contacts and Dutch language proficiency could be more
beneficial to low-skill-transferability immigrants due to their lack of host-country
specific human capital. It is then hypothesised that social contacts and Dutch language
proficiency have a greater impact on the likelihood of employment and earnings for
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low-skill-transferability immigrants than for high-skill-transferability immigrants in
the Netherlands. (H2)
The effect of social contacts and Dutch language proficiency varies with migration
motives. Economic migrants are those who move primarily because of their own
economic opportunities, and are mostly described as ambitious and hard-working
(Chiswick, 1999). Compared to non-economic migrants, such as tied movers, refugees
and ideological migrants, they are likely to make greater use of social contacts and
Dutch language skills to enhance their labour market performance. This leads to
the hypothesis that social contacts and Dutch language proficiency have a greater
impact on the likelihood of employment and earnings for economic migrants than for
non-economic migrants. (H3)
Last but not the least, occupational attainment is an important but frequently
neglected indicator of labour market performance in immigrant literature. Apart
from years of schooling, training, qualifications, language skills (Nickell, 1982; Evans,
1987; Chiswick and Miller, 2007), social network have also been found to increase
occupational status (Lin et al., 1981; Mullan, 1989; Kanas et al., 2012). Certain
occupations require social skills and effective communication for success. Blue-
collar jobs, such as agricultural workers and machine operators, require technical
skills more than the worker’s social network. For white-collar jobs, however, such as
clerks and service workers, the work performance is closely related to how well they
communicate with people. Therefore we hypothesise that social contacts and Dutch
language proficiency have a greater impact on occupational status for white-collar jobs
than for blue-collar jobs. (H4)
We also analyse the extent to which immigrants in the Netherlands benefit
from different types of social contacts. Upon arrival at the destination country, an
immigrant faces choices of developing social capital with different types of people,
among which ethnicity might be the most important dimension. Contact with the
natives yields unambiguously positive returns because it provides immigrants with
information on higher quality job offers and assistance in assimilation (Kazemipur,
2006; Iosifides et al., 2007; Lancee, 2012a). However, the economic returns of co-ethnic
contacts are less clear-cut. Lancee (2010) found that co-ethnic networks do not affect
economic outcomes. On the one hand, socializing with co-ethnics provides assistance
in job information and initial settlement (Clark and Drinkwater, 1998; Chiswick and
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Miller, 2005). Yet, while embedding into co-ethnic networks enhances ethnic solidarity,
it retards contact with the host society. This may hamper upward economic mobility.49
Therefore we hypothesise that immigrant’s contact with Dutch people leads to better
economic performance (earnings, employment and occupational status) (H5), and
that co-ethnic contact has an ambiguous effect on immigrant’s economic performance
(earnings, employment and occupational status) (H6).
4.3 Data and Variables
4.3.1 Data
The data are from the Dutch survey ‘Social Position and Use of Public Facilities by
Immigrants’ (SPVA), which is a large-scale, cross-sectional survey for the four largest
non-western immigrant groups in the Netherlands: Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese,
and Antilleans. The aim of the survey is to collect information for the analysis of
the socio-economic and socio-cultural position of the four largest immigrant ethnic
minorities in the Netherlands. The data were collected using a stratified random
sampling method to target municipalities with a high percentage of immigrants. The
empirical analysis is restricted to adult foreign-born men, with the age ranging from
25 to 64 years. The individuals included are those who were reported as the household
head. The sample frame consists of 10 to 13 cities (depending on survey year), where
immigrants are relatively overrepresented. It was conducted in year 1991, 1994, 1998
and 2002, with 1981, 1762, 3228, and 1949 households, respectively.
We follow the approach in Martinovic et al. (2009) to create a sample of panel
respondents. A number of immigrants participated more than once in the survey.
There are in total 718 two-waves participants, 118 three-waves participants, and 18
four-waves participants. Those who participated more than twice (for example a
1991-1994-1998 participant), are registered both as belonging to the 1991-1994 and
1994-1998 panel groups. As a result, a pooled data set of 1450 cases is obtained, with
responses on two occasions that are separated by a time distance of 3 to 4 years.50
49This classification of the two types of social contacts is more frequently called bonding and
bridging by sociologists, according to the definitions in Putnam (2000); Woolcock and Narayan (2000).
50A household which has changed its head across waves is excluded from the analysis.
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4.3.2 Dependent and independent variables
In the Appendix, Table 4.5 shows a list of the dependent and independent (explanatory)
variables, with their detailed definitions and coding.
Three different variables jointly measure immigrant labour market performances.
Monthly earnings: respondents report their monthly labour market earnings from
all jobs. Employment: dichotomous variable equals 1 if the respondent is working
regularly and 0 if the respondent is without a job.51 Occupational status: it is measured
in terms of the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). It
refers to the primary occupation reported in the survey year.
There are several explanatory variables:
Only employed respondents were asked about their working hours, occupations,
and sectors. Contract working hours: the respondents were asked how many hours
they work per week according to the employment contract. Occupations: occupations
are categorised into two types. Blue-collar workers perform manual labour (e.g.
agricultural workers and machine operators), and white-collar workers perform
professional, managerial, or administrative work (e.g. service workers, clerks and
legislators).52 Sectors: three types are distinguished. Primary sector involves activities
of raw materials extraction (e.g. agriculture, horticulture, and forestry), secondary
sector involves manufacturing activities (e.g. food processing and construction), and
the tertiary sector involves services (e.g. telecommunication and accountants).
Human capital variables for both the origin-country and host-country are included.
Education is measured by five dichotomous variables: No education, primary edu-
cation, lower secondary education, intermediate education, and higher education.53
51Respondents who reported to be housewives, incapacitated, students, retired or in other unspeci-
fied situations are not included in the sample.
52Here we make use of the International Standard Classification of Occupation, ISCO-88, 1-digit
level. ISCO codes (1) legislators, senior officials and managers, (2) professionals, (3) technicians and
associate professionals, (4) clerks, (5) service workers and shop and market sales workers, are defined as
white collar. ISCO codes (6) skilled agricultural and fishery workers, (7) craft and related trades workers,
(8) plant and machine operators and assemblers, (9) elementary occupations, are defined as blue collar.
53According to Oosterbeek (1992), secondary education in the Netherlands is composed of both
vocational and general branches, with different years of schooling. Within each branch, students can
enter lower secondary education directly after primary education and can only enter intermediate
education upon graduation from the previous one. Higher education refers to higher vocational educa-
tion and university. We distinguish education as primary education (LO), lower secondary education
(LBO/MAVO), intermediate education (MBO/HAVO/VWO), and higher education (HBO/WO).
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Education in OC: the highest degree obtained in the country of origin, among the
five levels. Education in NL: the highest degree obtained in the Netherlands. Work
experience in OC: work experience in the country of origin is measured in years. Work
experience in NL: work experience in the Netherlands is measured in years. Dutch
language proficiency: it is a categorical variable with (1) do not speak Dutch or find it
very difficult, (2) Not very well, sometimes find it difficult, (3) Very well, never find it
difficult, where (1) is the reference category.
Social capital variables are included for both co-ethnic contact and contact with
Dutch people. Contact composition during free time: the respondents were asked
about their frequency of Dutch contact and co-ethnic contact during free time. Three
categories are, (1) more contacts with co-ethnics, (2) equal contacts with Dutch and
co-ethnics, (3) more contacts with the Dutch, where (1) is the reference category.
Contact composition at work: the respondents were asked about their frequency of
Dutch contact and co-ethnic contact at work. Three categories are, (1) more contacts
with co-ethnics, (2) equal contacts with Dutch and co-ethnics, (3) more contacts
with the Dutch, where (1) is the reference category. Organisation membership: the
respondents were asked whether they belong to any organisation and whether the
composition of the organisation is predominantly Dutch or co-ethnic. Two questions
are combined and a variable with three categories is constructed, (1) no membership,
(2) member of a predominantly ethnic organisation, (3) member of a predominantly
Dutch organisation, where (1) is the reference category.
Other background characteristics are included as well. Ethnicity: respondents
self-report their ethnicity, including Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans.
The Turks are treated as the reference group. Municipality: respondent’s place of
residence. Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht, Eindhoven, Enschede, Almere,
Alphen aan den Rijn, Bergen op Zoom, Hoogezand-Sappemeer, Delft, Dordrecht,
and Tiel are identified in the survey and are included in the analysis. Amsterdam
is the reference category. Ethnic concentration: is measured by the proportion of
the respondent’s ethnic group in the population of the city of residence, for Turks,
Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans.54 Nationality: dichotomous variable equals
1 if the respondent reported having Dutch nationality (citizenship) and 0 otherwise.
Married: dichotomous variable equals 1 if the respondent is married (spouse present)
54The ethnic distribution of population within cities is from Statistics Netherlands.
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and 0 otherwise. Number of children: the respondents were asked how many children
they have at home in the Netherlands and also outside home. We create a new variable
by summing up the numbers. Years since migration: Years of stay in the Netherlands.
Migration motives: migration motives are categorised into four types. Work, study,
family (mainly family reunification, marriage or being brought to the Netherlands by
parents) and other reasons (political situation in the origin-country, health reasons,
etc).
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for cross-sectional data. The sample is
restricted to adult foreign-born men, whose ages range from 25 to 64. The average
monthly earnings of the total sample is 2627 Dutch guilders. 58 % of the immigrants
are employed. The ISEI scale ranges from 16 (agricultural workers; helpers and
cleaners in offices, hotels and other establishments) to 88 (medical doctors). The
mean occupational status in the cross-sectional sample is 41 (locomotive-engine
drivers). An increase of one standard deviation above the mean in the average ISEI
scale would be equivalent to working as production and operations managers in
wholesale and retail trade, or in transport, storage and communications. A decrease
of one standard deviation below the mean would be equivalent to working as building
caretakers, gardeners, or garbage collectors. 53 % of the immigrants have a Dutch
nationality.55 The average duration in the Netherlands is 18 years. Up to 69 % of the
respondents do not have any education in the Netherlands and only 6 % completed
higher education (university) in the Netherlands. 5 % of the respondents work in the
primary sector, 28 % work in the secondary sector, 29 % work in the tertiary sector, and
the rest 38 % are unemployed. The ethnic concentration is measured in percentages,
with an average level of about 5 %.
Table 4.2 shows that social contacts and Dutch language proficiency vary signifi-
cantly across the four ethnic groups. In general, Surinamese and Antilleans have more
networks developed among Dutch people compared to Turks and Moroccans, either
during free time, at work or organisation types. This may be a consequence of Dutch
55In the Netherlands, it is possible to hold two nationalities. Some of the immigrants still keep their
nationalities in the country of origin. The percentages of Dutch nationality holders in the sample are
34 % for Turks and Moroccans, 95 % for Surinamese, and 100 % for Antilleans.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Cross-sectional Data, Adult Foreign-born Men
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Earnings (in Dutch guilders) 4,618 2,627.09 1,137.78 9.00 21,989.00
Employed now 8,913 0.58 0.49 0 1
Occupational status 3,323 40.51 17.77 16 88
Age 8,920 41.04 10.51 25 64
Turks 8,920 0.35 0.48 0 1
Moroccans 8,920 0.34 0.47 0 1
Surinamese 8,920 0.19 0.39 0 1
Antilleans 8,920 0.12 0.32 0 1
Dutch nationality 8,920 0.53 0.50 0 1
YSM (in years) 8,792 18.04 8.94 0.00 52.50
Married 8,920 0.82 0.38 0 1
Number of children 8,920 2.63 2.34 0 17
Motive: study 8,920 0.11 0.31 0 1
Motive: family 8,920 0.31 0.46 0 1
Motive: work 8,920 0.43 0.50 0 1
Motive: others 8,920 0.15 0.36 0 1
No edu. in OC 8,698 0.33 0.47 0 1
Primary edu. in OC 8,698 0.35 0.48 0 1
Lower edu. in OC 8,698 0.16 0.37 0 1
Intermed. edu. in OC 8,698 0.13 0.33 0 1
Higher edu. in OC 8,698 0.03 0.17 0 1
No edu. in NL 8,581 0.69 0.46 0 1
Primary edu. in NL 8,581 0.10 0.29 0 1
Lower edu. in NL 8,581 0.08 0.28 0 1
Intermed. edu. in NL 8,581 0.07 0.26 0 1
Higher edu. in NL 8,581 0.06 0.23 0 1
Exp. in OC (in years) 8,531 4.85 3.29 0.00 21.36
Exp. in NL (in years) 8,833 12.17 8.56 0.00 48.00
Work in primary sector 8,920 0.05 0.22 0 1
Work in secondary sector 8,920 0.28 0.45 0 1
Work in tertiary sector 8,920 0.29 0.45 0 1
Contract working hours 5,025 37.92 7.25 0 96
Ethnic concentration 6,938 4.78 2.52 0.26 9.73
Notes: Earnings are measured as monthly labour market income, unadjusted for inflation.
Occupational status is measured in terms of ISEI. Contract working hours are measured per
week. Ethnic concentration is measured in percentages.
Source: SPVA 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002.
86 Chapter 4. Social Contacts, Language Proficiency and Economic Performance
language proficiency. 85 % of Surinamese speak Dutch very well, 72 % for Antilleans,
28 % for Moroccans, while only 20 % of Turks reach this level of proficiency.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Social Contacts and Dutch Language Proficiency
across Ethnicity for Cross-sectional Data, Adult Foreign-born Men
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans
During free time: more contact with co-ethnics 0.48 0.29 0.29 0.19
During free time: equal contacts 0.19 0.28 0.40 0.33
During free time: more contact with Dutch 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.38
At work: more contact with co-ethnics 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.03
At work: equal contacts 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.09
At work: more contact with Dutch 0.22 0.19 0.48 0.56
No membership 0.77 0.83 0.65 0.64
Ethnic org. membership 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.08
Dutch org. membership 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.29
Do not speak Dutch 0.38 0.29 0.03 0.04
Dutch: not very well 0.42 0.43 0.12 0.23
Dutch: very well 0.20 0.28 0.85 0.72
Notes: The social contacts and language variables are dichotomous with a value of either 0 or 1.
The figures in the table are the percentage of respondents in the total sample that fit the description
of the first column within each ethnic group.
Sample size: 13023.
Source: SPVA 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002.
Figure 4.1 shows the average monthly earnings of adult foreign-born men across
ethnic groups. All groups show a steady increase in earnings over the years. Moroccans
are economically worse off than the other three groups. Antilleans reported the highest
earnings in 1991 and 1994, but were later surpassed by Surinamese in 1998 and 2002.
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Cross section analyses
The empirics begin with a cross-section regression analysis for adult foreign-born
men in the Netherlands. Table 4.3 presents the regression estimates for earnings,
employment and occupational status. Column (1) is the OLS earnings regression
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Figure 4.1: The Average Monthly Earnings of Adult Foreign-born Men in Each Wave
Notes: In 2002, the currency changed from Dutch guilders to Euros. The exchange ratio 2.2:1 is used to
unify the monetary unit across four waves. Earnings shown in this figure is not adjusted for inflation.
Source: SPVA 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002.
(Mincer, 1974) incorporated with YSM variables (Chiswick, 1978). The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of earnings. The sample includes employed men
reporting positive or non-zero labour market earnings. Column (2) is a logistic
regression model and the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable for being
employed or not. The sample includes those who reported ‘working regularly’ or
‘unemployed/search for jobs’. Column (3) is an OLS estimation for occupational status,
with ISEI being the dependent variable. The sample includes employed respondents
with reported occupations. All the standard errors are clustered on respondent ID,
given the fact that some respondents appear more than once in the pooled cross-
sectional data.
In column (1) of Table 4.3 on earnings, the coefficients for all social contact
variables are statistically insignificant. Dutch language proficiency turns out to be an
important factor in increasing earnings. Respondents who speak Dutch very well earn
around 6 % more than those who have no mastery of the Dutch language. This effect
is smaller than the effect of language proficiency found elsewhere in other destination
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Table 4.3: Cross-section Regression Analysis of Earnings, Employment and Occupa-
tional Status, Adult Foreign-born Men
Earnings Employment ISEI
Constant 5.178 (0.182)∗∗∗ −0.068 (0.348) 57.151 (2.373)∗∗∗
Social Contacts
Free time: equal contact −0.020 (0.025) 0.273 (0.123)∗∗ 0.631 (0.680)
Free time: more with Dutch −0.045 (0.036) 0.187 (0.180) −1.423 (0.952)
At work: equal contact 0.008 (0.023) −1.082 (1.055)
At work: more with Dutch 0.015 (0.023) 1.072 (1.071)
Ethnic org. membership 0.019 (0.023) 0.107 (0.122) 1.653 (0.685)∗∗
Dutch org. membership 0.039 (0.036) 0.263 (0.172) 2.505 (0.804)∗∗∗
Human Capital
Dutch: not very well −0.015 (0.020) 0.277 (0.112)∗∗ −0.171 (0.678)
Dutch: very well 0.060 (0.019)∗ 0.815 (0.139)∗∗∗ 1.044 (0.792)
Primary edu. in OC −0.007 (0.023) −0.048 (0.106) −1.270 (0.588)∗
Lower edu. in OC −0.010 (0.034) −0.039 (0.154) 0.097 (0.757)
Intermed. edu. in OC 0.055 (0.039) −0.003 (0.155) 1.933 (0.867)∗∗
Higher edu. in OC 0.099 (0.085)∗ 0.139 (0.270) 9.547 (2.025)∗∗∗
Primary edu. in NL −0.002 (0.030) 0.053 (0.138) 2.395 (0.862)∗∗∗
Lower edu. in NL 0.065 (0.026)∗ 0.477 (0.193)∗∗∗ 0.177 (0.826)
Intermed. edu. in NL 0.088 (0.037)∗∗ 0.979 (0.245)∗∗∗ 4.890 (1.059)∗∗∗
Higher edu. in NL 0.168 (0.062)∗∗∗ 2.145 (0.370)∗∗∗ 18.946 (1.335)∗∗∗
Exp. in NL 0.007 (0.005) 0.282 (0.023)∗∗∗ 0.224 (0.136)∗
Exp. in OC −0.002 (0.008) −0.229 (0.042)∗∗∗ −0.452 (0.265)∗
Exp. in NL squared/100 −0.006 (0.018) −0.283 (0.069)∗∗∗ −0.889 (0.398)∗∗
Exp. in OC squared/100 0.021 (0.051) 0.599 (0.291)∗∗ 3.100 (2.166)∗
Control Variables
Moroccans −0.026 (0.019) −0.218 (0.108)∗∗ −1.719 (0.617)∗∗
Surinamese −0.023 (0.038) 1.007 (0.181)∗∗∗ 0.603 (0.898)
Antilleans 0.048 (0.045) 0.984 (0.230)∗∗∗ 0.527 (1.120)
Dutch nationality −0.004 (0.018) 0.101 (0.107) 0.275 (0.560)
YSM 0.006 (0.010) −0.158 (0.024)∗∗∗ −0.236 (0.144)
YSM squared/100 −0.012 (0.030) −0.048 (0.061) 0.979 (0.367)∗∗∗
Married 0.060 (0.030)∗∗ 0.786 (0.128)∗∗∗ −0.499 (0.743)
Number of children 0.007 (0.008) −0.062 (0.026)∗∗ 0.202 (0.170)
Inflation factor 1.495 (0.093)∗∗∗
Contract working hours 0.014 (0.002)∗∗∗
Ethnic concentration 0.010 (0.006)∗ 0.035 (0.030) 0.184 (0.151)
R2 0.144 0.480
Adj. R2 0.131 0.471
Num. obs. 3160 4715 2990
Log Likelihood -1773.689
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered on respondent ID.
The dependent variable of column (1) is the natural logarithm of earnings. Column (2) is estimated
using a logistic regression model. The dependent variable of column (3) is the International Socio-
Economic Index.
The reference for each categorical variable is as follows. Contact composition during free time: more
contact with co-ethnics. Contact composition at work: more contact with co-ethnics. Organisation
membership: no membership. Dutch proficiency: do not speak Dutch or find it very difficult.
Education in OC: no education. Education in NL: no education. Ethnicity: Turks.
The inflation factor is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in year 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2002.
Year effect, city effect and sector effect are controlled in the regressions.
The variance inflation factors for social contact variables and language proficiency variable are all
smaller than 4, implying no multicollinearity problem.
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countries. In addition, higher earnings are associated with more schooling in the
Netherlands. There is no significant difference in earnings among the four immigrant
groups.
In column (2) of Table 4.3 on employment, the effects of social contacts and Dutch
language proficiency on the probability of employment are interpreted using the odds
ratio. The odds ratio is expected to change by exp(biδ) for a change of δ in variable xi ,
ceteris paribus.
Pr (Empl oyed = 1|X = {xi +δ, x−i })
Pr (Empl oyed = 1|X = {xi , x−i })
= exp(biδ), (4.1)
where bi is the estimated coefficient for variable xi in the logistic regression model.
The odds ratio is 1.31 times greater for a change from ‘more contact with co-ethnics’
to ‘equal contacts with Dutch and co-ethnics’ in the ethnic composition. The odds
ratio is 2.26 times greater for a change from ‘speak no Dutch’ to ‘speak Dutch very
well’. Surinamese and Antilleans have higher employment rates than Turks and
Moroccans.56
In column (3) of Table 4.3, ethnic organisation membership and Dutch organ-
isation membership are both associated with a higher occupational status. The
occupational status is positively associated with education level. The negative
coefficient for YSM (although not statistically significant) and the significant positive
coefficient for YSM squared suggest that the International Socio-Economic Index rises
at an increasing rate with duration in the Netherlands.57
4.4.2 Panel data analyses on earnings
This subsection discusses the econometric specifications for testing immigrant
economic assimilation using longitudinal data, and the corresponding regression
analysis. The following notation is used: LnEi t is the natural logarithm of earnings
for immigrant i = 1,2, · · · , N , in time period t ; Y SMi t is years since migration of i
in time t ; Xi t is the individual characteristics that may vary over time, for example,
56This is consistent with the finding in Zorlu and Hartog (2012).
57Zorlu (2013) shows that labour market adjustment of immigrants in the Netherlands runs through
inter-occupational job mobility, rather than intra-occupational mobility, while the focus is put more on
the initial disadvantage upon arrival and the rate of adjustment (including interval categories for YSM
as the explanatory variable, but not quadratic terms of YSM) in later years.
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social contact variables and language variables; θi is the individual specific effect for
immigrant i , including observed characteristics (such as ethnicity), and unobserved
heterogeneity; εi t is the residual error.
We follow convention by assuming that the earnings assimilation curve is quadratic
in years since migration:
LnEi t =α+β ·Y SMi +γ ·Y SM 2i +λ ·Xi t +θi +εi t . (4.2)
The intercept α could be interpreted as the logarithm of the benchmark for immigrant
group evaluated at Xi = 0. It is assumed that our coefficients of interest β, γ and
λ do not vary over time. For simplicity, it is assumed that the effect on earnings of
education in the Netherlands is captured by the years since migration variable.
Let τ= t+T where T > 0 is the time interval between two longitudinal observations.
Let ∆T denote the difference operator over T periods. Equation 4.2 implies that in
time period τ:
LnEiτ =α+β · (Y SMi +T )+γ · (Y SMi +T )2+λ ·Xiτ+θi +εiτ. (4.3)
Subtracting Equation 4.3 from Equation 4.2 differences away the immigrant
specific effect:
∆T LnEi = (βT +γT 2)+2Tγ ·Y SMi +λ ·∆T Xi +∆T εi . (4.4)
β,γ, andλ are exactly identified in Equation 4.4. Note the sign of γ determines whether
the immigrant earnings increase at an increasing or a decreasing rate with duration in
the destination.
The panel data sample is created with a time interval of T ≈ 4 years between
the first and the second time of the survey, making it possible for us to estimate
Equation 4.4. The variable Xi include the social capital variables (Contact composition
during free time, contact composition at work, and organisation membership) and
Dutch language proficiency variable. The longitudinal regression analysis would be
concerned with the level changes in social contacts and Dutch language proficiency
between two time periods.
Table 4.4 presents the longitudinal regression analysis of earnings for adult
foreign-born men in the Netherlands. The dependent variable is the difference
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between the natural logarithm of earnings adjusted for inflation in time 2 and time
1. Column (1) ‘All’ is the estimation for the whole sample. In column (1), contrary
to the cross-sectional findings, it is found that the coefficients for social contacts
are statistically significant. Co-ethnic contact during free time compared to Dutch
contact (16 %), equal contact compared to co-ethnic contact at work (17 %) and Dutch
language proficiency compared to not speaking Dutch (15 %) all lead to an increase
in earnings.58 The effect of network differs by the context. If an immigrant allocates
more time in co-ethnic contact during free time or some contact at work with Dutch
people compared to only co-ethnics, this would yields returns to earnings. These
confirm our hypotheses H1, H5, H6 about earnings.
Column (2) of Table 4.4 ‘T&M’ is the estimation for the Mediterranean group (Turks
and Moroccans), and column (3) of Table 4.4 ‘S&A’ is the estimation for the Caribbean
group (Surinamese and Antilleans). The Mediterranean group is predominantly of
Muslim origin and its linguistic distance from the Dutch is great. The Caribbean group,
however, is close to the Dutch society concerning religious and cultural characteristics
due to a colonial history. Column (2) shows that co-ethnic contact compared to equal
contact (14 %), some contact with Dutch people at work (17 %), and Dutch language
proficiency (15 %) all lead to an increase in earnings for the Mediterranean group,
while the effect is much lower for the Caribbean group. As shown in equation 4.4,
solving βT +γT 2 = 0.204,2Tγ=−0.011 yields β= 0.057 and γ=−0.0014 (Table 4.4,
column 2). The earnings of the Mediterranean group increases at a decreasing rate
with duration.
Column (4) of Table 4.4 ‘No NL Edu.’ is the estimation for immigrants who
completed their education in the country of origin, and column (5) of Table 4.4 ‘NL
Edu.’ is the estimation for immigrants who completed education in the Netherlands.
58Yao and Van Ours (2015) analyses the effect of Dutch language proficiency on the wages of adult
male immigrants in the Netherlands from all countries of origin. Although the sample is relatively
small for a microdata analysis of male earnings (407 observations), those who are proficient in Dutch
(measured by a dichotomous variable) earn about 14 percent more than those lacking proficiency,
which is marginally significant (t=1.91). This magnitude is comparable to what is found in this study
and in studies of other countries. Using an IV approach to identify Dutch proficiency, Yao and Van
Ours found the coefficient declines to 9.4 percent, but the standard error increases sharply (t=0.49).
Presumably because of the difficulty of finding appropriate identifying instruments, other studies using
the IV technique to study the relation between earnings and proficiency also found a large increase in
the standard error compared to an OLS analysis. For a discussion of this issue, see Chiswick and Miller
(1995).
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Comparing column (4) and column (5), the effects of social contacts (15 % for ‘more
contact with Dutch at work’) and Dutch language proficiency (19 %) on earnings
of immigrants who completed their education in the country of origin are stronger
than that for immigrants who completed their education in the Netherlands. Solving
βT +γT 2 = 0.196,2Tγ=−0.009 yields β= 0.054 and γ=−0.0011 (Table 4.4, column
4), and solving βT +γT 2 = −0.238,2Tγ = 0.017 yields β = −0.068 and γ = 0.0022
(Table 4.4, column 5). The earnings of those without a Dutch diploma increases at
a decreasing rate with duration. However, the earnings of Dutch diploma holders
increases with duration only for those who have migrated over 30 years. The result
might be heavily induced by many immigrants who migrated at a very young age. The
initial years of duration does not contribute to earnings directly but via schooling in
the Netherlands.
Column (6) of Table 4.4 ‘AAM>18’ is the estimation for immigrants whose age
at migration (AAM) is older than 18, and column (7) of Table 4.4 ‘AAM≤18’ is
the estimation for immigrants whose age at migration (AAM) is younger than 18.
Comparing column (6) and column (7), co-ethnic contact during free time (22 %),
Dutch contact at work (23 %), and Dutch language proficiency (19 %) all increase
earnings for immigrants who migrate at an older age, while only the coefficient for
Dutch organisation membership is positively significant in column (4). The effects
of social contacts and Dutch language proficiency on earnings of immigrants who
migrate at an older age are also slightly stronger than that for immigrants who migrate
at a younger age.
Above all, we have done regressions for three pairs of (low-skill-transferability
versus high-skill-transferability) subgroups: the Mediterranean versus the Caribbean;
immigrants’ education completed in the country of origin versus education completed
in the Netherlands; age at migration older than 18 versus age at migration younger
than 18. We consistently found that low-skill-transferability immigrants benefit more
from social contacts and especially from Dutch language proficiency in earnings than
high-skill-transferability immigrants, thus confirming hypothesis H2 about earnings.
Column (8) of Table 4.4 ‘Econ’ is the estimation for the economic migrants, and
column (9) of Table 4.4 ‘Non-Econ’ is the estimation for the non-economic migrants.
Column (8) shows that the statistically significant contact with Dutch people at work
(31 %) and Dutch language proficiency (24 %) both lead to an increase in earnings of
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economic migrants. However, among non-economic migrants, only the coefficient for
Dutch organisation membership is statistically significant (16 %). This confirms our
hypothesis H3 on the effects on earnings of motives for migrating.
4.4.3 Panel data analyses on employment
Appendix Table 4.6 presents the random effects logistic regression results of employ-
ment for adult foreign-born men in the Netherlands. The random effects logit model
is a maximum likelihood solution where the parameters are estimated through a
weighted combination of within and between individual covariances. The dependent
variable is a dichotomous variable for being employed or not. Column (1) ‘All’ is
the estimation for the whole sample. σ is the estimated random effects’ standard
deviation. The significance of σ implies that there is random effect. Similar with
cross-sectional findings in Table 4.3, Dutch contact greatly enhances the probability of
being employed. In column (1), participating in a Dutch organisation is significantly
associated with a higher probability of being employed, and the odds ratio is 4.93
times higher. The odds ratio is 1.76 times greater for a change from ‘do not speak
Dutch’ to ‘Dutch: not very well’, and is 3.06 times greater for a change from ‘do not
speak Dutch’ to ‘Dutch: very well’. Social contacts and Dutch language proficiency
turn out to increase the likelihood of employment, especially contact with Dutch
people. Co-ethnic contact does not seem to have any positive effect on employment.
These confirm the hypotheses H1, H5, H6 about employment.
Column (2) of Table 4.6 ‘T&M’ is the estimation for the Mediterranean group
(Turks and Moroccans), and column (3) of Table 4.6 ‘S&A’ is the estimation for the
Caribbean group (Surinamese and Antilleans). Only the Mediterranean group has a
higher probability of being employed with more Dutch contact, and a higher level of
Dutch language proficiency. Social contacts and Dutch language proficiency do not
have these positive effects for the Caribbean group, perhaps because they are highly
adjusted to Dutch culture and language at immigration.
Column (4) of Table 4.6 ‘No NL Edu.’ is the estimation for immigrants who
completed their education in the country of origin, and column (5) of Table 4.6 ‘NL
Edu.’ is the estimation for immigrants who completed education in the Netherlands.
In column (4), participating in a Dutch organisation is significantly associated with a
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higher probability of being employed for immigrants who completed their education
in the country of origin, and the odds ratio is 9.97 times higher. The odds ratio is
1.74 times greater for a change from ‘do not speak Dutch’ to ‘Dutch: not very well’,
and is 2.24 times greater for a change from ‘do not speak Dutch’ to ‘Dutch: very
well’. However in column (5), none of the coefficients for social contacts and Dutch
language proficiency are significant for immigrants who completed their education in
the Netherlands.
Column (6) of Table 4.6 ‘AAM>18’ is the estimation for immigrants whose age
at migration (AAM) is older than 18, and column (7) of Table 4.6 ‘AAM≤18’ is
the estimation for immigrants whose age at migration (AAM) is younger than 18.
Comparing these two columns, the coefficients for Dutch organisation membership
and Dutch language proficiency are positively significant for immigrants who migrated
at older age, while only the coefficient for language variable is positively significant
for immigrants who migrated at younger age.
Above all, we have compared the three pairs (low-skill-transferability versus high-
skill-transferability) of subgroups: the Mediterranean versus the Caribbean; education
completed in the country of origin versus education completed in the Netherlands; age
at migration older than 18 versus age at migration younger than 18. We consistently
found that low-skill-transferability immigrants benefit more in terms of employment
from social contacts and Dutch language proficiency than high-skill-transferability
immigrants, thus confirming hypothesis H2 about employment.
Column (8) and (9) of Table 4.6 report the random effects regression results
separately for economic and non-economic migrants. Participating in a Dutch
organisation is significantly associated with higher probability of employment for
economic migrants, and the odds ratio is 11.99 times higher. The odds ratio is 2.49
times greater for a change from ‘do not speak Dutch’ to ‘Dutch: not very well’. However,
the effect of language is much less for non-economic migrants. This confirms our
hypothesis H3 about employment.
4.4.4 Panel data analyses on occupational status
The fixed effects estimation on occupational status for adult foreign-born men
in the Netherlands is reported in Appendix Table 4.7. The dependent variable is
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the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI). The model eliminates unobserved
heterogeneity by using deviations from the means of the variables, and hence the time-
invariant variables, such as ethnicity, are eliminated. Column (1) is the estimation for
the whole sample. Column (2) is the estimation for immigrants who are blue-collar
workers, and column (3) is the estimation for immigrants who are white-collar workers.
In column (1), it is found that both co-ethnic contact and contact with Dutch people
are useful for occupational upward mobility. This confirms the hypotheses H5 and
H6 about occupational status. Comparing column (2) and column (3), we do not find
any significant effect of social contacts on occupational status in blue-collar jobs. In
white collar-jobs, however, co-ethnic contact and some contact with Dutch people
compared to only co-ethnics increases the occupational status. This confirms our
hypothesis H4.
4.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we mainly discuss two issues: selectivity of panel respondents in cross-
sectional data; and the possible reverse causality between earnings and social contact
variables.
It should be noted that this Dutch survey was not originally set up as a longitudinal
study and hence the level of attrition is rather high. Around 80 % agree to take part in
the next wave, but only 20 % actually realise the re-interview. The interviewers did
not trace the respondents who move in the period between the two surveys. We also
checked the descriptive statistics for the pooled panel data, both at the first and the
second time of measurement. They do not differ greatly from Table 4.1 and Table
4.2.59 To further check whether these respondents are selective, we apply Heckman
selection model. In the first step, a probit regression is run to predict the participation
of respondents in the panel sample. Apart from all the control variables, the dummy
for living in a rented house is added. The coefficient is significantly negative, implying
that the respondents who live in a rented house are less likely to participate in the next
wave compared to those who own a house. The intuition is that respondents renting
a house have higher probabilities of changing address by returning to their country
59The descriptive tables for the pooled panel data are available on request.
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of origin or moving elsewhere in the Netherlands. In the second step, the outcome
regression is run controlling for the selectivity coefficient obtained in the first step.
The Heckman selectivity correction models for earnings, employment and occu-
pational status are reported in Appendix Table 4.8. The inverse Mills’ ratio reported in
the last row of each column is not significant in any of the specifications, implying
that there is no selection bias. This result validates the empirical analysis for the panel
data.
Apart from utilising the longitudinal approach to tackle the endogeneity problem,
we further study the causal relationship between social contacts and earnings by
including in the model lagged measures of social contacts and Dutch language
proficiency (Appendix Table 4.9). In our panel data sample, these lagged variables are
3 to 4 years prior to the measured earnings.
Although the lagged contact variables during free time and at work are not
statistically significant, lagged variables for ethnic organisation membership, Dutch
organisation membership and the ethnic concentration all have significant positive
effects in earnings. The ethnic organisation membership effect (15 %) is larger and
more highly significant than the effect of Dutch organization membership (11 %).
The lagged language variables are not statistically significant implying that recently
acquired language skills have the bigger impact on earnings, as it is unlikely that
higher earnings increases a worker’s Dutch language skills.
4.6 Main Conclusions and Discussion
This chapter studies the effects of social contacts and Dutch language proficiency on
the adult foreign-born men’s labour market performances in the Netherlands, using
four large cross-section samples from year 1991 to 2002, together with a constructed
panel dataset. It is found that social contacts and Dutch language proficiency have
positive impacts on labour market outcomes (mainly employment and earnings).
But the strength of the effects varies by the degree of the transferability of their pre-
migration skills and their motivation for migration (economic or non-economic).
There are several important findings. First, the Mediterranean group (Turks and
Moroccans) benefits much more from social contacts and Dutch language proficiency
in their economic performance than the Caribbean group (Surinamese and Antilleans).
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For example, the Mediterranean immigrants who speak Dutch well earn 15 % more
than those who do not speak Dutch at all. For Turks and Moroccans, two economically
disadvantaged groups with lower education levels, contact with Dutch people turns
out to be of great use in job-related activity. Surinamese and Antilleans’ earnings
are quite invariant to changes in social contacts and Dutch language proficiency.
Surinamese and Antilleans, as two immigrant groups that are closer to Dutch culture
and language due to colonial ties, their pre-migration contacts with Dutch were rather
frequent. The marginal effect of contact with Dutch people in the Netherlands is not
that important for them.
Second, immigrants who completed their education in the country of origin
benefit more from social contacts and Dutch language proficiency in their economic
performances than immigrants who had some years of schooling in the Netherlands.
In the former group, immigrants who report more contact with Dutch at work earn
15 % more than those who have more co-ethnic contact at work, ceteris paribus.
Certain qualifications in the Netherlands are useful to get a job or a promotion at
work. Immigrants who completed their education in the country of origin lack the
destination-specific exposure, and hence social contacts provide more information
for them to familiarize with the local labour market.
Third, immigrants who migrated at an older age have a larger partial effect from
social contacts and Dutch language proficiency in their economic performances than
immigrants who migrated at a younger age. The older age an immigrant migrates, the
less transferable is his skill to the destination. Younger migrants have accumulated
more destination-specific qualifications and mostly speak fluent Dutch. Therefore
they are more competitive in job market than those who migrated at an older age.
Fourth, social contacts and Dutch language proficiency have larger impacts on the
economic outcomes of economic migrants than non-economic migrants. Economic
migrants make better use of social contacts and Dutch language proficiency to obtain
economic benefits. For example, ceteris paribus, contact with Dutch at work and
having a good mastery of Dutch yield 31 % and 24 % increases in earnings, respectively,
while they do not have any significant effects on non-economic migrants’ earnings.
Fifth, social contacts and Dutch language proficiency also enhance occupational
status, but only for white-collar jobs. Contact with Dutch people is found to be
consistently positive in increasing all labour market outcomes (earnings, employment
4.6. Main Conclusions and Discussion 99
and occupational status), but co-ethnic contact does not increase the likelihood of
employment among immigrants.
This study demonstrates the importance of social contacts and the distinction be-
tween contacts among co-ethnics and with the host population, and Dutch language
proficiency on immigrant economic outcomes. As a result, the study provides insights
for the Netherlands, and the European Union more broadly, on programs to enhance
the integration of immigrants by the government, immigrant ethnic communities
and the immigrants themselves.60 A greater scope may involve mixed neighbourhood
housing, which facilitates communications between the immigrants and the natives. A
greater emphasis on Dutch language proficiency would enhance their earnings directly
and enhance their earnings indirectly by facilitating contact with Dutch people during
their free time, at work and through participating in Dutch organisations.
60Wang (2016), for example, studies how local labour market conditions affect immigrant’s decision
on network formation both in the co-ethnic group and the native group.
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Appendix
Table 4.5: The Definitions and Coding of the Variables in ‘Social Position and Use of
Public Facilities by Immigrants’ (SPVA)
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
Earnings ‘What is your net monthly income from employment?’
In year 2002, the currency changed from Dutch
guilders to Euros. The exchange ratio 2.2:1 is
used to unify the monetary unit across four waves.
Employed now ‘Do you have a paid job at the moment?’
0-No;
1-Yes.
Occupations ‘What kind of work are you doing at the moment?’
The answers are coded either as International
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88)
or Standaard Beroepenclassificatie 1992 (SBC 1992)
in Dutch code.
Contract working ‘How many hours do you work according to your
hours employment contract?’
Education in OC ‘What is the highest degree you have completed
in your country of origin?’
0-No degree;
1-Degree in primary education (LO);
2-Degree in secondary education (LBO/MAVO);
3-Degree in intermediate education (MBO/HAVO/VWO);
4-Degree in higher education (HBO/WO).
This question was originally asked in the survey
as the degree completed outside Netherlands.
Since pre-migration human capital is not the main
focus of this chapter, we assume most of the schooling
is completed in the country of origin.
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
Education in NL ‘What is the highest degree you have completed in
the Netherlands?’
0-No degree;
1-Degree in primary education (LO);
2-Degree in secondary education (LBO/MAVO);
3-Degree in intermediate education (MBO/HAVO/VWO);
4-Degree in higher education (HBO/WO).
Work experience in OC ‘How long have you been in paid work in total in
country of origin?’
This question was asked only in the 1991
questionnaires. To supplement this variable in
the other three waves, we regress reported 1991
work experience in OC on individual background
characteristics (gender, age, years since
migration, total education, etc) and predict
values for the other three waves.
Work experience in NL ‘How long have you worked in total in the
Netherlands?’
Dutch language ‘When you are in a conversation, do you have any
proficiency difficulty in using Dutch language?’
0-Yes, very difficult/ do not speak Dutch at all;
1-Yes, sometimes;
2-No, never.
Contact composition ‘In your spare time, do you have more contact with
during free time Dutch people or do you have more contact with
people from your own ethnic group?’
1-More co-ethnic contact;
2-Both equally;
3-More contact with Dutch people.
Contact composition ‘At work, do you have more contact with
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
at work Dutch people or do you have more contact with
people from your own ethnic group?’
1-More co-ethnic contact;
2-Both equally;
3-More contact with Dutch people.
This variable is not recorded in 2002. Similar
with what has been done for work experience
in OC, we use the regression technique to predict
this variable in 2002.
Organisation Q1: ‘Are you a member of an association or club?’
membership 0-No;
1-Yes.
Q2: ‘Are there many, few or almost no co-ethnic
members of these associations?’
0-Almost no;
1-Few;
2-Many.
Ethnicity ‘What is your ethnic group?’
1-Turks;
2-Moroccans;
3-Surinamese;
4-Antilleans.
Municipality Registered residence municipality
1-Amsterdam; 2-Rotterdam; 3-Den Haag; 4-Utrecht;
5-Eindhoven; 6-Enschede; 7-Almere; 8-Alphen aan
den Rijn; 9-Bergen op Zoom; 10-Hoogezand-Sappemeer;
11-Delft; 12-Dordrecht; 13-Tiel.
Leeuwarden, Spijkenisse, Zwijndrecht and Gornichem
are recoded in SPVA 1991, but not in other waves.
And hence we drop the observations in these
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
municipalities.
Nationality ‘What is your nationality?’
1-Origin country’s nationality;
2-Dutch nationality;
3-Both the origin country’s and Dutch nationalities;
4-Others.
The answers are recoded to a dichotomous variable
which equals 1 if the respondent reported having
Dutch nationality, and 0 otherwise.
Married ‘What is your marital status?’
1-Married; 2-Divorced; 3-Widow/widower;
4-Never been married.
Number of children ‘How many children are there living at home?’
‘How many children are not living at home?’
These two answers are summed up.
Years since migration ‘What is your length of stay in the Netherlands?’
Migration motives ‘You are not born in the Netherlands. What was
the main reason for coming to the Netherlands?’
1-Work; 2-Study; 3-Social safety;
4-Political situation in origin country; 5-Family
reunion; 6-Marriage, family formation; 7-Come
along with parents; 8-Others.
The answers are recoded to four main categories:
work, study, family and other reasons.
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Table 4.7: Fixed Effects Estimation of Panel Data on Occupational Status, Adult Foreign-
born Men: All Sample and Groups by Occupation
All Blue-Collar White-Collar
Constant 0.000 3.942∗∗∗ −3.499∗∗∗
(0.397) (0.625) (0.443)
YSM −1.179∗∗∗ −1.384∗∗∗ −0.695∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.289) (0.194)
Free time: equal contact 1.200 −3.379 4.280∗
(2.051) (3.103) (2.373)
Free time: more with Dutch 1.861 −1.399 3.481
(2.692) (3.962) (3.228)
At work: equal contact 6.501∗∗ 6.380 5.403
(3.220) (5.865) (3.284)
At work: more with Dutch 6.580∗∗ 6.057 5.551
(3.345) (5.782) (3.499)
Dutch visits sometimes −3.111 −4.873 −2.217
(2.107) (3.488) (2.300)
Dutch visits frequently 3.185 2.295 1.576
(2.500) (3.935) (2.849)
Ethnic org. membership 5.490∗∗ 4.573 5.217∗
(2.509) (4.137) (2.709)
Dutch org. membership 1.668 2.283 −0.015
(2.294) (3.254) (2.838)
Dutch: not very well 2.187 4.280 1.154
(2.487) (4.416) (2.577)
Dutch: very well 2.962 3.371 2.270
(2.841) (4.805) (3.019)
R2 0.089 0.102 0.069
Adj. R2 0.070 0.062 0.034
Num. obs. 655 303 352
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
The dependent variable is ISEI. The fixed effects estimator is obtained by within
transformation. Column (1) is the estimation for the whole panel data sample.
Column (2) is the estimation for immigrants who are blue-collar workers. Col-
umn (3) is the estimation for immigrants who are white-collar workers.
The reference for each categorical variable is as follows. Contact composition
during free time: more contact with co-ethnics. Contact composition at work:
more contact with co-ethnics. Organisation membership: no membership.
Dutch proficiency: do not speak Dutch or find it very difficult.
The variance inflation factors for social contact variables and language profi-
ciency variable are all smaller than 4, implying no multicollinearity problem.
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Table 4.8: Heckman Selection Model for Earnings, Employment, and Occupational
Status, Adult Foreign-born Men
Earnings Employment ISEI
Constant 4.884 (0.839)∗∗∗ 0.938 (0.152)∗∗∗ 24.227 (5.853)∗∗∗
Social Contacts
Free time: equal contact −0.018 (0.066) 0.030 (0.031) 1.722 (1.606)
Free time: more with Dutch −0.061 (0.078) −0.024 (0.041) 0.595 (2.091)
At work: equal contact 0.030 (0.077) −0.768 (2.754)
At work: more with Dutch 0.016 (0.074) 0.427 (2.162)
Ethnic org. membership 0.074 (0.063) 0.036 (0.031) 3.613 (1.684)∗∗
Dutch org. membership 0.143 (0.062)∗∗ 0.010 (0.034) 2.561 (1.652)
Human Capital
Dutch: not very well 0.037 (0.062) 0.079 (0.029)∗∗∗ −0.760 (1.607)
Dutch: very well 0.115 (0.076) 0.162 (0.037)∗∗∗ 2.393 (1.952)
Primary edu. in OC −0.024 (0.054) −0.012 (0.026) −2.822 (1.339)∗∗
Lower edu. in OC 0.033 (0.067) 0.033 (0.036) −0.418 (1.692)
Intermed. edu. in OC 0.072 (0.075) −0.011 (0.037) −0.512 (1.847)
Higher edu. in OC −0.142 (0.120) −0.029 (0.060) 13.468 (2.919)∗∗∗
Primary edu. in NL −0.079 (0.070) 0.006 (0.035) 1.759 (2.003)
Lower edu. in NL 0.018 (0.089) 0.080 (0.045)∗ −3.201 (2.903)
Intermed. edu. in NL 0.160 (0.113) 0.097 (0.055)∗ 4.164 (3.169)
Higher edu. in NL −0.139 (0.097) 0.191 (0.052)∗∗∗ 16.141 (2.962)∗∗∗
Exp. in NL 0.004 (0.012) 0.035 (0.005)∗∗∗ −0.133 (0.288)
Exp. in OC −0.014 (0.019) −0.040 (0.009)∗∗∗ −0.737 (0.493)
Exp. in NL squared/100 −0.019 (0.037) −0.024 (0.016) −0.398 (0.862)
Exp. in OC squared/100 0.129 (0.139) 0.165 (0.068)∗∗ 5.378 (3.592)
Control Variables
Moroccans −0.005 (0.071) −0.014 (0.031) −2.837 (1.639)∗
Surinamese 0.017 (0.096) 0.061 (0.045) 2.433 (2.301)
Antilleans −0.010 (0.091) 0.107 (0.048)∗∗ 4.388 (2.346)∗
Dutch nationality 0.000 (0.052) 0.047 (0.025)∗ −1.492 (1.298)
YSM −0.005 (0.019) −0.038 (0.008)∗∗∗ 0.264 (0.437)
YSM squared/100 0.023 (0.046) 0.024 (0.021) 0.106 (1.193)
Married 0.140 (0.063)∗∗ 0.056 (0.033)∗ 0.589 (1.536)
Number of children 0.014 (0.014) 0.001 (0.007) 0.481 (0.368)
Inflation factor 1.764 (0.825)∗∗
Contract working hours 0.014 (0.003)∗∗∗
Ethnic concentration 0.006 (0.016) 0.011 (0.009) 0.462 (0.459)
Selectivity Coefficient
Inverse Mill’s ratio −0.094 (0.361) −0.232 (0.172) −1.212 (9.379)
R squared 0.070 0.250 0.400
Adj. R squared 0.050 0.240 0.380
Num. obs. 3155 4708 3490
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
The dependent variable of column (1) is the natural logarithm of earnings. Column (2) is estimated
using a linear probability model. The dependent variable of column (3) is ISEI.
The reference for each categorical variable is as follows. Contact composition during free time: more
contact with co-ethnics. Contact composition at work: more contact with co-ethnics. Organisation
membership: no membership. Dutch proficiency: do not speak Dutch or find it very difficult.
Education in OC: no education. Education in NL: no education. Ethnicity: Turks.
The inflation factor is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in year 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2002.
Year effect, city effect and sector effect are controlled in the regressions.
For inverse Mill’s ratio, the null hypothesis is that there is no selection bias.
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Table 4.9: Longitudinal Regression Analysis of Earnings Using Lagged Social Contact
Variables, Adult Foreign-born Men
Earnings
Constant 5.280 (0.335)∗∗∗
Social Contacts
Free time: equal contact (t-1) 0.045 (0.056)
Free time: more with Dutch (t-1) 0.043 (0.069)
At work: equal contact (t-1) −0.055 (0.088)
At work: more with Dutch (t-1) 0.042 (0.082)
Ethnic org. membership (t-1) 0.148 (0.063)∗∗
Dutch org. membership (t-1) 0.106 (0.058)∗
Human Capital
Dutch: not very well (t-1) 0.010 (0.060)
Dutch: very well (t-1) 0.018 (0.069)
Primary edu. in OC −0.050 (0.057)
Lower edu. in OC 0.051 (0.067)
Intermed. edu. in OC 0.022 (0.076)
Higher edu. in OC 0.104 (0.160)
Primary edu. in NL −0.153 (0.071)∗∗
Lower edu. in NL −0.093 (0.075)
Intermed. edu. in NL 0.055 (0.075)
Higher edu. in NL 0.132 (0.086)
Exp. in NL 0.007 (0.011)
Exp. in OC −0.015 (0.021)
Exp. in NL squared/100 −0.028 (0.031)
Exp. in OC squared/100 0.046 (0.161)
Control Variables
Moroccans −0.079 (0.063)
Surinamese −0.014 (0.079)
Antilleans 0.074 (0.094)
Dutch nationality −0.035 (0.058)
YSM −0.015 (0.013)
YSM squared/100 0.049 (0.030)
Married 0.089 (0.061)
Number of children 0.029 (0.014)∗∗
Inflation factor 1.472 (0.223)∗∗∗
Contract working hours 0.017 (0.003)∗∗∗
Ethnic concentration 0.022 (0.013)∗
R2 0.306
Adj. R2 0.239
Num. obs. 568
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
The dependent variable of column (1) is the natural logarithm of earnings.
Column (2) is estimated using a logistic regression model. Contact composi-
tion during free time: more contact with co-ethnics. Contact composition
at work: more contact with co-ethnics. Organisation membership: no
membership. Dutch proficiency: do not speak Dutch or find it very difficult.
Education in OC: no education. Education in NL: no education. Ethnicity:
Turks.
The inflation factor is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in year 1991, 1994,
1998 and 2002.
City effect and sector effect are controlled in the regressions.
The variance inflation factors for social contact variables and language profi-
ciency variable are all smaller than 4, implying no multicollinearity problem.

CHAPTER 5
Look Who’s Talking: On the
Heterogeneous Returns to Foreign
Language at Work Use among
Natives and Migrants in Europe61
5.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, much attention has been focused on the labour market
consequences of acquiring the local language (see, e.g., Carliner, 1981; Chiswick,
1998). However, very little is known about the labour market returns to using a
foreign language (other than the local language) at work. European countries have
experienced an increasing pace of globalisation, which has raised the desirability of
valuing foreign language skills. Moreover, speaking a common language is an essential
element in spurring international trade (Melitz, 2008; Kim et al., 2015). It is estimated
that 11% of exporting EU small-to-medium enterprises may be losing business due
to a shortage of foreign language skills (European Commission, 2008). This problem
could be solved via two predominant channels. One is to enhance native workers’
61This chapter is based on Wang et al. (2016b).
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linguistic skills, and the other is to increase international migrants’ mobility to fill the
shortage.
Language skills are considered to be major economic assets for individuals.
Although several studies have addressed the labour market effects for native workers
of speaking a foreign language in general (Grin, 2001; Fry and Lowell, 2003; Henley and
Jones, 2005; Williams, 2011; Ginsburgh and Prieto-Rodriguez, 2011; Isphording, 2013;
Di Paolo and Tansel, 2015; Christofides and Swidinsky, 2010; Chiswick and Miller,
2016), there is rather scant evidence on the reward patterns for migrant workers. On
top of those studies, some others have extended the analysis to foreign-born workers.
Stohr (2015) found a sizable return to the occupational use of foreign languages for
immigrants in Germany, but it is restricted to a few specialized occupations. Lang
and Siniver (2009) analysed how native Israelis benefit from a knowledge of English
while immigrants with a low level of education do not. Toomet (2011) indicated a
significant wage premium for ethnic Russians who speak English at work in Estonia
and Latvia, but no wage premium for the local language. Given that native-born
workers and foreign-born workers have distinctively different backgrounds, linguistic
skills, and motives for using a foreign language at work, there is a large missing gap
in the literature about the heterogeneity of returns to foreign language use. Workers
benefit differently from using a foreign language at work, which heavily depends on
identity and perhaps other factors. This chapter aims to tackle this heterogeneity
and further shed light on how European countries could fill a shortage in foreign
language skills. Therefore, we propose the following research question: what are the
heterogeneous returns to foreign language use at work, and how do they vary with
country of residence, country of origin, workers’ skill portfolio, and the types of foreign
language used at work?
We first analyse the average returns to foreign language use at work among natives
and migrants in Europe. The acquisition and skill-maintenance of a foreign language
comes at some cost if it is not the mother tongue of the worker. It might take too
much time from the acquisition of other skills (e.g. the local language) that could have
yielded higher returns in the labour market, and therefore the acquisition of a foreign
language would not turn out to be an efficient investment in human capital (Williams,
2011). Native-born workers are already fluent in the local language, and acquiring a
foreign language does not seem to be competitive with learning the local language.
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But for foreign-born workers, foreign language use at work might have the opposite
impact, due to the limited time for human capital accumulation.
The heterogeneity of returns is associated with the type of foreign language at work
as well. Which foreign language used at work yields the highest return? This would
be the second issue we are concerned about. The returns to foreign languages in
Europe is complex, due to its multilingual environment (Hagen et al., 2006; Ginsburgh
and Weber, 2011). The demand for specific types of languages might substantially
affect the economic payoffs. Ginsburgh and Prieto-Rodriguez (2011) found that for
native workers, English skills are well rewarded in Northern Europe, while much less
rewarded in Southern Europe (for example, less than French and German in Italy, etc.).
Still, the rewards to foreign-born workers in Europe remain somewhat unknown. At
first sight, multilingual talents are always appreciated in the labour market, especially
those who master several foreign languages distinctively different from each other.
However, if the linguistic distance from one’s mother tongue is positively correlated
with the effort required to master that foreign language, is it still worthwhile for a
foreign-born worker to use a linguistically distant language at work?
Lastly, we look particularly at foreign-born workers, since their choices of the use of
foreign languages and on the use of the mother tongue at work might heavily depend
on the local language in the country of residence. Previous literature has emphasised
sufficiently the importance of acquiring the local language for immigrants.62 The local
language seems to be the biggest competing skill with the foreign language used at
work for foreign-born workers. If they are not using the mother tongue as the reported
foreign language at work, this issue would turn out to be even more complicated.
In the end, there are in total three languages involved: the local language, a foreign
language, and the mother tongue. Thus, foreign-born workers are faced with several
related questions about human capital formation and labour market returns: Is the
foreign language skill a pre-migration human capital? If not, should the worker acquire
a new foreign language? Are the worker’s language skills in the mother tongue valued
in the local labour market? Should the worker also acquire the local language for
62See Carliner (1981); McManus et al. (1983); Chiswick and Miller (2002); Dustmann and Fabbri
(2003); Chiswick and Miller (1995) for the returns in English-speaking countries, such as the US, Canada,
Australia and the UK, and see Dustmann and Van Soest (2001); Budria and Swedberg (2012); Chiswick
and Wang (2016) for the returns in non-English speaking countries, such as Germany, Spain, and the
Netherlands.
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future economic performance in the country of residence? What types of jobs should
be chosen, one that requires the local language, one that requires the mother tongue,
one that requires a non mother-tongue foreign language, or one that does not have
any language requirement?
We explore these questions using a longitudinal survey, the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP), running from 1994 to 2001. The main conclusions are
as follows. First, for native-born workers, using a foreign language at work has an
unambiguously positive impact on their earnings, and the payoffs do not differ much
with educational levels or occupations. Second, for foreign-born workers, the use
of a foreign language at work is highly complementary to the educational level, and
the use of a non mother-tongue foreign language is more rewarded (10 % on average)
in blue collar occupations than in white collar occupations, ceteris paribus. Third,
among the three types of languages, (1) English, (2) an EU official language (Danish,
Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish), (3)
non-EU official languages (Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and other languages
not specified), non-EU official languages are rewarded the most; English comes in
second place; and other EU official languages rank the lowest. This holds for both
native-born and foreign-born workers. Lastly, the local language in the country of
residence plays a significant role in affecting foreign-born workers’ choice of foreign
language use and of whether using the mother tongue at work.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 describes the data
and methodology. Section 5.3 presents the empirical analysis. Section 5.4 provides
concluding remarks, and discusses avenues for future research.
5.2 Data and Methodology
5.2.1 Description of the data
We use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) running from 1994 to 2001
(8 waves). The ECHP is a harmonised cross-national longitudinal survey conducted in
15 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and the United
Kingdom) and coordinated by EUROSTAT. It includes information on individual
5.2. Data and Methodology 113
socio-economic characteristics, employment characteristics, earnings from wages
and salary, and information on foreign language use at work.
Unfortunately, the survey has been conducted in different ways in different
countries of the ECHP. First, for Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, the
data set includes not only the ECHP respondents, but also the respondents from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the national household survey in Luxembourg
(PSELL), and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Second, Austria entered the
ECHP in 1995; Finland entered in 1996; and Sweden entered in 1997. We removed
Sweden from the empirical analysis due to substantial shares of missing values in most
of the variables.63 Third, and perhaps the most important, the variable of our primary
interest, ‘foreign language use at work’ was formulated differently after 1999. In Waves
1 to 6, the question was asked as ‘does your work involve the use of a language other
than [the official language of the country]’ and ‘what is the first foreign language
used in the current job’. We directly code the questions as a dichotomous variable
F L equal to 1 if a foreign language is used at work and 0 otherwise. In Waves 7 and 8,
however, the question was changed to ‘main language used in main work’ and ‘second
language used in main work’. If the respondent reported a language other than the
official language of the country, the variable F L is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.64 In the
Appendix, Table 5.8 presents a full list of the definitions and coding of the variables.
In total, the ECHP contains 285851 observations from the native-born and 16531
from the foreign-born, who are adult workers (ages between 20 to 64) with positive
earnings from labour market activities and non-missing information on foreign
language use at work. Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the individual
characteristics by country of birth. The native-born group and foreign-born group
do not differ much in terms of socio-demographic characteristics or distribution of
occupation. The mean average age is around 39. Almost 60% of the sample are male
workers and almost 70% reported being married. Around one-quarter of the sample
reported having completed recognised third level education. The biggest difference
occurs in earnings (16075.31 for the foreign-born and 14238.04 for the native-born)
and the percentage of foreign language users (44 % for the foreign-born and 24 % for
63See Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 in the Appendix for the structure of the unbalanced panel by year and
country.
64Both Belgium and Luxembourg have more than one official language, and we have taken this into
account.
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the native-born). The wage distribution for the foreign-born workers appears flatter
than that for the native-born workers. When we check the average earnings difference
country by country, the case that the foreign-born workers earn more than the native-
born workers only exist in four countries, namely Belgium, the United Kingdom,
Portugal and Finland. In the United Kingdom and Portugal, the foreign-born workers
are on average more educated than the native-born workers.
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Figure 5.1: The Distribution of Foreign Language Users at Work
Notes: ‘FB’ means foreign-born workers. ‘NB’ means native-born workers.
Panel (a): Codes 1 to 9 are from the International Standard Classification of Occupation, ISCO-88, 1-digit
level. 1 means legislators, senior officials and managers, 2 means professionals, 3 means technicians and
associate professionals, 4 means clerks, 5 means service workers and shop and market sales workers, 6
means skilled agricultural and fishery workers, 7 means craft and related trades workers, 8 means plant and
machine operators and assemblers, 9 means elementary occupations.
Panel (b): EU official languages include Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese,
Spanish and Swedish. Non-EU official languages include Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Russian and other
languages not specified.
Source: ECHP, 1994–2001.
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of foreign language users at work across occupa-
tions and language types. We make use of the International Standard Classification of
Occupation, ISCO-88 at the 1-digit level: (1) legislators, senior officials and managers,
(2) professionals, (3) technicians and associate professionals, (4) clerks, (5) service
workers and shop and market sales workers, (6) skilled agricultural and fishery workers,
(7) craft and related trades workers, (8) plant and machine operators and assemblers,
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Individual Characteristics, by Country of Birth
Native-Born Foreign-Born
Earnings (in PPP terms) 14238.04 16075.31
Foreign language use at work 0.24 0.44
Age 38.79 38.76
Male 0.59 0.57
Married 0.66 0.70
Household size 3.38 3.43
Children under 12 in the household 0.35 0.41
Education Levels
1. Less than second stage of secondary education 0.38 0.37
2. Second stage of secondary level education 0.38 0.36
3. Recognised third level education 0.24 0.27
Working hours per week 39.79 39.44
Occupations
1. Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.05 0.06
2. Professionals 0.13 0.13
3. Technicians and associate professionals 0.15 0.12
4. Clerks 0.15 0.11
5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers 0.12 0.12
6. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.02 0.01
7. Craft and related trades workers 0.15 0.17
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.09 0.11
9. Elementary occupations 0.10 0.14
10. Missing, armed forces, miscellaneous 0.03 0.03
Sectors
1. Agriculture 0.03 0.01
2. Industry 0.30 0.34
3. Services 0.67 0.65
Work in private sector 0.67 0.77
Full-time 0.91 0.91
Sample size: 285851 for the native-born and 16531 for the foreign-born.
Notes: The table presents the mean values of each variable. Earnings are adjusted for Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP).
Source: ECHP, 1994–2001.
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and (9) elementary occupations. Codes 1 to 5 are defined as white-collar occupations,
while codes 6 to 9 are defined as blue-collar occupations. In panel (a) of Figure 5.1, The
foreign language users who are foreign-born are more or less equally distributed across
all occupations, except for an extremely low percentage for (6) skilled agricultural and
fishery workers. Foreign language users who are native-born are, however, heavily
concentrated in the white-collar occupations. Panel (b) of Figure 1 summarises the
distribution of foreign language users across the types of language used at work. We
categorise the reported languages into three groups: English, EU official languages
(Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and
Swedish), and non-EU official languages (Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and
other languages not specified).65 Among the foreign-born workers, about 50% of
foreign language users reported the use of an EU official language (excluding English),
while the most frequently reported foreign language among the native-born workers
is English.
5.2.2 Empirical methodology
We aim to estimate the effect on earnings of mastering and using a foreign language
at work. The baseline specification is a Mincer earnings function, which estimates
the natural logarithm of annual earnings Ei t (in purchasing power parity terms) as
follows:
LnEi j t =β1Xi t +β2Z j t +β3F Li t +β4F Li t ∗Hi t +ηi +εi j t , (5.1)
where Xi t denotes individual i ’s socio-demographic characteristics, such as age and
education (the years since migration variable is only applicable to the foreign-born
sample but not to the native-born sample), Z j t denotes job j -specific characteristics,
and F Li t is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a foreign language is used at work by
individual i at time t . Hi t denote certain characteristics (either coming from Xi t , Z j t ,
or other sources), that might lead to heterogeneous returns to foreign language use.
Therefore an interaction term F Li t ∗Hi t is added, and the marginal effect on earnings
of foreign language use at work is ∂LnE/∂F L =β3+β4Hi t . ηi denotes an individual
65Needless to say, English, as a lingua franca, is a key language for gaining access to export markets
(Ku and Zussman, 2010; Crystal, 2003). Although English is an EU official language, it is singled out to
be its own category because of its role as a lingua franca in intercultural communication.
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specific effect to capture unobserved heterogeneity. εi j t denotes an i.i.d. idiosyncratic
error term.
Foreign language use and earnings may both depend on unobserved individual
aptitudes or other skills. Those with a great talent for learning languages might
be fluent in various languages and then sort themselves into jobs with intensive
requirements for foreign language skills. Due to the selection of job entry, their higher
earnings reflect not only the effect of using a foreign language, but also the reward to
fluency level. Hence there will be a positive bias in the estimate β3. Using the panel
data set, the fixed effects estimation eliminates ηi and thus eliminates this bias by
de-meaning the variables over time t .
One limitation of the ECHP is that it does not include any question on language
proficiency level, and hence we employ a linguistic similarity index between the
mother tongue and the reported foreign language to fill this gap. It would be expected
that the respondents are more likely to speak a language fluently which is similar
to the mother tongue. As linguistic distance is an obstacle to the acquisition of a
language (Isphording and Otten, 2014), the level of proficiency could be more or less
proxied by the linguistic similarity index.66 Following Adserà and Pytliková (2015), we
constructed the linguistic similarity index by counting the shared number of linguistic
family trees from Ethnologue (Lewis, 2009). The index ranges from 0 to 1. It is equal
to 0 if the two languages do not belong to any common language family. It is equal
to 0.1 if the two languages only share the most aggregated level of language family
(e.g. an Indo-European language versus a Uralic language). It is equal to 0.25 if the
two languages share the first and second linguistic tree level (e.g. Italic under the
level of Indo-European languages). It is equal to 0.45 if the two languages share three
levels of linguistic trees (e.g. Indo-European, Italic, Romance). It is equal to 0.7 if
the two languages share all four levels of linguistic trees. Lastly, it is equal to 1 if the
two languages are exactly the same. The index accumulates at an increasing weight
(0.1, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.3), in order to distinguish between within-level similarity and
between-level similarity. This linguistic similarity index enters into Hi t as one of the
dominant factors explaining the heterogeneous returns.
66Isphording (2013) uses the linguistic distance between the mother tongue and a foreign language
as the identifying instrument for language proficiency to deal with the error measurement problem of
self-reported language proficiency, as discussed in Dustmann and Van Soest (2001). The first stage of IV
estimation provides a sufficient negative partial correlation with the language proficiency indicators.
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Given the potential labour market discrimination against migrant workers (De
Beijl, 2000) and the difference between these two groups in skill distribution, we run
the regressions separately for the native-born workers and foreign-born workers.
5.3 Empirical Results
5.3.1 Econometric specification
Table 5.2 presents the average effect on earnings of foreign language use at work.
Column (1) is the OLS estimation for the whole native-born sample. Column (2) is the
OLS estimation for the whole foreign-born sample. Column (3) is the Fixed Effects
(FE) estimation for the whole native-born sample. Column (4) is the Fixed Effects (FE)
estimation for the whole foreign-born sample.
In column (1) of Table 5.2, the native-born workers who use a foreign language at
work earn 14 % more than those who do not, and the estimate is 9 % for the foreign-
born sample in column (2). However, when we control for individual fixed effects, the
returns to foreign language use at work turn out to be much smaller. In column (3),
native-born workers who use a foreign language at work earn only 2 % higher than
those who do not. For the foreign-born workers in column (4), the estimate is not
statistically significant. In either OLS or FE specifications, the return for the native-
born sample is about twice as much as that for the foreign-born sample. With regard
to the other variables, earnings increase at a decreasing rate with age (also potential
working experience), and are positively associated with the status of marriage, being
male, higher education, longer working hours per week, and full-time contract. These
conform with the previous literature on immigrants’ earnings. Note that the estimates
for years since migration (YSM) and its quadratic form conform with the observation
in Chiswick (1978) that foreign-born workers catch up with the natives’ earnings at a
decreasing rate. Note that in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.2, we control for the country
of residence as well. The estimates for the country dummies are statistically significant,
implying a substantial variation in earnings (in PPP terms) between countries. Austria,
Germany, and Luxembourg rank the highest, while Greece, Portugal and the United
Kingdom rank the lowest.
The estimates for the F L variable in the FE model are much smaller. Individual
unobserved heterogeneity indeed plays a significant role, as was stated in Williams
5.3. Empirical Results 119
Table 5.2: The Average Effect of Foreign Language Use at Work on Earnings
OLS,NB OLS,FB FE,NB FE,FB
Age 0.079∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.021)
Age squared/100 −0.083∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.014)
Married 0.080∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.000 0.013
(0.004) (0.020) (0.006) (0.029)
Male 0.251∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.020)
Edu2 0.096∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.024)
Edu3 0.209∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.033) (0.007) (0.040)
Working hours 0.000 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Private sector −0.157∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ 0.011∗ −0.012
(0.004) (0.024) (0.006) (0.031)
Full time job 0.599∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.039) (0.006) (0.028)
FL use at work 0.140∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.005) (0.022) (0.004) (0.018)
YSM 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.003) (0.018)
YSM squared/100 −0.003 −0.057∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.011)
R2 0.351 0.313 0.117 0.124
Adj. R2 0.351 0.311 0.081 0.078
Num. obs. 263748 12378 263748 12378
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered on respondent ID in columns
(1) and (2).
Column (1) is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation for the whole native-
born sample. Column (2) is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation for the
whole foreign-born sample. Columns (3) is the Fixed Effects (FE) estimation for
the whole native-born sample. Columns (4) is the Fixed Effects (FE) estimation
for the whole foreign-born sample.
The dependent variable for all columns is the natural logarithm of earnings.
The variable male is time-constant variable and hence is removed from FE
estimation.
Edu2 denotes upper secondary educational level, and Edu3 denotes tertiary
educational level. The reference categorical variable Edu1 is less than upper
secondary education. The reference categorical variable for private sector is
public sector.
Other variables not shown in the table include occupation dummies and sector
dummies. In columns (1) and (2), country of residence is also controlled.
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(2011). The OLS model explains the variation in the levels of earnings between
individuals. If there is a sizable share in the sample of both high wage earners
and low wage earners, the slope of the fitted line is highly biased upwards. The FE
model, however, explains the variation of earnings within each individual. When the
unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, the estimate becomes much smaller than
before. It turns out that the unobserved productivity differentials explain substantially
the returns to foreign language use at work in the cross-section regression analysis.
In the following subsection, we will mainly employ the FE model, and focus
particularly on a set of interaction terms to study the heterogeneous effect of foreign
language use at work.
5.3.2 Heterogeneous returns
Table 5.3 presents the fixed effects estimation of the heterogeneous returns to foreign
language use at work. Foreign language use at work is now interacted with educational
levels, a white collar occupation dummy, and the linguistic similarity index. Column
(1) is the fixed effects estimation for the whole native-born sample. Column (2)
considers English users and non foreign language users at work. Column (3) considers
EU official language users (excluding English) and non foreign language users at
work. Column (4) considers other languages users and non foreign language users at
work. Column (5) is the fixed effects estimation for the whole foreign-born sample.
Column (6) considers English users and non foreign language users at work. Column
(7) considers EU official language users (excluding English) and non foreign language
users at work. Column (8) considers other languages users and non foreign language
users at work.
We start by analysing the complementarity between foreign language use and
educational level. In column (1) of Table 5.3, the native-born workers who use a foreign
language at work earn 3 % more than those who do not, and the effect differs neither
across educational levels nor occupations. However, in column (5) of Table 5.3, the
return varies greatly across educational levels of foreign-born workers. Those foreign
language users below the upper secondary educational level earn 11 % less than those
who do not use a foreign language at work, ceteris paribus. The foreign language use
seems to pay off only for foreign-born workers above the upper secondary educational
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level.67 Foreign-born workers with an upper secondary educational diploma earn
2 %(=−11 %+13 %) more than those who do not use a foreign language at work, ceteris
paribus. Additionally, foreign-born workers with a tertiary educational diploma earn
7 %(=−11 %+18 %) more than those who do not use a foreign language at work, ceteris
paribus.
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Figure 5.2: Hypothetical Workers Described in Columns (1) and (5) of Table 5.3
Notes: ‘BlueCollar’ means working in blue collar occupations. ‘WhiteCollar’ means working in white collar
occupations. According to ISCO-88, 1 digit level, codes 1 to 5 are defined as white-collar occupations,
while codes 6 to 9 are defined as blue-collar occupations. Educational level 1 is less than upper secondary
education, educational level 2 is upper secondary diploma, and education level 3 is tertiary diploma. We
use the sample mean of earnings (in PPP terms) of Danish workers who are in the lowest educated group
and who do not use a foreign language at work as the base earnings, respectively for the foreign-born and
the native-born group.
Source: Authors’ calculation using the coefficients in columns (1) and (5) of Table 5.3.
Figure 5.2 summarises six hypothetical workers described in columns (1) and (5) of
Table 5.3. We use the sample mean of earnings (in PPP terms) of Danish workers who
are in the lowest educated group and who do not use a foreign language at work as the
base earnings, respectively for the foreign-born and the native-born group.68 Panel (a)
67We calculate the marginal effect of using a foreign language at work with the following formula
(take the Edu2 group for example): ∂LnE/∂F L =βF L+βF L∗E du2, where βF L is the estimated coefficient
for F L, and βF L∗E du2 is the estimated coefficient for F L∗E du2.
68We tried this with all countries. The choice of country would only affect the initial earnings gap
between the foreign-born workers and native-born workers, which will be reflected in the scale of the
Y axis. It dose not affect the complementarity relation in the figure.
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shows that the earnings growth curve with respect to the educational level is quite flat.
Using a foreign language at work shifts the earnings a level up at a fixed percentage of
increase on average. In contrast, panel (b) shows that the complementarity between
foreign language use and educational level is much stronger among the foreign-born
workers. Foreign language use at work complements being highly educated. The
lowest educated group earns significantly less if they reported using a foreign language
at work. The compulsory requirement of foreign language skills crowds out workers’
time for other human capital accumulation that could have yielded higher returns in
the labour market.
We also find that different language types yield unequal returns. Comparing
columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table 5.3, the return to using English is rather moderate, and
is consistent with the estimate of the average effect in column (1). Using an EU official
language (excluding English) seems to be the least rewarded. Using non-EU official
languages (such as Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian) as the foreign language
at work yields the highest returns (more than 10%), but only in a certain group. The
result could be well explained by the labour supply side of foreign language skills. Due
to the geographical proximity of European countries and language education at a very
early age, a European native-born worker on average has the capability of speaking
two to three European languages, which makes this skill relatively less well paid in the
labour market. The reward to English is slightly higher, most probably because of its
significant role in international trade and affairs. Non-EU official language skills are
rather scarce in the European labour market, and these languages are not required in
the European schooling system. If the respondent ever reported using it at work, it is
most likely because of the job rather than for other casual reasons. Therefore, the high
demand in the market and the professional level of native-born workers make these
language skills highly rewarded. When we compare columns (6), (7) and (8) of Table
5.3, the returns to the three language types unanimously exhibit a complementarity
with the educational level. Similar to what we have found for the native-born workers,
non-EU official languages are rewarded the most; English comes in second place; and
other EU official languages rank the lowest.
With regard to the interaction term F L∗LS (between MT and FL)69, we conclude
from columns (1) and (5) of Table 5.3 that there are distinctively different reward
69LS denotes linguistic similarity, MT denotes mother tongue, and FL denotes the foreign language
used at work.
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patterns for native-born workers and foreign-born workers. Native-born workers are
better paid when the foreign language used is linguistically distant from their mother
tongue (which is also the local language of the country). This seems to be an argument
reinforcing the previous finding on the high returns to other EU official languages.
Non-EU official languages are linguistically distant from any EU language, and hence
this statistically negative coefficient (−4 %) is most likely to be driven by the high wage-
earners who master a non-EU official language skill. In contrast, foreign-born workers
are better paid when the foreign language used is linguistically close to their mother
tongue. Given that 55 % of the workers in the foreign born sample are born outside the
12 original member states in the European Community (Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and
the United Kingdom), the statistically positive coefficient (9 %) is likely to be driven by
the substantial share of foreign language users using a non-EU official language which
is close to their mother tongue. In addition, we propose proficiency level as a second
tentative explanation. Assuming that workers speak a foreign language more fluently
if it is linguistically closer to their mother tongue, proficiency would then lead to a
positive wage premium. Admitting the imperfectness of this measure, we hope the
claim can be tested in future research with more information regarding proficiency.
5.3.3 Does the local language matter?
This subsection is restricted to foreign-born workers. We are going to analyse the
ambiguous relation between the local language, the foreign language used at work,
and the mother tongue of the foreign-born worker. Would the returns be different
for a foreign-born worker who uses the mother tongue at work? If a foreign-born
worker’s mother tongue is linguistically distant from the local language, is that worker
more inclined to use a foreign language at work? If so, is that worker more likely to
use the mother tongue? To disentangle these questions, we first look at the returns to
foreign language use at work by using the mother tongue or a non mother tongue, and
then analyse how the local language affects foreign-born workers’ choice of foreign
language use and mother tongue use at work.
Table 5.4 presents the fixed effects estimation of the returns to foreign language use
at work for foreign-born workers, distinguishing between use of the mother tongue or
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Table 5.4: Fixed Effects Estimation of the Returns to Foreign Language Use at Work for
Foreign-born Workers, by Use of Mother Tongue or Not
FB,not using MT FB,using MT
Edu (ref: < upper secondary edu.)
Edu2 0.043 (0.026) 0.057 (0.025)∗∗
Edu3 0.131 (0.046)∗∗∗ 0.093 (0.049)∗
Occ (ref: blue collar occupations)
White collar occupations 0.055 (0.031)∗ 0.069 (0.031)∗∗
FL-Related Terms
FL use at work −0.077 (0.060) −0.061 (0.042)
FL*Edu2 0.123 (0.058)∗∗ 0.102 (0.064)
FL*Edu3 0.186 (0.061)∗∗∗ 0.079 (0.101)
FL*WhiteCollar −0.101 (0.055)∗ 0.082 (0.077)
FL*LS(between MT and FL) 0.211 (0.115)∗
R2 0.139 0.132
Adj. R2 0.089 0.082
Num. obs. 9439 8691
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
In the last row of the variables, LS denotes linguistic similarity, MT denotes mother tongue,
and FL denotes foreign language.
Column (1) includes those who do not use a foreign language at work and those who uses a
non-mother-tongue language as the foreign language at work. Column (2) includes those
who do not use a foreign language at work and those who uses the mother tongue as the
foreign language at work.
The dependent variable for all columns is the natural logarithm of earnings.
Edu2 denotes upper secondary educational level, and Edu3 denotes tertiary educational
level.
Other variables not shown in the table include age and its quadratic term, marital status,
working hours, sector dummies, private sector dummy, job contract type, years since
migration (YSM) and its quadratic term.
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not. Column (1) includes those who do not use a foreign language at work and those
who use a non mother tongue as the foreign language at work. Column (2) includes
those who do not use a foreign language at work and those who uses the mother
tongue as the foreign language at work. Note that F L∗LS (the interaction between
MT and FL) is removed in the second column because the linguistic similarity index
variable takes the value 1 for all observations.
Columns (1) and (2) shows that foreign-born workers are only rewarded when
they use a non mother-tongue foreign language at work. The magnitudes of the
coefficients for F L, F L∗E du2, and F L∗E du3 are comparable with those in column
(4) of Table 5.3. The coefficient for the interaction term F L∗W hi teCol l ar becomes
statistically significant, implying that a non mother-tongue foreign language yields
higher returns in blue collar occupations than in white collar occupations, ceteris
paribus. In column (2) of Table 5.4, none of the coefficients for the FL-related terms
are statistically significant. When foreign-born workers use a foreign language at work,
not only is the foreign language skill itself valued, but also the potential benefit from
the ability to speak another language (no matter whether they use the mother tongue
or not at work).
Next we investigate how the local language plays a role in foreign language use.
Table 5.5 presents the logistic regression models of the choice of FL use and the
choice of using the mother tongue for foreign-born workers. Column (1) is the logistic
regression model for the whole foreign-born sample. Column (2) is the logistic model
for all foreign language users in the whole foreign-born sample. The dependent
variable in column (1) is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the respondent reported
using a foreign language at work and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in column
(2) is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the respondent reported using the mother
tongue as the foreign language at work and 0 if using a non mother-tongue. We omit
other individual characteristics and only focus on the linguistic similarity between the
mother tongue and the local language.
We interpret the results of these logistic regression models using the odds ratio.
The odds ratio is expected to change by exp(biδ) for a change of δ in variable xi , ceteris
paribus.
Pr (Y = 1|X = {xi +δ, x−i })
Pr (Y = 1|X = {xi , x−i })
= exp(biδ), (5.2)
where bi is the estimated coefficient for variable xi in the logistic regression model.
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Table 5.5: Logistic Regression Models of FL Use Choice and Mother-tongue Language
Use Choice for Foreign-born Workers
Use foreign language Use mother tongue as FL
LS (between MT and LL) −0.274 (0.112)∗∗ −3.184 (0.218)∗∗∗
Edu2 0.549 (0.110)∗∗∗ −1.159 (0.236)∗∗∗
Edu3 1.597 (0.121)∗∗∗ −2.127 (0.265)∗∗∗
Num. obs. 7461 2367
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.460
L.R. 815.833 938.997
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
In the first row of the variables, LS denotes linguistic similarity, MT denotes mother tongue,
and LL denotes local language.
Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered on respondent ID.
Column (1) is the logistic regression model for the whole foreign-born sample. Column
(2) is the logistic model for all foreign language users in the whole foreign-born sample.
The dependent variable in column (1) is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a respondent
reported using a foreign language at work and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable in column (2) is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if a respondent
reported using the mother tongue as the foreign language at work and 0 if using a non-
mother-tongue language.
Other variables not shown in the table include age and its quadratic term, marital status,
gender, and years since migration (YSM).
In column (1) of Table 5.5, the coefficients for higher educational levels are
statistically significant and positive. The odds ratio of using at least one foreign
language at work is 1.73 times greater for a foreign-born worker with an upper
secondary diploma, relative to a worker with less education. The odds ratio of
using at least one foreign language at work is 4.94 times greater for a foreign-born
worker with a tertiary diploma. More highly educated people are more likely to be
capable of using foreign languages at work, either because sufficient human capital
has already been accumulated or due to their quickness at acquiring a new language.
The coefficient for LS (the interaction between MT and LL)70 is statistically significant
and negative, implying that foreign-born workers have lower probabilities of using a
foreign language at work if the mother tongue and the local language are very similar.
70MT denotes mother tongue, and LL denotes local language.
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Consider the example of a German working in the Netherlands, who might be quite
capable of using Dutch at work.
In column (2) of Table 5.5, the analysis is done on the subsample of foreign
language users at work. The coefficients for higher educational levels are statistically
significant and negative, implying that more highly educated workers who use a
foreign language at work have much lower probabilities of using their mother tongue
as the foreign language. Also, among those foreign language users, they have lower
probabilities of using the mother tongue as the foreign language at work if the mother
tongue and the local language are very similar. This conforms with the two possible
examples, of a German working in the Netherlands using English as the foreign
language, and a Japanese working in the Netherlands using their mother tongue
as the foreign language. Analytically, if the linguistic similarity index changes from 0
to 0.4571, the odds ratio of foreign language use will decrease to 0.24 times its original
odds ratio.
From the demand side of the labour market, the result would indicate that
companies employ foreign-born workers who are fluent in a relatively scarce language.
A foreign language which is linguistically distant from the local language is extremely
helpful at spurring trade and cross-country business. In such a case, the company
would directly hire foreign-born workers who are capable of speaking a linguistically
distant language (very likely their mother tongue), and hence the chances of using a
foreign language at work and using the mother tongue as the foreign language become
much higher. It is also possible to interpret the result from the supply side of language
skills. If we assume that a foreign-born worker makes it a priority to acquire the local
language upon arrival at the destination country, the difficulty level squeezes that
worker’s time for learning other languages. Such a worker could only use the mother
tongue as the foreign language at work. A different foreign-born worker whose mother
tongue is close to the local language would then have much more time available for
other human capital accumulation, and hence we observe a lower probability of using
the mother tongue as the foreign language at work.
71German and Dutch share three levels of linguistic trees and hence their index is 0.45; Japanese
and Dutch do not share any linguistic trees, and hence their index is 0.
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5.3.4 Other sources of heterogeneity
In this subsection, some subgroup analyses are implemented to further test the
heterogeneity of the returns to foreign language use at work. First, we remove
occupation controls to test whether the returns are underestimated due to the pre-
requisite of foreign language skills in a specific occupation. As mentioned both in
Ginsburgh and Prieto-Rodriguez (2011); Isphording (2013), knowing a foreign language
skill might lead workers to a specific occupation associated with higher wages, and
workers whose qualifications other than those foreign language skills are the same will
sort into other occupations with lower wages. In this way, foreign language skills have
both a direct and indirect effect on earnings via choice of occupation. Second, gender
issues arise for a variety of reasons: the lower labour force participation rate of women,
the greater talent of women for language learning, etc. Therefore we divide the sample
into males and females to test whether there is a gender difference in the returns.
Third, we create the subsample of those respondents who have ever changed jobs,
and explore the interaction effect of ever having changed jobs and foreign language
use at work. This is to test whether workers are able to move to positions that match
their foreign language skills and are well paid. If workers are quite free in choosing a
job or choosing whether to use a foreign language or not, will job change enhance the
returns to foreign language use at work?
In the Appendix, Table 5.9 removes the occupation controls from the main specifi-
cation. If the returns to foreign language use were mediated through the channel of
occupation choice, our main estimates in Table 5.3 would be underestimated. The
estimate for the foreign-born sample increases very slightly (from 1.1 % to 1.3 %),
but is still statistically insignificant. The mediating channel does not seem to play
a substantial role here. Table 5.10 separates the sample into males and females.72
For the foreign-born sample, the returns to foreign language use at work are even
higher for educated women than for educated men: 69 % of foreign-born women
work in white collar occupations (close to the share for native-born women, 79 %),
and the foreign language skills at work are likely to be valued among the foreign-
born sample for the diversity of foreign-born workers’ linguistic skills. Table 5.11
72See Ginsburgh and Prieto-Rodriguez (2013) for a country-level analysis of the gender difference in
returns to foreign language use at work.
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considers the effect of ever having changed jobs on foreign language use at work.
Only respondents who have ever changed jobs are included in the subsample, with
all waves available. The marginal effect of ever having changed jobs on earnings is
∂LnE/∂JobC hang e =βJobC hang e +βF L∗JobC hang e . For those foreign language users,
we found that native-born workers have significantly higher earnings after job changes
(3 %). For foreign-born workers, this wage premium is independent of whether they
have ever switched jobs or not. Having changed jobs only enhances earnings for
native-born workers but not for foreign-born workers. We speculate that most of
the native-born workers’ job changes are related to linguistic skills (e.g. switching
to another foreign language with higher returns), while this is not the case for the
foreign-born workers.
5.4 Conclusion
There are different patterns of the payoff of foreign language use at work for natives
and migrants in Europe. In this chapter, we employed ECHP data running from
1994 to 2001, and focused on the heterogeneity between native-born and foreign-
born workers, the language types used at work, and the role of the local language
in the returns. We further considered other types of heterogeneity by dealing with
occupation controls, gender differences, and job switching behaviour. The main
conclusions are as follows.
First, native-born workers earn an unambiguously positive bonus (3 % on average)
from using a foreign language at work, ceteris paribus. The effect is, however, ambigu-
ous for foreign-born workers. Foreign language use at work is highly complementary
with educational level. It only incurs wage premiums for workers who have at least
an upper secondary diploma. For less educated workers, the foreign language users
earn much less (−11 % on average) than those who do not use a foreign language at
work, ceteris paribus. Consider a waitress in a Dutch restaurant, who is only capable
of serving in English. She would be likely to be paid more if she learns Dutch, having
then many more job choices.
Second, linguistically distant foreign language skills are highly valued in the
European labour market in general, both for native-born and foreign-born workers.
Among the three types of languages, (1) English, (2) an EU official language (Danish,
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Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish), (3)
non-EU official languages (Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and other languages
not specified), non-EU official languages are rewarded the most; English comes in
second place; and EU official languages rank the lowest. For companies who wish to
expand their business with faraway countries or increase the exporting/importing
shares of their products, non-EU official languages are needed the most. As children
start to learn English and other EU official languages at a rather early age, these other
two types of languages are paid relatively less.
Third, for foreign-born workers, the use at work of a foreign language which is
not their mother tongue is much more rewarded (10 % on average) in blue collar
occupations than in white collar occupations, ceteris paribus. This could be heavily
driven by the scarcity of foreign language endowments among workers in blue collar
occupations, and to some extent explain the higher shares of foreign language users
in blue collar occupations among foreign-born workers compared to native-born
workers. Another explanation is that the service workers and shop and market
sales workers are included in the blue collar occupations. Clearly speaking multiple
languages is an advantage at work, as they could approach a wider range of customers.
Fourth, for foreign-born workers, using the mother tongue as the foreign language
at work does not increase earnings. This implies the importance to foreign-born
workers of acquiring an additional foreign language. Except for the case that the
employers need exactly the mother tongue of a worker, which is linguistically distant
from the local language and is in high demand, the use of the mother tongue at work
does not have a statistically significant impact on earnings. Multilingualism is valued
in the labour market. Consider the cases where numerous multinational corporations
implement an international recruitment and rotation plan. For example, a law firm
hires a Chinese lawyer who speaks English. It is actually aiming at both the English
language skills to communicate with colleagues at work and the Chinese language
skills to communicate with Chinese clients. Employers are paying not only for the
foreign language to be itself used at work, but also the potential benefit of the worker’s
mother tongue.
Fifth, the ambiguous relations between the local language, the foreign language at
work, and the mother tongue, has been investigated. When the local language and
the mother tongue of the foreign-born worker are very similar, the chance of using
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a foreign language at work decreases, and so does the chance of using the mother
tongue as the foreign language at work. The linguistic distance between the mother
tongue and the local language makes it an obstacle for acquiring the local language.
This might have two consequences. Foreign-born workers choose not to acquire the
local language due to its difficulty, instead opting to use a foreign language at work.
Alternatively, the foreign-born workers choose to acquire the local language despite
its difficulty. The large amount of time spent acquiring the local language crowds
out time for learning other foreign language skills, and hence the probability of using
the mother tongue (if needed) as the foreign language at work increases. There is a
straightforward substitution between acquiring the local language and acquiring a
foreign language.
This study has provided a detailed analysis of how native-born and foreign-born
workers benefit from foreign language use at work, which is highly relevant to the
EU’s language policy. Acquiring a foreign language skill is not always a worthwhile
investment for foreign-born workers, especially for the low-educated group. This
is of great relevance for framing immigrant economic assimilation policies. In
addition, non-EU official languages (e.g., Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian)
have gained importance with the enlargement of the set of trade partners of the
European countries, and Europe is still in great need of international migrants to
fill the shortage of these linguistic skills.73 Furthermore, there is no straightforward
answer to whether the foreign-born workers should acquire the local language or
acquire a foreign language. The returns to the two types of human capital need to
be carefully assessed in dependence on the specific country. The intended duration
of migration also affects the decision, as migrants have little incentive to invest in
acquiring the local language if it will not be used in the long term. Nevertheless, the
intended duration might be an endogenous decision itself, in response to expected
future earnings at the destination.
On a final note, due to complications involving the mother tongue, the local
language, and the foreign language at work, we provide implications for the future
development of language acquisition theory. The conventional language acquisition
model (Lazear, 1999; Chiswick and Miller, 1995) could be extended by introducing
73The returns to the use of a foreign language at work vary across regions to a great extent (Beblavý
et al., 2016; Ginsburgh and Prieto-Rodriguez, 2011).
5.4. Conclusion 133
multidimensional linguistic skills.74 As we have observed in some Nordic countries,
the prevalence of the use of English among the native inhabitants has actually
prevented migrants from acquiring the local language. Speaking a foreign language
suffices in daily routines and even the job requirements in the local labour market. In
further research, it remains an interesting topic in the context of Europe to investigate
the deterring effect on migrant workers of local language proficiency on foreign
language proficiency at work, or the other way round.
74Ginsburgh et al. (2005) is one example. It looks at the optimal sets of official languages that depend
on society’s sensitivity against disenfranchisement and comprehensiveness of the chosen language
regime.
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Appendix
Table 5.6: The Structure of the Unbalanced Panel for the Native-born Adult Workers
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Austria 0 2728 2616 2595 2444 2339 2202 2140
Belgium 2809 2648 2534 0 0 0 2101 1949
Denmark 2964 2873 2627 2476 2296 2227 2234 2208
Finland 0 0 3804 3710 3530 3441 2940 2880
France 5007 5024 5029 4638 4654 4398 4281 4302
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 4553 3875
Greece 2902 2626 2422 2414 2268 2099 2156 2301
Ireland 3099 2719 2423 2340 2219 1958 1634 1578
Italy 5476 5245 5103 5027 4690 4513 4338 4289
Luxembourg 539 517 507 0 0 0 1431 1385
Netherlands 4074 3843 3928 4244 4251 4287 1005 0
Portugal 3858 3883 3830 4042 4048 4091 3674 4128
Spain 4688 4158 4008 4005 3933 3949 3973 4085
United Kingdom 4161 3551 2982 0 0 0 0 0
Sample size: 285851.
Notes: Austria entered the survey in year 1995. Finland entered the
survey in year 1996. For Belgium (1997–1999), Germany (1994–1999),
Luxembourg (1997–1999), the Netherlands (2001), and the United
Kingdom (1997–2001), the questions on foreign language use are not
included.
Source: ECHP, 1994–2001.
5.4. Conclusion 135
Table 5.7: The Structure of the Unbalanced Panel for the Foreign-born Adult Workers
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Austria 0 247 218 198 183 159 141 135
Belgium 269 239 217 0 0 0 154 127
Denmark 84 82 82 81 66 60 60 62
Finland 0 0 123 131 113 115 88 97
France 526 495 446 377 328 300 271 260
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 1049 872
Greece 165 138 124 115 123 98 105 111
Ireland 168 151 124 123 107 86 78 68
Italy 123 127 122 120 104 96 96 92
Luxembourg 406 373 352 0 0 0 935 1096
Netherlands 41 50 45 52 51 58 18 0
Portugal 122 126 119 136 129 140 134 151
Spain 87 78 70 61 64 56 65 74
United Kingdom 315 222 167 0 0 0 0 0
Sample size: 16531.
Notes: Austria entered the survey in year 1995. Finland entered the
survey in year 1996. For Belgium (1997–1999), Germany (1994–1999),
Luxembourg (1997–1999), the Netherlands (2001), and the United
Kingdom (1997–2001), the questions on foreign language use are not
included.
Source: ECHP, 1994–2001.
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Table 5.8: The Definitions and Coding of the Variables in the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP)
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
Foreign-born ‘Migration trajectory’.
0-Born in the country of present residence;
1-Born abroad.
The information on this question was not
available for Germany, part of Luxembourg
and part of the Netherlands, so we have
used other questions (year of arrival and
citizenship) to supplement this variable.
Earnings in purchasing ‘Regular wage and salary earnings (amount
power parity terms in national currency)’.
The amount reported is divided by the
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). For France
and Finland, the earnings are in gross
terms.
Foreign language use ‘Does your work involve the use of a
at work language other than [the official language
of the country]?’ (Wave 1–6)
‘Main language used in main work’ and
‘second language used in main work’.
(Wave 7–8)
0-No; 1-Yes.
In Wave 7 and 8, if the respondent
reported a language other than the official
language of the country, the variable is
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. For Spain,
‘main foreign language’ and ‘second
foreign language’ was asked instead.
Reported foreign ‘First foreign language used in current
Continued on next page
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Table 5.8 – continued from previous page
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
language job’. (Wave 1–6)
‘Main language used used in main work’.
(Wave 7–8)
1-English; 2-EU official languages (Danish,
Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian,
Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and Swedish);
3-non-EU official languages (Arabic, Chinese,
Japanese, and other languages not specified).
In Wave 7 and 8, only those reported
languages that are not the official
language of the country are included.
For Spain, ‘main foreign language’ was asked
instead.
Years since migration ‘Year of arrival in the country of present
residence’. (only applicable to foreign-born
respondents)
We calculate years since migration using the
formula Y ear Sur ve yed −Y ear Ar r i val +1.
Foreign country of ‘Code of foreign country of birth’. (only
birth applicable to foreign-born respondents)
1-Community; 2-Other foreign country.
Community includes the 12 original member
states in the European Community (Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, the United Kingdom).
Mother tongue ‘Mother tongue’.(only applicable to foreign-born
respondents)
1-English; 2-French; 3-German; 4-Spanish;
5-Italian; 6-Dutch; 7-Portuguese; 8-Danish;
Continued on next page
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Table 5.8 – continued from previous page
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
9-Greek; 10-Finnish; 11-Swedish; 12-Russian;
13-Japanese; 14-Chinese; 15-Arabic;
16-Other modern languages.
The question was only asked in Wave 7 and 8.
The time-invariant feature of this information
makes it possible to supplement the previous
6 waves for traceable respondent.
Age ‘Age of the individual’. (in years)
Male ‘Sex of the individual’.
0-Female; 1-Male.
Married ‘Present marital status’.
0-Divorced, widowed and never married;
1-Married, separated.
Household size ‘Total number of household members at present’.
Education ‘Highest level of general or higher education
completed’.
1-Less than second stage of secondary education
(ISCED 0-2); 2-Second stage of secondary level
education (ISCED 3); 3-Recognised third level
education (ISCED 5-7).
Working hours ‘Total number of hours working per week (in
main and additional jobs)’.
Occupation ‘Occupation in current job, i.e. principal
activity performed’.
1-legislators, senior officials and managers;
2-professionals; 3-technicians and associate
professionals; 4-clerks; 5-service workers and
shop and market sales workers; 6-skilled
agricultural and fishery workers; 7-craft and
related trades workers; 8-plant and machine
Continued on next page
5.4. Conclusion 139
Table 5.8 – continued from previous page
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
operators and assemblers; 9-elementary
occupations; 10-Missing, armed forces,
miscellaneous.
Sector ‘Main activity of the local unit of the
business or organisation in current job’.
1-Agriculture; 2-Industry; 3-Services.
Job type ‘Current job in private or public sector?’
0-Public sector; 1-Private sector.
Contract type ‘Main job: full-time/part time’.
0-Part time; 1-Full-time.
140 Chapter 5. Heterogeneous Returns to Foreign Language Use at Work
Table 5.9: Other Sources of Heterogeneity: Without Occupation Controls
NB,without OCC FB,without OCC
FL use at work 0.018 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.013 (0.018)
R2 0.116 0.122
Adj. R2 0.081 0.078
Num. obs. 263748 12378
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Column (1) is the fixed effects estimation for the whole native-born sample.
Column (2) is the fixed effects estimation for the whole foreign-born sample.
The dependent variable for all columns is the natural logarithm of earnings.
Other variables not shown in the table include age and its quadratic term, mar-
ital status, educational levels, working hours, sector dummies, private sector
dummy, job contract type, years since migration (YSM) and its quadratic term.
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Table 5.10: Other Sources of Heterogeneity: Gender Differences
NB,male NB,female FB,male FB,female
Edu (ref: < upper secondary edu.)
Edu2 0.017∗∗∗ 0.009 0.024 0.072∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.033) (0.040)
Edu3 0.044∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.067 0.208∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.060) (0.064)
Occ (ref: blue collar occupations)
White collar occupations −0.006 0.026∗∗∗ 0.050 0.077∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.039) (0.045)
FL-Related Terms
FL use at work 0.030∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.007 −0.117∗
(0.011) (0.024) (0.039) (0.060)
FL*Edu2 −0.021∗∗ 0.009 0.096∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.048) (0.070)
FL*Edu3 −0.006 0.015 0.146∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.061) (0.071)
FL*WhiteCollar 0.002 0.005 −0.102∗∗ −0.074
(0.011) (0.023) (0.049) (0.069)
R2 0.109 0.127 0.121 0.137
Adj. R2 0.077 0.087 0.077 0.086
Num. obs. 155500 108248 6992 5386
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Column (1) is the fixed effects estimation for the whole male native-born sample. Column (2) is the
fixed effects estimation for the whole female native-born sample. Column (3) is the fixed effects
estimation for the whole male foreign-born sample. Column (4) is the fixed effects estimation for
the whole female foreign-born sample.
The dependent variable for all columns is the natural logarithm of earnings.
Edu2 denotes upper secondary educational level, and Edu3 denotes tertiary educational level.
Other variables not shown in the table include age and its quadratic term, marital status, working
hours, sector dummies, private sector dummy, job contract type, years since migration (YSM) and its
quadratic term.
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Table 5.11: Other Sources of Heterogeneity: Job Change
NB,job switchers FB,job switchers
Edu (ref: < upper secondary edu.)
Edu2 0.006 (0.006) 0.077 (0.041)∗
Edu3 0.004 (0.010) 0.116 (0.062)∗
Occ (ref: blue collar occupations)
White collar occupations 0.005 (0.006) 0.031 (0.033)
FL-Related Terms
FL use at work −0.009 (0.013) −0.141 (0.054)∗∗∗
FL*Edu2 0.002 (0.011) 0.115 (0.060)∗
FL*Edu3 0.005 (0.012) 0.210 (0.068)∗∗∗
FL*WhiteCollar 0.014 (0.012) −0.007 (0.052)
JobChange 0.003 (0.003) 0.017 (0.020)
FL*JobChange 0.031 (0.007)∗∗∗ −0.033 (0.035)
R2 0.092 0.159
Adj. R2 0.067 0.107
Num. obs. 86564 2844
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Columns (1) is the fixed effects estimation for a subsample of native-born workers who
have switched jobs at some point. Columns (2) is the fixed effects estimation for a subsam-
ple of foreign-born workers who have switched jobs at some point.
The dependent variable for all columns is the natural logarithm of earnings.
Other variables not shown in the table include age and its quadratic term, marital status,
working hours, sector dummies, private sector dummy, job contract type, years since
migration (YSM) and its quadratic term.
CHAPTER 6
Retrospect and Prospect
Migration is nowadays high on the political agenda due to the recent influx of migrants
from the Middle East and North African countries to Europe. The alarming rise of
migrant arrivals has created substantial challenges for Europe, which is facing an
urgent need to address the economic assimilation and social integration of migrants.
This long-term process requires gradual steps, given that many migrants are very
different from the natives in terms of the economic situation, the skills, and the
cultural background. It is, therefore, essential to know how strong the barriers are for
incoming migrants to live in a new country, and what the economic payoffs are once
they have overcome the barriers.
This dissertation aims to address the importance of culture, networks and language
for the economic position of migrants. In the four interrelated chapters, I investigate
the research question by sequentially tackling the following issues: how does the
regional cultural composition attract migrants? How do migrants start developing
their social networks upon arrival at the destination? How do their social network help
them to improve their economic performance? And how do their linguistic skills (in
both local and foreign languages) assist in their economic performance?
6.1 Main Results and Policy Relevance
Chapter 2 looks at the impact of culture in the context of European regions. It treats
culture as a collective identity based on certain norms, values and beliefs. Using
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an attitudinal survey, this study quantifies the average cultural distance between
the native group and the immigrant group for each NUTS1 region in Europe as
a compositional amenity. It was found that regions with the cultural distance
between the native group and the immigrant group being too large are less attractive
for incoming migrants to locate. This result has clear implications for urban and
regional planning and mixed neighbourhood construction, if a region or city aims
to attract more migrants. So, enhancing cultural integration is important. This is
not opposed to increasing cultural diversity, since cultural diversity is measured
by the index of fractionalisation. The thrust of integration is to make immigrants
know a country’s social norms, principles, and institutions, and to make natives
understand the immigrants more, which reduces the risk of social conflicts due
to misunderstanding. In this way, the cultural gap between the native group and
the immigrant group becomes smaller, and thus this kind of cultural atmosphere
increases regional attractiveness. A variety of instruments could be used to facilitate
cultural integration, such as lessons of culture in the host society, language trainings,
education, public infrastructure to deepen contacts between immigrants and natives,
etc.
Chapter 3 looks at social network formation at the time of entry. Theoretically,
I find that, when the local labour market is doing well, it becomes relatively easy
for migrants to get a job within their co-ethnic networks, and they therefore choose
not to incur the cost of developing native networks (e.g. learning the local language).
Therefore, migrants spontaneously assimilate less into the host society in good times of
the economy at the destination country. The empirical analysis for immigrants in the
Netherlands conforms with the propositions from the theoretical model. This result
directly bears implication for the intensity of integration policy at specific business
cycles of the local economy. Migrants would most likely to make native contacts for
job opportunities when the local economy is in a recession, since they are under a
huge economic pressure. In good times of the local economy, however, they tend to
make co-ethnic contacts. This correlation between the local economic indicator and
migrants’ network composition hints on the impact of the network composition on
numerous outcomes of individual, and even on future intergenerational mobility. If
the locked-in effect of the co-ethnic network is strong, the clustering of co-ethnics
would further leads to persistent residential segregation and makes income inequality
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worse. To avoid this, instruments to encourage developing native networks should
be implemented. Similar with the implications for cultural integration, enhancing
migrants’ native networks involves policies reducing the cost of developing native
networks.
Chapter 4 complements Chapter 3 by providing an empirical analysis on immi-
grants’ economic performance in the Netherlands. The conclusions are clear-cut. It
confirms the importance of the native networks and local language proficiency for all
aspects of migrants’ economic performance: earnings, employment and occupational
status. However, the effects of co-ethnic networks are ambiguous. Again, the results
shed light on promoting immigrants to acquire Dutch language proficiency and to
develop more native networks in the Netherlands. In the meantime, they support the
higher requirements on the acquisition of a language level and integration practice
tests for getting citizenship in the Netherlands.
Finally, Chapter 5 studies the returns to language skills among workers across
Europe. First and foremost, it was found that the migrants’ economic payoffs to
foreign language skill (other than the local language skill) are highly complementary to
their educational level. Only migrant workers above the upper secondary educational
level earn a wage premium from using a foreign language at work. There thus seems
to be a significant trade-off between investment in acquiring local language skills
and in acquiring a foreign language skill for work, especially for the lower-educated
migrant workers. Second, with regard to language types, non-EU official languages are
rewarded most; English comes in the second place; and other EU official languages
rank the lowest. This directly reflects the scarcity of language skills among potential
workers in the European labour market. Workers who could use a foreign language
that is distant from EU official languages are highly likely to be using their mother
tongue at work, given that natives would find it too difficult to learn. Third, the local
language plays a significant role in affecting the foreign-born workers’ choice on the
use of foreign languages and on the use of the mother tongue at work. The linguistic
distance between the mother tongue and the local language makes it an obstacle for
acquiring the local language. This increases the foreign-born workers’ chances of
using a foreign language at work, if they choose not to acquire the local language due
to its difficulty. To sum up, these results are particularly relevant for Europe, where
inter-country trade flows are quite high. The heterogeneity in the returns to foreign
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language skills across educational level provides insight both to the companies and
to the migrants themselves. If companies in Europe aim at recruiting multilingual
talents, setting a threshold for educational levels or skill levels would increase the
efficiency of foreign language use at work. For lower-educated migrant workers, it
seems that acquiring the local language skill has a priority over acquiring a foreign
language skill for work. Besides, the nexus between the local language and the foreign
language deserves further attention when the linguistic distance between the mother
tongue and the local language is taken into account.
6.2 Future research
The dynamics of the regional or urban cultural composition and its continuing
attractiveness for incoming migrants is a field worth being studied. Chapter 2 studies
the regional cultural composition in a static setting, where the cross-sectional cultural
attributes of the natives and the immigrants are discussed. In reality, however, the
regional cultural composition keeps evolving, with the inflow of migrants and with
the evolution of cultural integration. Note that the world is becoming more and more
globalised. Moving between countries will likely become much easier in the future
with the sharply decreasing cost of travel. Physical barriers (such as borders, distance)
are no longer the predominant factor that prevents the labour flow. In the meantime,
more and more temporary migration behaviours take place due to the emerging trend
to move frequently for studying or working reasons. In that case, migrants might trade
their preferred cultural composition for higher productivity and wages in a specific
region. It remains interesting to study regional culture integration over time with
the pace of a region or city continuously absorbing immigrants over time. Is there a
steady-state for regional cultural composition in terms of specific values and beliefs?
And what are the evolution paths for cultural evolution?
The dynamics of social networks evolution is thus worth being studied as well.
Chapter 3 develops a static model, which investigates how migrants’ networks
are formed upon arrival at the destination. However, the evolution of network
composition might be closely correlated with the individuals’ life-cycle behaviours
and local labour market conditions. Is there a locked-in effect for immigrants who
have developed a dense co-ethnic network upon arrival? Can it cause a social status
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trap? If so, how to trigger immigrants to reach out to the native people? There are
some life-cycle behaviours that might play a role here in facilitating the formation
of the native networks, which deserves further attention. Events such as fertility,
employment, job changes and schooling of children could to a large extent affect their
network composition. In that case, how stable would the network be? And on the
meso-level, how does this contribute to social cohesion of the local society? In the
meantime, bridging this topic to the urban economic literature will supplement the
missing elements in the current model, i.e. urban amenities, housing price, cost of
living, etc. The interdependent relationship with the urban characteristics and social
interaction deserves a lot more attention, with the decreasing cost of communication,
and the increasing use of networks in job activities.
Based on language acquisition as studied in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, a promising
extension may be research on human capital investment, both regarding local
language and foreign language skills for migrants. Given the limited time for human
capital accumulation, a comparison between the economic payoffs from the local
language and another foreign language needs to be incorporated into conventional
language acquisition theory. The cost function of acquiring a specific language then
should be associated with the linguistic distance from one’s mother tongue. This has,
so far, not yet received due attention in the migration economic literature. Second,
given that the prevalence of English is quite common in some Nordic countries, it
remains interesting to investigate the deterring effect on migrant workers of foreign
language proficiency at work on local language proficiency. This might well fit the
pattern of a substantial share of high-skilled workers in Europe who use English only,
and in the meantime are well integrated into the host society. A third strand of future
research could be focused on the social benefit of acquiring the local language and
the foreign language skill. Speaking a common language for the majority reduces
the cost of communication on the meso-level, and implicitly works as a channel to
increase transactions and to promote regional economic growth. A fourth extension
is further merging current individual data with firm data, in order to provide a
more thorough analysis on the heterogeneous labour market returns to different
languages. The firm data record the specific tasks of workers, and details on the
requirements (communication, technical skills, etc). With the increasing accessibility
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to international databases nowadays, it is foreseeably a new and promising direction
in the literature.
The dissertation has clearly demonstrated that migration is in a complex way
intertwined with culture, networks, and language. Geographic proximity does not
necessarily mean cultural proximity, nor does it mean linguistic proximity. Many
precise measurements of these definitions are being developed with contributions
from economists, sociologists, geographers, linguists, etc. Many more studies still
need to be done to link them to regional economic growth or individual economic
progress. Although the aim of the research is far from an analysis of a complete range
of topics related to barriers of culture, networks, and language for migration, I hope it
generally achieved the goal in providing insights into the significant role of the barriers
and the necessity to overcome them from an economic perspective.
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English Summary
This dissertation addresses the importance of culture, networks and language for the
economic position of migrants. It tackles the following issues in a logical order: the
cultural gravity force for migrants in the choice of location, the determinants of social
network formation upon arrival at the destination country, and the economic payoffs
to their networks as well as the linguistic skills.
Chapter 2 analyses the impact of cultural composition on regional attractiveness
from the perspective of international migrant sorting behaviour on a European
regional NUTS1 level. We use an attitudinal survey to quantify cultural distances
between natives and immigrants in the region concerned, and estimate the migrants?
varying preferences for both cultural diversity and cultural distance. To account
for regional unobserved heterogeneity, our econometric analysis employed artificial
instrumental variables, as developed by Bayer et al., [2004a. An equilibrium model
of sorting in an urban housing market. NBER no. 10865]. The main conclusions are
twofold. On the one hand, cultural diversity increases regional attractiveness. On the
other hand, average cultural distance greatly weakens regional attractiveness.
Chapter 3 investigates the consequences of local labour market conditions on
immigrants’ social network formation, with an emphasis on the co-ethnic contact
and the contact with the natives. A job and residential search model is derived and
empirically tested for the case of immigrants in the Netherlands. I find that a higher
job arrival rate, and a larger wage difference between the ethnic labour market and
the host labour market, both lead to more co-ethnic network developed, less native
network developed, and the residential choice of more ethnically concentrated areas.
A paradox of economic prosperity and social integration seems to exist in the sense
that immigrants spontaneously assimilate less into host society in good times of the
economy at the destination country.
166 English Summary
Chapter 4 examines the impacts of social contacts and Dutch language proficiency
on adult foreign-born men’s earnings, employment and occupational status, using
longitudinal data on immigrants in the Netherlands for the years 1991, 1994, 1998,
2002. The main conclusions are as follows. On average, social contacts and a good
mastery of the Dutch language enhance immigrants’ economic performances. The
effects are stronger for immigrants with low-skill-transferability than for immigrants
with high-skill-transferability, and are stronger for economic migrants than for non-
economic migrants. Contact with Dutch people and Dutch organisations unambigu-
ously enhances all aspects of immigrants’ economic performance, however, we find
no evidence for a positive effect of co-ethnic contact on employment status.
Chapter 5 examines in particular the heterogeneous impacts of foreign language
use at work on earnings of both native-born workers and foreign-born workers, using
a longitudinal survey, viz. the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) running
from 1994 to 2001. Our findings are the following. First, for native-born workers, using
a foreign language at work is found to have an unambiguously positive impact on
their earnings (3 % on average). Second, for foreign-born workers, however, foreign
language use at work is highly complementary to educational level. It appears that
only workers above the upper secondary educational level earn a wage premium
from using a foreign language at work. Those foreign language users below the upper
secondary educational level earned significantly less (-11 %) than those who do not
use foreign languages at work. Third, with regard to language types, non-EU official
languages are rewarded the most; English comes in second place; and other EU official
languages rank the lowest. This holds for both native-born and foreign-born workers.
Fourth, we find that the local language plays a significant role in affecting the foreign-
born workers’ choice of the use of foreign languages and the use of the mother tongue
at work.
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